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FOREWORD 
It is my pleasure to welcome readers to the 2012 issue of the Journal of Applied Law and 
Policy (JALAP). JALAP is a double-blind refereed journal that publishes scholarly works 
on all aspects of law.  
 
JALAP was established by the Applied Law and Policy (ALAP) Area of Research Focus 
and it represents an important initiative which is central to the research endeavours of 
ALAP. All submissions have undergone a rigorous double-blind peer review and I am 
confident that readers will find the articles not only interesting and topical, but scholarly as 
well. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, I need to extend my sincere thanks to a number of people 
whose collective efforts have made this journal possible. First, in addition to all members 
of the ALAP Executive, I would like to thank my Editorial Board colleagues for their 
counsel and support. Second, I must thank all referees who assisted us with the double-
blind refereeing process. I would also like to offer my thanks to Anne Kallies for her 
exceptional work in proofreading and to David Brennan for his efforts in typesetting. 
Lastly, I need to record a special thanks to Deepa Sharma who is ALAP’s Administrative-
Coordinator whose efforts in bringing this issue to fruition are very much appreciated. 
 
I commend this issue of JALAP to all readers and ALAP looks forward to continuing to 
contribute to legal scholarship through this journal. 
 
Professor Dale Pinto 
Editor-in-Chief 
JALAP 
 
COMMUNITIES OF TAXATION AND JUSTICE 
 A COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH TO INEQUALITY AND TAXATION 
JONATHAN BARRETT∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In the light of increasing inequality in contemporary society and a crisis of confidence in 
the neoliberal policies that have principally informed Western governance in the past 30 
years, this article proposes and considers a communitarian approach to taxation. First, 
broad concepts of community and communitarianism, and basic policy considerations are 
outlined. Second, specific egalitarian proposals are sketched. Third, more radical 
communitarian proposals are floated. It is concluded that a shift in tax policy focus from 
the individual to the community could have significant social and economic benefits.     
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer published their seminal 
communitarian theses in the early 1980s,1 communitarianism constituted one of a triad of 
plausible philosophical underpinnings for democratic government.2 Narrowing the gap 
between economic outcomes was widely considered both desirable and attainable,3 and 
programmes of wealth redistribution that today might be considered chimerical constituted 
normal policy for post-war, Western governments across the political spectrum.4 As Tony 
Judt observes, ‘[b]y the early ’70s it would have appeared unthinkable to contemplate 
unravelling the social services, welfare provisions, state-funded cultural and educational 
resources and much else that people had come to take for granted’.5 However, in the 30 
year period beginning roughly in 1980,6 neoliberalism,7 which has since normalised 
                                                
∗ Associate Professor, School of Business, Open Polytechnic, New Zealand 
1  See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Duckworth, 1981); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice (Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Basic Books, 1983). 
(Other leading communitarians include Michael Oakeshott and Charles Taylor.) The authors do not 
identify themselves as ‘communitarian’; this is a description typically applied by critics. However, they 
have in common a rejection of ‘liberalism’s devaluation of community’. See Daniel Bell, 
‘Communitarianism’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/communitarianism/>.    
2  Communitarians tended to critique the progressive liberalism expounded in John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) from one flank, while Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(Blackwell, 1974) attacked from the other, libertarian flank.  
3  Different strains of communitarianism may be progressive or conservative, even totalitarian; thus Walzer 
is a ‘democratic socialist’ and Michael Oakeshott, a ‘traditional conservative’ (Michael J Sandel, 
‘Introduction’ in Michael J Sandel (ed), Liberalism and Its Critics (Basil Blackwell, 1984) 1, 10). 
Conservative communitarianism may be socially inclusive inasmuch as everyone has a place in society, 
but anti-egalitarian, see Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1992) 64-5. Modern 
communitarianism is, however, most likely to coincide with social democratic policies, because, as 
Gordon Graham, Contemporary Social Philosophy (Basil Blackwell, 1988) 54 notes, ‘individualists stress 
the importance of individual liberty and communitarians stress the importance of social justice’. In this 
article, reference to communitarianism connotes the progressivism typified by Sandel and Walzer. 
4  Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (Penguin Books, 2011) 91 notes that ‘Conservatism – not to mention the 
ideological Right – was a minority preference in the decades following World War II’.  
5  Ibid, 79.      
6  Margaret Thatcher became the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister in 1979 and Ronald Reagan was elected 
United States President in 1980. Thatcher famously claimed, ‘there is no alternative’ to neoliberalism. See 
generally, Claire Berlinksi, There Is No Alternative: Why Margaret Thatcher Matters (Basic Books, 
2008).      
7  Colin Gordon identifies neoliberalism as a totalising ideology that claims all rational conduct as a concern 
of economics: see Colin Gordon, ‘Government Rationality: an Introduction’ in Graham Burchell, Colin 
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economic individualism in everyday life, became the ‘dominant discourse’.8 And now, 
after three decades of ascendency, the consequences of neoliberal policies, including 
egregiously unequal wealth distributions and the collapse of the deregulated financial 
system,9 have intimated fracture of the neoliberal consensus.10  
Three inequality considerations that transcend ideological preference are of particular 
contemporary relevance. The effects inequality has on society and all members of that 
society are becoming better understood. Furthermore, sustained inequality has deleterious 
macro-economic and structural consequences.11 Finally, inequality has become the subject 
of increasing popular anger that democratic governments cannot ignore.12 In this context, 
equality must be brought back to the policy agenda and, it is submitted, a communitarian 
conception of taxation has much to offer the ensuing debate.  
Unlike liberalism, for which equality of opportunity is the pertinent concern,13 
communitarianism values a tendency towards equality of outcomes.14 And, whereas 
traditional tax theory focuses on the aggregate welfare of individuals,15 a communitarian 
approach to taxation starts from a rejection of ‘a mistaken prioritization of individuals over 
their communities’.16 Since, in the communitarian view, ‘the individual only becomes an 
individual or person by being part of and taking part in communal life’,17 the solidarity and 
sustainability of the taxpaying community is a principal concern.18 Furthermore, social 
justice within that community demands an egalitarian approach to outcomes. This article 
proposes and considers the idea of communities of taxation and justice. First the idea of 
‘community’ is explained and the basic communitarian tax principles established. Second, 
the contemporary significance of inequality is outlined. Third, specific tax policy measures 
consistent with communitarianism are sketched and conclusions drawn.   
                                                                                                                                  
Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect (Harvester, 1991) 1, 43. According to Jonathan Boston 
et al, Public Management: the New Zealand Model (Oxford University Press, 1996) 17, neoliberalism is 
founded on the presumptions that human behaviour is dominated by self-interest and social interactions 
are value maximising exchanges.   
8  See David Hudson and Mary Martin, ‘Narratives of Neoliberalism: The Role of Everyday Media Practices 
and the Reproduction of Dominant Ideas’ in Andreas Gofas and Colin Hay (eds), The Role of Ideas in 
Political Analysis: A Portrait of Contemporary Debates (Routledge, 2010) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033221>. 
9  See generally, Richard A Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crises of ’08 and the Descent into 
Depression (Harvard University Press, 2009).         
10  See Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Post-Washington Consensus Development after the 
Crisis’ (2011) 90(2) Foreign Affairs 45, 45-53.  
11  See generally, James K Galbraith, Inequality and Instability: A Study of the World Economy Just Before 
the Great Crisis (Oxford University Press, 2012) 148. 
12  On protest movements, including the 99%, Los Indignados and Occupy, see Geoffrey Pleyers, Alter-
Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age (Polity Press, 2010).  
13  See Rawls, above n 2, 61.    
14  Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Blackwell, 1995) 147 note, regarding 
Walzer’s idea of complex equality, ‘what is unjust about capitalist society is not so much the unequal 
distribution of money as the fact that money is able to bring its possessor goods, such as health care or 
education, that properly belong to different distributive spheres.’ Critically, then, opportunity is greatly 
determined by pre-existing and unequal patterns of distribution.     
15  See, for example, J A Mirrlees, ‘An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation’ (1971) 38(2) 
Review of Economic Studies 175, 176.  
16  Mulhall and Swift, above n 14, xi.  
17  Johan van der Walt, ‘The Relation between Law and Politics: A Communitarian Perspective’ (1993) 110 
South African Law Journal 757, 761.   
18  Emile Durkheim described social solidarity as ‘a wholly moral phenomenon’ of which law is its ‘visible 
symbol’. See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (W D Halls trans, Macmillan, 1984) 24  
[trans of: De la Division du Travail Social (first published 1893)]. 
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II. COMMUNITY AND COMMUNITARIAN TAX PRINCIPLES  
Communitarians reject the liberal principle that the wishes of individuals should be 
prioritised ahead of the flourishing of the community in which they live. As Gordon 
Graham explains, ‘on the liberal individualist view society is necessarily and essentially a 
plurality, a mere association of different views an interests … [whereas 
communitarianism] regards society as a community, and this, as the very word implies, 
means that society is in some way a unity, a single thing in which individual members are 
bound together’.19 In this part, the idea of community is discussed and basic principles for 
taxation from a communitarian perspective established.  
A. Community 
In the communitarian view, the political community precedes individual rights. Thus for 
Walzer, the welfare state is derived from membership, rather than rights, as Rawls 
proposes.20 But, if it is to be accorded priority over the individual, what is a ‘community’?   
Ferdinand Tönnies first distinguished the traditional community (Gemeinschaft) from 
an association (Gesellschaft),21 for which the principal underpinning is ‘the rational pursuit 
of individual self-interest’.22 In contrast, as Talcott Parsons explains, the Gemeinschaft:  
… is a community of fate (Schicksal). One may say that within the area of the relationship 
the parties act and are treated as a unit of solidarity. They share benefits and misfortunes in 
common, not necessarily equally, because Gemeinschaft relations perfectly well admit 
both of functional and of hierarchical differentiation. But it is the specific field of 
application of the communistic principle, to each according to his needs, from each 
according to his abilities. 23     
The national political community cannot plausibly be likened to a church congregation or 
family (typical Gemeinschaft examples) but nor can it be considered a voluntarily 
associative Gesellschaft, which people may join and leave at will, or pick and choose 
which of its rules they will comply with.24 Indeed, elements of both Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft are manifest in the nation, and so strict categorisation does not ensure 
understanding of the real nature of a particular social group. Sandel says: 
… to ask whether a particular society is a community is not simply to ask whether a large 
number of its members happen to have among their various desires the desire to associate 
with others or to promote communitarian aims – although this may be one feature of a 
community – but whether the society is itself a society of a certain kind, ordered in a 
certain way, such that community describes its basic structure and not merely the 
dispositions of persons within the structure. For a society to be a community in this strong 
sense, community must be constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants 
                                                
19  Graham, above n 3, 12.       
20  Sandel, above n 1, 10. 
21  See generally, Ferdinand Tönnies, Community & Society (Charles P Loomis, trans, Michigan State 
University Press, 1957) [trans of: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (first published 1887)].  
22  See Talcott Parsons, ‘Notes on Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft’, in Max Weber, Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization (A R Henderson and Talcott Parsons trans, William Hodge, 1947) 687 [trans of: 
Grundriss der Sozialoekonomik (first published 1911-20)]. 
23  Ibid, 688-9. 
24  Tönnies stressed the involuntary nature of the Gemeinschaft, typified by the parent-child relationship, and 
compared this with the voluntary nature of the Gesellschaft, which may be exemplified by the choice of 
becoming a shareholder (or, in older terminology, a member) of a joint stock company. One may join a 
political community by immigrating or conversely leave by emigrating and renouncing citizenship. 
However, provided the host agrees, one may voluntarily take residency of another country, but, having 
done so, is bound by the rules, and, to some extent, the traditions and customs of the new country. See 
Parsons, above n 22, 689.      
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and embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply an attribute of certain of the 
participants’ plans of life. 25 
If, then, two societies are compared, one may manifest more of the community features 
Sandel identifies, but both may, nevertheless, be properly considered communities.26  
For Sandel, ‘[Rawlsian] justice as fairness fails to take seriously our commonality’27 
and, indeed, devalues it. And so, in one sense, community is about holding feelings in 
common with others.28 However, since all human beings share many experiences and 
feelings in common,29 the expression of community lies greatly in valorising those aspects 
of our lives which we do not hold in common with others, such as a shared history and the 
practice of particular traditions. For people to positively imagine themselves members of a 
certain political community, and no other, is critical for nationhood,30 but constructing 
differences from those outside the community is equally important.31  
Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay are plausible when they argue that crises of 
‘liberalism and individualism, of Gesellschaft law and of the Gesellschaft concept of 
liberty under law … point not backward to the Gemeinschaft, or forward to the traditional 
communist utopia, but to a new and much more complex paradigm’.32 Nevertheless, 
citizens do need to think of the national political community as having some features of the 
Gemeinschaft (broadly, a discrete community of mutual support) if tax-benefit systems are 
to be sustainable. As Walzer observes, ‘distributive justice presupposes a bounded world 
within which distribution takes place … whose members distribute power to one another 
and avoid, if they possibly can, sharing it with anyone else’.33 However, the strength of 
community feeling and the sense of shared fate inevitably influences the degree of 
mutuality expected and practised in a particular society. A degree of mutual trust, which is, 
of course, challenging in spatially dispersed, multicultural societies, is also necessary. As 
Judt observes, ‘we cannot do without trust. If we truly did not trust one another, we would 
not pay taxes for our mutual support’.34 Again, the degree of mutual trust present in the 
community influences the extent of mutual provision.   
Individualism may have impacted on local community cohesion and, indeed, local 
communities themselves.35 Whether or not government actively set out to attack 
communities,36 a weakening of community-based opposition has benefitted the neoliberal 
                                                
25  Sandel, above n 1, 173. 
26  While less obviously communitarian than, say, Finland, the United States is nevertheless a distinct 
political community. Crucially, notwithstanding regional differences, particular cultural allegiances and a 
strong sentiment for individual liberty, US Americans overwhelmingly think of themselves as citizens of 
the United States. They do not think of themselves as members, for the time being, of a voluntary 
association of millions of individuals.      
27  Sandel, above n 1, 174.        
28  J A Simpson and E S C Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd, Clarendon Press, 1989) vol II, 581. 
29  See, for example, Abraham H Maslow, Motivation and Personality (first published 1954, Harper & Row, 
1970 ed) 24, 54, respectively, on the commonality of human physiological and psychological experiences, 
and the alikeness of cultures.  
30  See generally, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (Verso, 1991) on the role of imagination in forming and sustaining political communities.  
31  For a universalist critique of this form of ‘parochialism’, see Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of 
Postmodernism (Blackwell, 1996) 114-16.  
32  Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, ‘Socialism, Anarchism and Law’ in Eugene Kamenka, Robert 
Brown and Alice Erh-Soon Tay (eds), Law and Society: The Crisis in Legal Ideas (St Martin’s Press, 
1978) 48, 55.  
33  Walzer, above n 1, 31.  
34  Judt, above n 4, 32 (emphasis in original).        
35  Pierre Bourdieu asked: ‘What is neoliberalism?’ and answered: ‘A programme for destroying collective 
structures which may impede the pure market logic.’ See Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Essence of 
Neoliberalism’, Le Monde Diplomatique (online English edition), 8 December 1998 
<http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu>.     
36  Neoliberal government certainly sought to weaken trade unions, which are typically a manifestation of 
communitarian fraternity: see, for example, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (NZ). Thatcher’s 
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project.37 However, even in the face of globalisation, it is not plausible to argue that the 
national community does not or should not exist.38 Indeed, Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson observe that, as the body of international law necessary for globalisation has 
proliferated, nation states have become increasingly important as ‘agencies that create and 
abide by the law’.39 And so, the national community remains intact, if only as a ‘hollow 
state’,40 but sentiments of community are less obvious. Through, inter alia, the promotion 
of equality, communitarian taxation may contribute to a resurgence of a sentiment of 
commonality and community.    
B. Communitarian Tax Principles 
Gesellschaft-oriented taxation would aim to maximise aggregate utility of individuals, 
whereas Gemeinschaft-oriented taxation would expect everyone to contribute according to 
their means and receive according to their needs. The resulting taxes could be similar,41 
although this seems improbable.42 While practicable communitarian tax policy would tend 
toward Gemeinschaft taxation, focus would lie with how the community of taxation and 
justice might be sustained. The sustainability and solidarity of the tax community would be 
a pre-eminent concern, rather than, say, individuals’ expectations to amass wealth, 
because, without a political community, individual flourishing cannot be realised.43 Since 
the political community is one of shared fate, every member of that community should be 
included in the tax contribution system. As Warren Buffett, the billionaire supporter of 
fairer taxes argues, government needs ‘to get serious about shared sacrifice’.44 At the 
social extremes, neither the ‘dole bludger’ nor the ‘billionaire rentier’ should be permitted 
to free ride.45 However, in the context of increasing inequality, particular attention must be 
paid to full inclusion of the wealthy in the tax community. These basic principles are 
applied in the discussion of policy in part IV. 
                                                                                                                                  
aphorism – there is no such thing as society – demonstrated disdain for social groups other than the 
Gesellschaft. See generally, John Kingdom, No Such Things as Society?: Individualism and Community 
(Open University Press, 1992).        
37  See, for example, Bruce Jesson, Only Their Purpose Is Mad (Dunmore Press, 1999) on the impact of 
neoliberal policies on local communities in New Zealand.     
38  For a counter argument, see Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional 
Economies (Free Press, 1995). 
39  Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities of Governance (Polity, 1996) 194.  
40  See Christopher Pollitt, New Perspectives on Public Services: Place and Technology (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 3. 
41  In accordance with traditional marginal utility theory, progressive income taxes are justifiable because the 
higher earner suffers less ‘pain’ when taxed at higher rates on higher slices of income: see, for example, 
Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 30. This scheme not only maximises aggregate utility (or, at least, minimises 
aggregate disutility) but also ensures taxpayers contribute according to their ability to pay – a 
communitarian expectation.     
42  Richard Epstein argues that, in a Lockean scheme, progressive income tax is morally indefensible because 
it interferes with individuals’ entitlements to property and their preferences, whereas consumption or 
benefit-based taxes, which do not disrupt choices, are justifiable notwithstanding their regression. See 
Richard A Epstein, ‘Taxation in a Lockean World’ in Jules Coleman and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds), 
Philosophy and Law (Basil Blackwell, 1987) 49, 49-74.  
43  Walzer, above n 1, 63. 
44  Warren E Buffett, ‘Stop Coddling the Super-Rich’, The New York Times (New York), 15 August 2011, 
A21.  
45  Gareth Morgan and Susan Guthrie, Tax and Welfare: The Big Kahuna (Public Interest Publishing, 2011) 
123 observe: ‘We hear a heap about the abuse of the welfare system by “bludgers”: we don’t hear quite so 
much about tax dodging by the wealthiest in our society, and you certainly don’t see politicians rushing in 
to jump on it.’  
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III. EQUALITY  
Equality is a critical concern for communitarian taxation, and, to some extent, 
contemporary inequality justifies a shift from liberal to communitarian taxation. In short, if 
neoliberal policies were in fact ‘raising all boats’ and social injustice were not rampant or 
the financial system not imperilled,46 beyond ideology, the grounds for preferring 
communitarian taxation would be diminished. In this part, a history of attitudes to equality 
of outcomes is outlined and then the major consequences of contemporary inequality are 
identified.      
A. A Brief History of Egalitarianism  
Plato, whose Republic is generally considered to be the first expression of 
communitarianism,47 proposed minimum and maximum levels of wealth so that the most 
affluent class in society should own no more than four times the wealth of the poorest 
class.48 Aristotle argued that all features of the social product should be allocated 
proportionately,49 and Christian teaching has, at times, condemned inequality of wealth.50 
The Levellers sought material equality in 17th century England,51 and the French 
revolutionary, François-Noël ‘Gracchus’ Babeuf argued there should be ‘neither rich nor 
poor’ and ‘every individual has an equal right to property’.52 However, Samuel 
Fleischacker concludes that these ideas were anomalous and a belief in wealth 
redistribution, as opposed to the alleviation of absolute poverty,53 only became commonly 
held – and not without strong opposition – in the 19th century.54  
For almost a century after the introduction of the United Kingdom’s progressive estate 
duty in the mid-1890s,55 the principle of wealth redistribution informed tax-benefit 
systems around the world.56 In the period of unprecedented economic growth following the 
Second World War, ideologically diverse governments pursued highly progressive tax 
policies.57 Whereas left-wing governments sought material equality as a matter of 
                                                
46  Galbraith, above n 11, 148, observes: ‘A rising tide may lift all boats, but recent business cycles have been 
more like waves, whereby certain sectors and areas ride the peals before crashing to the shore. This is a 
sign, surely not of the social evil of inequality per se but of the instability of bubble economies, closely 
associated with inequality of money, wealth and power, for which we now pay a fearsome price.’  
47  Graham, above n 3, 12. For an argument on the malignity of Plato’s influence, see Karl Popper, The Open 
Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato (Princeton University Press, 1971). 
48  Plato, ‘Laws’ in John M Cooper and D S Hutchinson (eds), Complete Works (Hackett Publishing, 1997) 
1318, 1425.  
49  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (David Ross trans, Oxford University Press, 2009) 85.   
50  See generally, Richard Harries, Is There a Gospel for the Rich? The Christian in a Capitalist World 
(Mowbray, 1993). Despite the Catholic Church’s consistent promotion of the idea of human dignity, 
Michael Rosen demonstrates how a sea-change occurred in Catholic thinking between the end of the 19th 
century and the second half of the 20th century, from anti-egalitarianism to support for the fullest political, 
social and economic equality. See Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Harvard University 
Press, 2012) 47-54.    
51  See J F C Harrison, The Common People: A History from the Norman Conquest to the Present (Flamingo, 
1984) 195.  
52  John Hall Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (Macmillan, 1951) 656-7.  
53  See, for example, the Poor Law Act 1601, 43 Eliz I, c 2. 
54  Samuel Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice (Harvard University Press, 2004) 54. 
55  See Finance Act 1894, 57 & 58 Vict, c 30. Cf the Death Duties Act 1909 (NZ) and Estate Duty Act 1914 
(Cth).   
56  Friedrich Hayek cites a narrowly defeated 1956 proposal of India’s National Planning Commission to 
limit all personal income to a ceiling equivalent to US$6 300 per annum and salary income to US$4 300 
per annum. See F A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition (first published 1960, 
University of Chicago Press, 2011 ed) 449.   
57  J K Galbraith, The Affluent Society (first published 1958, Pelican Books, 1968 ed) 76-7 argues that despite 
high nominal rates, progressive income tax was undermined by loopholes and inequities. He considered 
the turn of the twentieth century to be the peak period for political concerns about inequality. Ibid, 77.  
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principle,58 the same motivation cannot be imputed to conservative governments. 
Equalisation of wealth could not possibly be maintained, and nor would it have obvious 
social value,59 but the consensus held that the consequences of inequality were sufficient 
(for governments that did not necessarily support equality of outcomes) to outweigh other 
considerations.60 Reflected in ‘cuts in benefits, tighter eligibility rules and a shift away 
from progressive income tax’,61 in the past 30 years, governments have tended to show 
less concern for equality of outcomes, which have, indeed, diverged.62  
B. Consequences 
Ricardo Tejada observes that inequality is an economic issue ‘because sustained inequality 
hinders growth’.63 Furthermore, ‘[r]estoring equality by redistributing income from the 
rich to the poor … could also help save the global economy from another major crisis’.64 
However, in the communitarian view, it is the ethical and social issues arising from 
inequality that matter most. A socio-economic system that perpetuates grossly unequal 
outcomes seems incompatible with the fundamental and universal ethical principle of 
                                                
58  It should be noted, however, that the Fourth Labour government (1984-1990), under the premiership of 
David Lange for the greatest period, introduced controversial neoliberal reforms to New Zealand. See 
Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Penguin Books, 2003) 495.  
59  See, for example, G W F Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (T M Knox trans, Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 165 [trans of: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (first published 1820)] and David 
Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerns for the Principles of Morals 
(Clarendon Press, 3rd ed, 1974) 194. As John Kenneth Galbraith, The Good Society: The Humane Agenda 
(Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996) 59 observes, equalisation of wealth is simply ‘not consistent with either human 
nature or the character and motivation of the modern economic system’.       
60  For right-wing governments, a feared consequence of gross material inequality might be the poor voting 
for extremist parties or revolting. The neoliberal revolution coincided with the fall of the Soviet bloc: 
afterwards there was no more communist threat to buy off. See generally, Francis Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man (Simon and Schuster, 1992). 
61  Angel Gurría, ‘Tackling Inequality’ (2011) 287(Q4) OECD Observer 3. Top marginal statutory rates of 
personal tax have been cut substantially in the past 30 years. The OECD average top marginal statutory 
rate of personal income tax was 66.8 per cent in 1981, and 41.7 per cent in 2010. See Alan Carter and 
Stephen Matthews ‘How Tax Can Reduce Inequality’ (2012) 290-291(Q1-Q2) OECD Observer 
(online)<http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3782/How_tax_can_reduce_inequality.html
>. 
A preference for regressive consumption taxes during this period should also be noted.  
62  Ricardo Tejada, ‘Inequality: Why the Struggle Matters’ (2011) 287 (Q4) OECD Observer 7, 7 records 
that, in the United States, CEO salaries are 183 times the average salary, and, even in the traditionally 
egalitarian Netherlands, the ratio is 85:1. In 2008, the top 0.1 per cent accounted for close to 3 per cent of 
total pre-tax incomes in Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand’s Gini coefficient moved from 0.27 in 
1985 to 0.33 in 2008. See OECD, An Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main 
Findings (2011) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/12/49499779.pdf>.  
 (The Gini index is between 0 and 100. A value of 0 represents absolute equality and 100 absolute 
inequality. See Tatyana B Soubbotina, Beyond Economic Growth: an Introduction to Economic 
Development (The World Bank, 2nd ed, 2004) 30). 
New Zealanders elected a National-led government in 2008, which has introduced regressive tax 
policies, notably lowering income tax rates and increasing the goods and services tax (GST) rate. 
Inequality can, therefore, be expected to have become more pronounced. However, it should be noted that 
the highest marginal income tax rate for individuals of 38 per cent introduced by the previous Labour-led 
government, by inviting high income professionals to channel their incomes through lower taxed trusts, 
may have vitiated the equality goal of the top rate. Cf Galbraith, above n 59, 76-7.         
63  Tejada, above n 62, 7.    
64  Michael Kumhof and Romain Rancière, ‘Leveraging Inequality’ (2010) 47 
(4) Finance & Development 28, 31. While it may appear unlikely that World Bank researchers, such as 
Kumhof and Rancière, should be giving such pre-neoliberal prescriptions, the global financial crisis has 
led to a resurgence in collectivist thinking. As Brendan Edgeworth notes, the United Kingdom ‘which 
paradoxically avoided nationalising banks even when in the post-war period it embarked on a policy of 
nationalisation of most of the other commanding heights of the economy, has now done so with 
unprecedented and unimaginable vigour’. See Brendan Edgeworth, ‘“New Property”, the Contracting 
State and the Global Financial Crisis’ in Lyria Bennett Moses, Brendan Edgeworth and Cathy Sherry 
(eds), Property and Security: Selected Essays (Law Book Co, 2010) 49, 64.  
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respect for human dignity.65 Furthermore, sustained disparities in economic outcomes 
among individuals have significant social consequences.66 Angel Gurría, Secretary-
General of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
observes, ‘[w]idening disparities weaken the structures that hold our societies together and 
threaten our ability to move forward’.67 This lack of social cohesion affects rich and poor 
alike. The more equal a society, the greater the trust,68 and vice versa. In more equal 
societies, ‘people are more likely to trust each other, measures of social capital and social 
cohesion show that community life is stronger, and homicide rates and levels of violence 
are consistently lower’.69 
Democracy, which is founded on the general parity of human attributes among 
citizens,70 implies some guarantee of a share in the social product if only to ensure 
participation.71 When people are engaged in a struggle for day-to-day survival, they cannot 
meaningfully participate in community decision-making, and democracy becomes an 
abstraction for them, rather than a lived experience. Conversely, if particular individuals 
are able to corner a disproportionate share of the common wealth,72 and, thereby, unduly 
influence democratic decision-making,73 democracy itself may be imperilled. Decisions 
about taxation and spending and ‘the kind of society which we want as citizens and as a 
community, and how the resources available to us are spent to achieve this’ are critical 
                                                
65  See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 November 1976) at 49; the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171(entered into force 23 
March 1976) at 52. Australia and New Zealand have signed both covenants, along with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 
(10 December 1948).       
66  See generally, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost 
Always Do Better (Allen Lane, 2009).  
67  Gurría, above n 61, 3.  
68  Judt, above n 4, 66. See also Francis Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 
(Hamish Hamilton, 1995).  
69 The World Bank, World Development Report 2003: Dynamic Development in a Sustainable World (The 
World Bank, 2003) 184. For a fuller discussion of the grounds for countering inequality through taxation, 
see Jonathan Barrett, ‘Progressive Income Taxation Revisited’ (2008) 14(4) New Zealand Journal of Tax 
Law and Policy 457, 467-9. 
70  See, for example, Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989) 97.   
71  On the social element of citizenship, as proposed by Thomas Marshall, see Robert Pinker, ‘Introduction’ 
in T H Marshall, The Right to Welfare and Other Essays (Heinemann Educational Books, 1981) 1, 10.  
72  John Locke argued that a person gains property rights in things held in common by applying labour, but 
added the proviso ‘at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others’. See John Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government (J M Dent & Sons, first published 1690, 1990 ed) 129. As Graham, above n 
3, 71 notes, this proviso greatly undermines Nozick’s theory of justice in relation to historical property 
holdings.   
73  See generally, The Leveson Inquiry, Leveson Inquiry: Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press (ongoing) 
<http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/about/>. 
   Mining magnate Gina Rinehart’s increased share in Fairfax Media has raised concerns about the 
influence of the wealthy on political discourse. See, for example, ‘Richest Aussie Stuns Media as She 
Buys Big Stake in Fairfax’, The New Zealand Herald (Auckland), 2 February 2012, B3.  
  Michael Rafferty reportedly argues that ‘the moguls’ efforts to sway public opinion are a disturbing 
development that has led to the country’s greatest alliance of political and economic power ‘in 70 or 80 
years’ … ‘They are very interested in advancing and protecting their interests by political power, whether 
it is investing in the media or being involved in the political parties.’ See Jonathan Pearlman, ‘The 
Australian Mining Magnate at the Top of the Rich List’, The Telegraph (online), 23 May 2012 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/9285055/The-Australian-mining-magnate-at-
the-top-of-the-rich-list.html>. Looking back to the early 20th century, Galbraith, above n 57, 81 observes: 
‘When the rich were not only rich but had the power that went with active direction of corporate 
enterprise, it is obvious that wealth had more perquisites than now. For the same reasons, it stirred more 
antagonism.’ 
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democratic choices:74 no members of the community should be excluded or, conversely, 
over-represented in this debate.  
IV. POLICY RESPONSES 
If arguments for greater equality of wealth outcomes are plausible, how can tax policy 
contribute to more equal outcomes? In this part, certain tax policy responses consistent 
with communitarian aspirations are considered. It is argued that tax policy based on the 
idea of community solidarity and sustainability may be more effective in delivering 
equality than approaches that focus on individuals in aggregate. 
A. Inclusion 
Inclusion of those marginalised in society by improving their socio-economic conditions 
and thereby helping to level opportunities is a progressive imperative. As elements of a 
comprehensive egalitarian programme,75 progressive tax and benefit policies are a proven 
way of countering inequality.76 Practical challenges arise when, say, negative income taxes 
are introduced. Discussing the particular New Zealand tax-transfer system, but, it seems 
likely, making generalisable observations,77 Gareth Morgan and Susan Guthrie argue that 
barriers are put ‘in the way of people properly contributing to the redistributive system … 
the targeted transfer system applying to those of working age imposes significant financial 
costs on those who attempt to cross the divide between a transfer and low-paid work’.78 
However, these are remediable technical problems that do not present grounds for 
opposing measures that have proven effective in promoting social inclusion. Sight must not 
be lost of the conditions of the needy, but society has two margins, and attention is 
increasingly being paid to the upper margin, popularly identified as the ‘1%’.79 If a 
community is to enjoy egalitarian tax-benefits, then, the wealthy will need to pay more tax, 
willingly or not.80 However, they too may be practically excluded since the ‘tax system 
permits tax “minimisation” for those with wealth so, for these people, self-interest dictates 
putting resources out of the reach of the tax net as much as possible’.81 
                                                
74  Fabian Society, Paying for Progress: A New Politics of Tax for Public Spending (Fabian Society, 2000) 
150. 
75  Wilkinson and Pickett, above n 66, 271 include: ‘minimum wage legislation, education policies, the 
management of the national economy, whether unemployment is kept to low levels, whether different rates 
of VAT [GST] and sales tax are applied to necessaries and luxuries, provision of public services, pension 
policies, inheritance taxes, negative income tax, basic income policies, child support, progressive 
consumption taxes, industrial policy, retraining schemes’.      
76  Galbraith, above n 57, 65. However, for examples of tax policies having unpredicted or nil effects, see 
Joseph E Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (W W Norton & Co, 3rd ed, 2000) 701-2.  
77  See, for example, Mike Brewer, Tom Clark and Michal Myck, ‘Credit Where It’s Due? An Assessment of 
the New Tax Credits’ (Commentary 86, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2001) 39 on the ‘clash of benefits’ 
problems the United Kingdom’s Working Families Tax Credit scheme faced, despite using taper rates.  
78  Morgan and Guthrie, above n 45, 131. Although, with a GST rate of 15 per cent and no merit good 
concessions, the poor make a disproportionate consumption tax contribution in New Zealand, whatever 
their income tax contribution.  
79  See, for example, Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%’, Vanity Fair (New York), 1 May 
2011, 126. 
80  £4.5-£7 billion is thought to be lost annually from the United Kingdom treasury as a consequence of 
individual tax avoidance. See Hannah Furness, ‘Comedian Jimmy Carr Has £3.3 million in Jersey Tax 
Avoidance Scheme’, The Telegraph (online), 19 June 2012 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/9341117/Comedian-Jimmy-Carr-has-3.3m-in-Jersey-tax-avoidance-
scheme.html>.   
81  Morgan and Guthrie, above n 45, 131. 
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B. Including the Wealthy 
François Hollande, France’s socialist president, is said to despise the rich.82 Political 
advantage may, no doubt, be gained from castigating the wealthy in times of economic 
hardship, but it is, perhaps, the great weakness and danger of communitarianism that social 
solidarity may be bolstered by demonising minorities, whether they are distinguishable on 
the grounds of their gender, ethnic origin, religious persuasion or economic standing.83 But 
envy of the wealthy cannot inform justifiable tax policy.84 Indeed, in a growth-oriented 
economic system, the lawful amassing of individual wealth through productive enterprise 
may be socially valuable, particularly if new jobs are created.85 Erecting tax barriers to the 
pursuit of individual wealth may disadvantage the community as a whole – although not all 
wealthy people are job-creating entrepreneurs.86 And so, while individual wealth cannot be 
considered inherently ‘bad’,87 conversely, there is no reason to view individual wealth as 
an inherent social ‘good’, and no plausible reasons exist to privilege the accumulation of 
individual wealth through tax concessions.88 Furthermore, because even the most 
imaginative individual is reliant on others and society in general (by, inter alia, granting 
patents and other intellectual property rights) to accumulate wealth from invention and 
enterprise, ‘a general system of redistribution’ should be established ‘which will ensure 
that everyone gets a reasonably fair share of the rewards that living in society brings’.89 
This consideration becomes particularly pressing when wealth creators are not willing to 
share the fruits of their good fortune with those who most obviously contribute to 
generating that wealth, such as employees,90 and less with the community as a whole.91 
Taxation of the wealthy raises particular tax policy issues.92 To illustrate these issues, it 
is useful to construct the crude categories of ‘mobile wealthy’ and ‘situated wealthy’.  
1. Mobile Wealthy  
                                                
82  Emma Rowley, Anna White and Helia Ebrahimi, ‘High Earners Say Au Revoir to France’ The Telegraph 
(online), 13 May 2012 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/9261905/High-earners-say-au-
revoir-to-France.html>. 
83  Kamenka and Tay, above n 32, 53 cite the Salem witch trials and Hester Prynne’s victimisation in 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter as examples of communitarian oppression of women. However, 
such oppression may be challenged in a human rights state: see above n 65 on the basic human rights 
commitments of Australia and New Zealand.     
84  See Nozick, above n 2, 239-46 for an argument that egalitarianism springs from envy.  
85  Research shows that, in the United States, new firms, as a class, add an average of three million jobs in 
their first year. See Tim Kane, ‘The Importance of Startups in Job Creation and Job Destruction’ 
(Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth, 2010) 2 
<www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/firm_formation_importance_of_startups.pdf>. 
86  See Pearlman, above n 73 for Rafferty’s characterisation of Rinehart and other mining magnates as 
‘rentiers’.   
87  Judt, above n 4, 39 reports: ‘Relative indifference to wealth for its own sake was widespread in the 
postwar decades.’    
88  Capital gains, which disproportionately accrue to the wealthy, are typically taxed at lower rates than other 
manifestations of comprehensive income under the Haig-Simon model. See R M Haig, ‘The Concept of 
Income’, in R M Haig, T S Adams and T R Powell (eds), The Federal Income Tax (first published 1921, 
BiblioBazaar, 2009 ed) 7 and H C Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a 
Problem of Fiscal Policy (University of Chicago Press, 1938) 50.    
89  Graham, above n 3, 76 (emphasis in original). 
90  For example, the revenue of Apple Stores divided by the number of sales staff is US$473 000. In 2011, 
Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO received stock grants worth more than US$570 million, whereas the average 
sales clerk’s annual salary was US$25 000. See David Segal, ‘Apple’s Retail Army, Long on Loyalty but 
Short on Pay’, The New York Times (New York), 23 June 2012, A1.   
91  See, for example, Charles Duhigg and David Kochieniewski, ‘How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes’, 
The New York Times (New York), 29 April 2012, A1.    
92  For example, typical optimal tax analysis models support regression for the highest earning taxpayers. See, 
Lawrence Zelanak and Kemper Moreland, ‘Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax 
Analysis?’ (1999) 53 Tax Law Review 51, 54-5.      
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The Rolling Stones were neither the first nor last artistes to prefer living abroad to the 
obligations of tax residency, but their decampment for France in 1971 remains a cause 
célèbre. Mark Blake records that because ‘high earners were required to pay 83 per cent 
tax on earned income and 98 per cent on income yet to be earned … the band moved to 
France, where they could live for more than a year without paying taxes’.93 In a move 
widely interpreted as an attempt to avoid tax once Facebook was listed,94 Eduardo Saverin, 
a co-founder of the firm, renounced his United States citizenship.95 (The United States is 
the only OECD member to base tax liability principally on citizenship.) After the election 
of the Hollande government, which, during its electoral campaign, promised to implement 
a 75 per cent marginal income tax rate on earnings over €1 million, many bankers are said 
to have left Paris for London.96 These examples indicate that some of the mobile wealthy 
will simply become tax exiles if nominal income tax rates are too high.97   
Tax exile not only generates considerable rhetoric, it may also mask other reasons for 
leaving a political community. Since the Rolling Stones had entered into notoriously 
disadvantageous record deals,98 it is possible that they received proportionately little 
unearned income but were simply ‘weary from the pressure of English authorities’.99 
Saverin, a Brazilian native, has denied he was motivated by tax concerns and besides 
would have been subject to an exit tax on his unrealised capital gains.100 Likewise, French 
bankers may not be simply reacting to a higher marginal tax rate (which they might easily 
mitigate) but rather fulfilling the Tiebout hypothesis.101 Being a far larger and more 
sophisticated financial centre than Paris, London offers better career opportunities for 
bankers, but also has a sizeable French expatriate community, as well as francophone 
schools and professional services.102      
People should in principle be free to move between political communities, although, 
due to immigration restrictions, it is typically easier to leave a political community than it 
is to join another one. However, emigrants may be expected to account for the wealth they 
have accumulated as a consequence of their membership of the particular community, such 
as unrealised capital gains, before they leave. Furthermore, their exit from the political 
community must be genuine: for example, despite being knighted and maintaining 
                                                
93  Mark Blake, ‘Soul Survivors’, Mojo (United Kingdom), January 2012, 71, 75. Guitarist Keith Richard has 
said ‘[w]e left England because we’d be paying 98 cents on the dollar (sic)’: see Andy Serwer, Julia 
Boorstin and Ann Harrington, ‘Inside the Rolling Stones Inc.’, Fortune (New York), 30 September 2002, 
58. In fact the highest rate of United Kingdom income tax in 1971 was 75 per cent, with a 15 per cent 
surcharge applying to unearned (investment income): see Tom Clark and Andrew Dilnot, ‘Long-Term 
Trends in British Taxation and Spending’ (Briefing Note No 25,The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 
2002) 7-8. The highest income tax rate was increased to 83 per cent by a Labour government elected in 
1974. The investment surcharge was not abolished until 1984, despite a radical Conservative government 
being elected in 1979. Ibid.  
94  See Quentin Hardy, ‘A Facebook Founder Renounces His U.S. Citizenship’, The New York Times 
(online), 11 May 2012 <http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/a-facebook-founder-renounces-his-u-s-
citizenship/?pagemode=print>. 
95  United States Government, Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate (2012) 
<https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/04/30/2012-10274/quarterly-publication-of-individuals-
who-have-chosen-to-expatriate>. 
 For a morality tale about a Singapore-resident lawyer renouncing his United States citizenship to gain tax 
benefits, see Paul Theroux, ‘Bottom Feeders’ in The Collected Short Novels (Penguin, 1998) 335, 335-82.  
96  Rowley et al, above n 82.   
97  Of course, for every prominent tax exile, countless other examples of tax residents can be adduced. Thus, 
whereas the Rolling Stones decamped, the far wealthier Beatle, Paul McCartney, did not.    
98  Blake, above n 93, 75.  
99  Bill Janovitz, Exile on Main Street (Continuum, 2005) 12.       
100  Hardy, above n 94. Presumably sophisticated legislation and practice would enable the revenue service to 
take into account the net present value of shares in a soon to be listed company.  
101  C M Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64 Journal of Political Economy 416, 424 
proposed that, under conditions of full ‘consumer-voter’ mobility, people will select areas to live, based on 
their preferences for local government revenue-expenditure patterns.  
102  Rowley et al, above n 82.   
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significant property in England, singer Mick Jagger has not been a British tax resident 
since 1971.103  
Morgan and Guthrie cite an 1891 pamphlet that claimed New Zealand’s progressive 
land tax was causing capitalists to leave the country in droves.104 Such scare mongering 
seems both perennial and implausible, and, as Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett 
observe, we should not ‘allow ourselves to be cowed by the idea that higher taxes on the 
rich will lead to their mass emigration and economic catastrophe. We know that more 
egalitarian countries live well, with high living standards and much better social 
environments.’105       
2. Situated Wealthy 
Once issues of exit and exile from the community are dealt with, mobility is not in itself a 
significant concern. Almost everyone has, at a particular point in time, a place they think 
of as home, often expressed in the passport they hold,106 and, rather than technical rules 
about days spent in a place, that allegiance is likely to provide a reliable indicator of tax 
nexus to a particular taxing jurisdiction. Political communities invariably have a physical 
locus and so extraterritoriality – floating above the situated community but taking its 
benefits – cannot be sanctioned. Zygmunt Bauman cautions that it is ‘the progressive 
breakdown in communication’ between elites within countries and the rest that really 
matters.107 The increasing cosmopolitanism of major cities indubitably challenges 
sentiments of commonality and community,108 but it is inequality, disproportionate 
political power at the disposal of the wealthy, and the increasingly different ontologies of 
those at the opposite margins of society that tear at the fabric of the political community. In 
short, the very rich may be ‘different from you and me’,109 and may require special 
attention if they are to be fully included in the tax community.  
C. Specific Policy Responses 
In order to optimise tax policy and law in promoting equality, government should, first, 
strictly enforce existing tax laws, particularly general avoidance and anti-evasion 
provisions, and optimise international cooperation to eliminate tax havens. Individual 
revenue services have achieved significant successes in combating evasion and avoidance 
schemes,110 but, despite cooperative measures to share information,111 James Henry of the 
                                                
103  These facts were highlighted when Jagger was revealed to have been one of the many wealthy Britons 
whose private residencies were owned by offshore companies, an arrangement that had the effect of 
avoiding substantial stamp duty. See Nicholas Hellen, ‘UK Chancellery to Clamp Down on Properties 
Held in Offshore Companies’, The Australian (online), 18 March 2012 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/uk-chancellery-to-clamp-down-on-properties-held-in-
offshore-companies/story-fnb64oi6-1226303010710>.   
104  Morgan and Guthrie, above n 45, 69. 
105  Wilkinson and Pickett, above n 66, 269. 
106  Blake, above n 93, 73 observes that ‘the Stones drifted across the globe, cocooned by fame, drugs and 
flattery’, but they still carried British passports. Taxation based on citizenship, as practised in the United 
States, presents itself as a sensible policy choice.    
107  Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: the Human Consequences (Columbia University Press, 1998) 3.  
108  For a discussion of the distinction between the demos, with its common political goals, and the globalised 
cosmopolis, see Daniele Archibugi, ‘Demos and Cosmopolis’ (2002) 13 New Left Review 24, 24-38. 
109  F Scott Fitzgerald wrote: ‘Let me tell you about the very rich. They are different from you and me.’ See F 
Scott Fitzgerald, ‘The Rich Boy’ in The Short Stories of F. Scott Fitzgerald, Volume 1: The Diamond as 
Big as the Ritz and Other Stories (first published 1926, Penguin, 1980 ed) 139, 139.  
110  See, for example, Australian Tax Office, Project Wickenby (2012) 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.aspx?doc=/content/00220075.htm&alias=wickenby>. But see 
Rob O’Neill, ‘Aussie Taxman Targets NZ Trusts’, Sunday Star-Times (New Zealand), 20 May 2012, D5 
on how a lack of co-ordination between Australian and New Zealand law has allowed New Zealand to 
become a tax haven for certain wealthy Australians.  
111  For a summary of measures adopted by the OECD, see OECD, The Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (2012) 
<http://wwww.oecd.org/ctp/harmfultaxpractices/43757434.pdf>.  
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Tax Justice Network concludes that between US$21 and 32 trillion remains invested 
‘virtually tax-free’ in offshore centres.112 Second, existing taxes may be made fairer by 
closing loopholes, removing concessions and raising marginal rates.113 Third, changes may 
be made to the mix of taxes within the overall tax system, for example, placing greater 
reliance on progressive income tax, rather than regressive goods and services tax (GST). 
Fourth, new taxes, notably on wealth or capital transfers might be introduced.114 Finally, 
radical shifts in taxation could be considered.   
Before considering radical alternatives, the issue of higher marginal income tax rates 
deserves comment. Gurría notes ‘[t]ax rates on high earners have declined in recent years, 
so raising marginal tax rates on high incomes would help restore fairness and generate 
some extra revenue as well’.115 The highest rate of marginal tax may have symbolic 
value,116 but is not necessarily indicative of tax actually paid. A tax base without loopholes 
and concessions may be more effective in promoting equality than a porous base coupled 
with high nominal rates.117 Furthermore, conventional arguments against high marginal 
rates on the grounds of behavioural responses may be adduced.118 Hence the increasing 
interest in minimum income tax rates for those with high incomes,119 and asset taxes.120        
Alan Carter and Stephen Matthews argue that ‘the most growth-friendly approach 
would be to reduce tax-induced distortions that harm growth … raising more revenues 
from recurrent taxes on residential property … while setting taxes to reduce environmental 
damage and correct other externalities’.121 This proposal signals a move from taxing 
people’s activities (income earning and consumption) to taxing the things in the 
community that people own. Intimating a still more radical shift in policy from taxing 
individual effort and enterprise (income tax) to property (capital taxes),122 Morgan and 
Guthrie propose taxing capital itself – land, buildings, plant and equipment and so forth, 
‘given how easy the income generated by capital can be hidden and shifted offshore’.123 
This proposal is squarely in the communitarian field and echoes earlier progressivism that 
privileged the community over the individual. As commentators have observed, in 
Progress and Poverty,124 Henry George, ‘a great progressive of the late nineteenth 
century’,125 argued for a single land tax on ‘unearned increment’ because ‘the value of the 
                                                
112  James S Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited: New Estimates for “Missing” Global Private Wealth, 
Income, Inequality and Lost Taxes (Tax Justice Network, 2012) 5. Henry critically notes that funds held 
secretly offshore are ‘large enough to have a major impact on estimates of inequality of wealth and 
income’. Ibid.    
113  Gurría, above n 61, 3.  
114  See, for example, Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer 
(2010) (‘Henry Report’) vol 1, [A3] on a potential bequests tax.  
115  Gurría, above n 61, 3. 
116  Cf Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s preference for taxing conspicuous luxury goods: see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
‘A Discourse on Political Economy’ in The Social Contract and Discourses (G D H Cole, trans, J M Dent, 
1992) 128, 166 [trans of: Du Contrat Social et al (first published 1762)].   
117  See Galbraith, above n 57, 76-7. 
118  See, for example, Stiglitz, above n 76, 477. 
119  For example, Nick Clegg, the United Kingdom Deputy Prime Minister, has proposed a minimum ‘tycoon 
tax rate’ of between 20 and 30 per cent. This would be a trade off for a reduction in the current marginal 
income tax rate of 50 per cent, which many high income earners do not pay. See Robert Winnett and 
James Kirkup, ‘Nick Clegg Goes after the Ultra-Rich’, The Telegraph (online), 10 March 2012 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nick-clegg/9135243/Nick-Clegg-goes-after-the-ultra-
rich.html>.  
120  See Morgan and Guthrie, above n 45, 183. 
121  Carter and Matthews, above n 61. 
122  Cf Richard W Lindholm, ‘Twenty-One Land Value Taxation Questions and Answers’ (1972) 31(2) 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 153, 153 who argues that a land value tax would shift the 
tax burden from ‘individual effort’ to the surplus ‘value created by society’ inherent in land value. 
123  Morgan and Guthrie, above n 45, 139. 
124  See generally, Henry George, Progress and Poverty (first published 1879, Hogarth Press, 1953 ed). 
125  Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Principles and Guidelines for Deficit Reduction’ (Working Paper No 6, The Roosevelt 
Institute, 2010) 5.  
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land is determined by community rather than individual efforts’.126 Any ‘increase in land 
values would be due to increased productivity which was closely related to increases in 
population and wealth. The rental income gave land its value and as such could be 
collected in taxes without decreasing incentives for efficient production.’127 
D. Radical Responses 
By putting the community first, communitarian thought allows us to think beyond the self 
(our immediate material ambitions and, indeed, longevity) and to consider our actions, 
both individual and collective, in the longer term context of those community members 
who came before and those who will come after us. Contemplating the philosophy of 
Baruch Spinoza, Bertrand Russell observed ‘[t]he wise man, so far as human finitude 
allows, endeavours to see the world … under the aspect of eternity’.128 No conception of 
the longest term can ignore the environment in which people and communities exist, and 
certainly, it seems likely that individual accumulation of wealth would not be privileged in 
that perspective.129 A consideration of what really matters for the community, is likely to 
generate radical responses: for example, based on G K Chesterton’s idea of Distributism, 
MacIntyre proposes an alternative economic system, which links virtue to contemporary 
society, by repudiating ‘usury, communism and capitalism in equal measure for an 
economy based on guilds, specialist associations, self-sufficiency and barter’.130 This 
proposal indicates the irrelevance of economic growth to many communitarians.  
‘Growth is a substitute for equality of income. So long as there is growth there is hope, 
and that makes large income differentials tolerable.’131 That hope appears to have 
dissipated for many people. One of the most commonly encountered arguments against 
heavily taxing the very wealth is that a country’s economic growth will be negatively 
affected.132 However, empirical evidence indicates that there is no straightforward 
connection between high growth and low tax rates.133 Furthermore, equality and growth are 
not mutually exclusive policy goals that must balanced against each other.134 ‘[G]reater 
equality makes growth much less necessary’,135 but economic growth is not the most 
important community goal. Thus Martha Nussbaum observes, the political community ‘is 
held together by a wide range of attachments and concerns, only some of which concern 
productivity. Productivity is necessary, and even good; but it is not the main end of social 
life.’136 Others go further and argue that we need ‘a historical shift in the sources of human 
                                                
126  Richard F Dye and Richard W England, ‘The Principles and Promises of Land Value Taxation’ in Richard 
F Dye and Richard W England (eds), Land Value Taxation: Theory, Evidence, and Practice (Lincoln Land 
Institute of Land Policy, 2009) 1, 4.       
127  William J McCluskey and Riël C D Franzsen, Land Value Taxation: An Applied Analysis (Ashgate, 2005) 
3. 
128  Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social 
Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present (Routledge, 2nd ed, 1961) 556. 
129  Cf the death bed test for how one would wish to have spent one’s life that Daniel Bell employs in Daniel 
A Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Clarendon Press, 1993) 188.  
130  See John Cornwell, ‘MacIntyre on Money’ (2010) 176 Prospect 58, 61. 
131  Henry Wallich, former governor of the Federal Reserve, quoted by Wilkinson and Pickett, above n 66, 
226.  
132  Walzer, above n 1, 120 observes, ‘if the constraints and limits are too severe, productivity may fall, and 
then there will be less room for the social recognition of needs. But at some level of taxation … the 
political community can’t be said to invade the sphere of money; it merely claims its own.’   
133  See Eric Toder and Daniel Baneman, ‘Distributional Effects of Individual Income Tax Expenditures: An 
Update’ (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, 2012) 
<http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412495-Distribution-of-Tax-Expenditures.pdf>; 
Emmanuel Saez, Joel B Slemrod, Seth H Giertz, ‘The Elasticity of Taxable Income with respect to 
Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review’ (NBER Working Paper 15012, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2009) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15012>. 
134  Joseph E Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (Allen Lane, 2002) 79. 
135  See Wilkinson and Pickett, above n 66, 221. 
136  Martha C Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2006) 160. 
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satisfaction from economic growth to a more sociable society’.137 For Tim Jackson, 
‘prosperity has to do with our ability to flourish: physically, psychologically and 
socially’,138 and the New Zealand Treasury, long a bastion of neoliberal economics,139 has 
recently argued that happiness, rather than gross domestic product, is a more appropriate 
measure of national prosperity.140 Following Richard Layard, above a certain level of 
wealth, happiness is determined by factors other than material wealth,141 and ‘prosperity 
hangs on our ability to participate meaningfully in the life of society’.142  
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has presented arguments for the potential role of communitarian tax policy in 
combating inequality and its deleterious impacts on individuals and society. A community 
of taxation and justice would manifest fairer outcomes and higher levels of mutual trust 
than contemporary neoliberal-informed societies. Increased trust in society benefits 
everyone, rich and poor alike. Greater equality may be compatible with economic growth, 
but thinking about what really matters for the community in the long-term is likely to lead 
to increased concerns for sustainability. Tax policy should therefore be oriented to 
sustaining the environment in which community members live, and promoting real 
prosperity, not short-term economic growth and the accumulation of individual wealth. 
                                                
137  Wilkinson and Pickett, above n 66, 231.     
138  Tim Jackson, Prosperity without Growth? The Transition to a Sustainable Economy. Sustainable 
Development Commission (2009) 86 <http://www.sd-
commission.org.uk/data/files/publications/prosperity_without_growth_report.pdf>. 
139  See generally, Malcolm McKinnon, Treasury: The New Zealand Treasury 1840 – 2000 (Auckland 
University Press, 2003). 
140  See Ben Gleisner, Mary Llewellyn-Fowler and Fiona McAlister, Working Towards Higher Living 
Standards for New Zealanders (New Zealand Treasury, 2011). 
141  Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (Penguin, 2005). Layard may be read as 
reconfiguring marginal utility theory, but he also intimates a concern for the community within which 
individual happiness may be realised.   
142  Jackson, above n 138, 86. 
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LONG SERVICE LEAVE IN AUSTRALIA 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE OPTIONS FOR A NATIONAL LONG SERVICE 
LEAVE MINIMUM STANDARD 
REBECCA CASEY, JOHN MCLAREN AND JOHN PASSANT∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Long service leave is an employment condition that provides paid leave to employees who 
serve an employer over a long period of time without a break in service. A common feature 
of long service leave is continuous service with an employer, which then entitles an 
employee to paid leave as a reward for their service. This means that in most jurisdictions 
the leave is generally not portable and is lost when transferring between employers. This 
paper will explore the long service leave entitlements for national system employees that 
currently exist in state and territory long service leave legislation in Australia and in 
selected key pre-reform instruments that have broad application in the various 
jurisdictions. The paper will not examine the situation relating to non-national system 
employees. In particular, it will not discuss the non-national system employees in Western 
Australia as a result of the Western Australian government not referring the relevant 
powers to the Commonwealth government.  The current long service leave entitlements 
vary in Australia because there are eight legislative frameworks relating to long service 
leave operating across the various states and territories. This makes the existing long 
service leave provisions in Australia highly complex and prescriptive for non-lawyers such 
as employers and employees. This paper will contend that a nationally consistent long 
service leave minimum standard would be a desirable outcome in Australia as it will 
ensure that all employees are rewarded for long term service with an employer and will 
provide employees with a paid break from work while maintaining job tenure. The various 
options for the national standard are examined in detail within the current long service 
leave environment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Long service leave is an employment condition that provides paid leave to employees who 
serve an employer over a long period of time without a break in service.1 A common 
feature of long service leave is continuous service with an employer, which then entitles an 
employee to paid leave as a reward for their service.2 This means that in most jurisdictions 
the leave is generally not portable and is lost when transferring between employers.3 Long 
service leave is recognised in all Australian jurisdictions through relevant state or territory 
legislation that outlines the entitlement. In addition to the legislation, some employers or 
industries provide long service leave benefits to their employees through private 
agreements or specific statutes.4  
This paper will explore the long service leave entitlements that currently exist in state 
and territory long service leave legislation in Australia and in selected key pre-reform 
                                                
∗  JD (Hons) Graduate, University of Canberra; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Canberra; and 
Tutor and PhD candidate, Australian National University. 
1  K R Handley and V Watson, ‘Australian Long Service Leave Legislation’ (1960) 3(2) Sydney Law Review 
260; Kennedy v Board of Fire Commissioners (1967) AR 455. 
2  B Creighton and A Stewart, Labour Law: An Introduction (The Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2000) 259. 
3  Ibid. Note that continuous service is not lost through a transmission of business transaction as held in Cf 
Crosilla v Challenge Property Services (1982) 2 IR 448. 
4  Creighton and Stewart, above n 2, 258. 
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instruments5 that have broad application in the various jurisdictions. The paper will not 
examine the situation relating to non-national system employees. In particular, it will not 
discuss the non-national system employees in Western Australia as a result of the Western 
Australian government not referring the relevant powers to the Commonwealth 
government. The current long service leave entitlements vary in Australia because there 
are eight legislative frameworks relating to long service leave operating across the various 
states and territories.6  This makes the existing long service leave provisions in Australia 
highly complex and prescriptive for non-lawyers such as employers and employees. For 
example, the qualifying period can range from 7 years7 to 158 years; the accrual rates differ 
and the actual amount of long service leave paid to an employee ranges from 
approximately 8 weeks to 13 weeks paid leave after 10 years’ service. The main focus of 
the paper is to find a way to ensure the equitable application of long service leave 
provisions across states for organisations operating in those states and employees working 
within those organisations. 
The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘Fair Work Act’) contains a commitment to develop a 
nationally consistent long service leave entitlement as part of the National Employment 
Standards and provides a safety net for employees.9 The Fair Work Act currently contains 
a transitional long service leave National Employment Standard.10 Moreover, a uniform 
national long service leave standard is currently a topic of discussion between the 
Commonwealth and state and territory governments.11 However, to date there is no 
uniform standard across all jurisdictions. It is contended that a national minimum standard 
would provide a safety net for employees and, with correct legal drafting in the Fair Work 
Act, the states and territories could supplement employee long service leave entitlements 
across jurisdictions. This would provide greater flexibility for employers and employees 
given the fact that the growth in full-time casual employment is becoming the norm in 
Australia.12 
The following passage by Senior Deputy President Lacy of the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission outlines the rationale for long service leave in Australia: 
…the entitlement to long service leave generally originated in the colonial service 
administration of the colonies of South Australia and Victoria. It gained statutory 
recognition throughout the several States of Australia commencing with New South Wales 
in 1951. Since that time there has been little change to the structure of long service leave. 
It is generally regarded now as an opportunity for an employee to take some respite from a 
long period of service in the one business.13 
Australia’s standard long service leave entitlement regime has its origins in a 1964 
decision of the then Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission.14 This 
decision took place after NSW legislation provided three months long service leave at full 
pay after 15 years of service in 1964.15 The first arbitrated federal long service leave award 
provided 13 weeks leave after 15 years service, with pro rata payment in lieu of 
                                                
5  Instruments mean an award, an enterprise agreement, a public sector industrial agreement, a former 
industrial agreement, a contract determination or a contract agreement. 
6  Rohan Price, Employment Law in Principle (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2009) 205. 
7  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (ACT).  
8  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (Tas) s 8(2)(a)(i). 
9  Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 39. 
10  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 113, 113A. 
11  Anthony Forsyth et al, Navigating the Fair Work Laws (Thomson Reuters, 2010) 51. 
12  Creighton and Stewart, above n 2, 259. 
13  Re. Office of the Chief Electrical Inspector Enterprise Agreement 2003 (AIRC) PR942414 (5 January 
2004) para 8. 
14  Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), Bills Digest, No. 38 of 2009–10, 15 October 2009.  
15  Symposium, State Systems of Industrial Relations:  Greg Patmore, ‘Setting the pace - The NSW 
jurisdiction before 1981’ (19 September 2005) Australian Review of Public Affairs, University of Sydney. 
<http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2005/09/patmore.html>  
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termination after 10 years service in the metal trades and graphic arts.16  New South Wales 
(NSW),17 Queensland (Qld) and South Australia (SA),18 the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT),19 and the Northern Territory (NT)20 have since adopted qualifying periods of 10 
years or less. At a federal level, the Fair Work Act currently preserves state and territory 
legislation for national system21 employees.22    
The existing long service leave provisions in Australia are complex and highly 
prescriptive, differing considerably in operation and level of entitlement across 
jurisdictions.23 Differing state or territory long service leave provisions within one 
organisation that operates across jurisdictions can lead to inequities between employees.24 
A new long service leave National Employment Standard could alleviate confusion, 
inequity and administrative complexities for employers and employees because there 
would be a single system in place, rather than many.25 
In Australia, long service leave is primarily regulated at a state and territory level, either 
through legislation or state awards.26 Long service leave is an entitlement that is fairly 
unique to Australia, although there are other countries that reward continuity of service.27 
In Greece and Britain there is a link between continuity of service and the length of annual 
leave.28 In Canada, some provinces have legislated for extended annual leave after set 
periods of continuous service. New Zealand has long service leave provisions in some 
employment contracts but the required length of service is generally longer and the 
entitlement is typically shorter than in Australia.29  
This paper will contend that the introduction of a national long service leave minimum 
standard would be an appropriate outcome in Australia. An analysis of the Fair Work Act  
and the current long service leave frameworks in Australia at both the federal level and the 
state and territory level will provide a solid basis for determining how a national long 
service leave minimum standard should be developed. The paper will also consider the 
legal issues arising in developing a national standard for long service leave, including the 
referral of workplace relations powers to the Commonwealth; the potential amendments of 
the Fair Work Act and state and territory long service leave legislation; and any 
constitutional issues surrounding the options for developing a nationally consistent long 
service leave framework in Australia. This will be followed with an examination of the 
various options for the development of a nationally consistent long service leave 
framework in Australia, including an analysis of other national systems that have been 
either attempted or successfully introduced. In conclusion, this paper will recommend the 
best model for a national long service leave minimum standard.  
                                                
16  Ibid.  
17  Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW) s 4. 
18  Long Service Leave Act 1987 (SA) s 5. 
19  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (ACT) s 3. 
20  Long Service Leave Act 1981 (NT) s 8. 
21  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 13 provides that ‘a national system employee is an individual so far as he or 
she is employed, or usually employed, as described in the definition of national system employer in s 14. 
22  Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), Bills Digest, No. 38 of 2009–10, 15 October 2009.  
23  Forsyth et al, above n 11, 51. 
24  I O’Donovan, ‘How Secure Are Employees’ Rights to Long Service Leave?’ (1977) 8(2) Sydney Law 
Review 429, 458. 
25  Ibid 437. 
26  Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth), 73. Note: entitlements to long service leave under 
a pre-reform award became legislative entitlements on 1 January 2010.   
27  John Burgess, Anne Sullivan and Glenda Strachan, ‘Long service leave in Australia: rationale, application 
and policy issues’ (2002) 13 Labour and Industry 21, 38. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Commonwealth, ‘Flexibility in Long Service Leave’ (Research paper, the Labour Ministers Council, May 
1999). 
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II. THE LONG SERVICE LEAVE FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIAN 
JURISDICTIONS 
Prior to examining the various options for a long service leave national standard, it is 
important to first demonstrate the different treatment of long service leave among the states 
and territories. 
A. The Operation of the Fair Work Act 2009 
The industrial relations laws in Australia have undergone significant change over the past 
six years with the introduction of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 
2005 (Cth) being arguably the most significant.30 The Work Choices amendments of 2005 
rewrote the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), which had been substantially unchanged 
since 1996.31 A key change in this legislation was the way agreements were made in the 
workplace. Work Choices moved away from collective bargaining arrangements and 
towards individual bargaining arrangements through the use of Australian Workplace 
Agreements.32 In addition, Work Choices set minimum employment conditions for 
employees nationally.33 To honour its election promise, the incoming Labor Government 
replaced the Work Choices legislation with the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in 2009.34  
The Fair Work Act outlines the transitional entitlement to long service leave for 
employees who had certain long service leave entitlements before 1 January 2010. The 
transitional arrangements were put in place pending the development of a uniform national 
long service leave standard. The Fair Work Act amended many of the provisions contained 
in the Work Choices legislation.35 The key changes were the transition to a national 
industrial relations system with the exclusion of state laws. Other key inclusions were the 
establishment of a safety net of 10 National Employment Standards, the implementation of 
modern awards, new dispute resolution procedures, and new unfair dismissal rules.36 The 
National Employment Standards set out the minimum employment conditions in 
Australian workplaces. The current National Employment Standard relating to long service 
leave preserves long service leave entitlements in pre-modernised awards from 1 January 
2010.37 Prior to the introduction of modern awards, pre-modern awards covered terms and 
conditions of employment. These included pre-reform (federal) awards, notional 
agreements preserving state awards, and state reference transitional awards.38 An 
employee’s entitlement to long service leave in a pre- reform award39 might apply rather 
than the state and territory legislation because it contains a more beneficial long service 
leave provision.40 If an employee did not have applicable award-derived long service leave 
term, any entitlement to long service leave was derived from state or territory long service 
leave legislation.41  
                                                
30  Forsyth et al, above n 11, 3. 
31  Ibid 5. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) s 3. 
34  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 2. 
35  Forsyth et al, above n 11, 5. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Peta Tumpey, ‘Government releases new National Employment Standards’ (August 2008) 60(7) Keeping 
Good Companies, 424-7. 
38  Fair Work Australia, Pre-modern awards (11 January 2011) < http://www.fairwork.gov.au/awards/pre-
modern-awards/pages/default.aspx>. Note: Pre-modern awards do not include transitional (federal) awards 
in Western Australia, Division 2B State awards and enterprise awards; Fair Work Ombudsman , Long 
Service Leave (25 October 2010)<http://www.fairwork.gov.au/leave/long-service-
leave/pages/default.aspx>.   
39  Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 73. 
40  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 29 and Forsyth et al, above n 11, 51; and Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 113. 
41  Price, above n 6, 205. 
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The Fair Work Act does not exclude state and territory laws that deal with long service 
leave, except in relation to employees who are entitled to long service leave under the Fair 
Work Act.42 The Act also states that state and territory laws that deal with long service 
leave prevail over an award or agreement,43 noting that there are eight legislative 
frameworks operating across the various states and territories relating to long service 
leave.44 The Act also prohibits a modern award from including terms dealing with long 
service leave.45  
B. The Long Service Leave Framework in Australia 
There are a number of long service leave entitlements that currently exist in state and 
territory long service leave legislation in Australia and in selected key pre-reform 
instruments that have broad application in the various jurisdictions.46 The following 
analysis of the current framework in the states and territories will assist in the proposed 
development of a nationally consistent long service leave framework in Australia. There 
are eight legislative frameworks operating across the various states and territories relating 
to long service leave.47 These frameworks are contained in the relevant legislation as 
follows: 
 
Long Service Leave Act 1958 (Western Australia) 
Long Service Leave Act 1955  (New South Wales) 
Long Service Leave Act 1992  (Victoria) 
Long Service Leave Act 1987  (South Australia) 
Industrial Relations Act 1999  (Queensland) 
Long Service Leave Act 1981  (Northern Territory) 
Long Service Leave Act 1976  (Australian Capital Territory) 
Long Service Leave Act 1976  (Tasmania)  
 
It is important to conduct an analysis of the core attributes of long service leave across 
jurisdictions in order to ascertain the differences between the long service leave 
entitlements across the states and territories. This analysis will reinforce the 
recommendations within this paper and support the argument that a national long service 
leave framework is needed for Australian employees. 
Not only do the states and territories have different legislative long service leave 
provisions, these can be exceeded in awards and agreements.48 Providing a uniform 
national standard for long service leave provides a number of challenges as any 
standardisation may result in an improvement in long service leave conditions for some 
employees but not for others, depending on the jurisdiction. For example, applying the 
lowest qualifying period and the highest accrual rate across-the-board would mean an 
increase in the long service leave entitlement for employees in some jurisdictions, whereas, 
employees in jurisdictions that already have the lowest qualifying period and the highest 
accrual rates would receive no additional benefit. This is a controversial issue for 
employers and employees as unions do not want to see a reduction in long service leave 
entitlements 49and employers do not want to see an increase in long service leave 
entitlements which will give rise to additional costs.50 A key challenge in standardising 
                                                
42  St Marys Rugby League Club Ltd [2010] FWA 8300 (12 November 2010). 
43  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 29. 
44  The Australian Road Transport Industrial Organisation (ARTIO), Road Transport (Long Distance 
Operations) 2010 (LDO Award): Modern Award Handbook (2010) 
<http://www.artio.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42&Itemid=68>. 
45  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 155. 
46  Forsyth et al, above n 11, 51. 
47  Price, above n 6, 205. 
48  Forsyth et al, above n 11, 51. 
49  Interview with Kim Sattler, Secretary, Unions ACT (Canberra, 16 August 2011). 
50  C Grealy, URBIS, ‘Portable long service leave for the ACT community services sector’ (Research 
Discussion Paper, Department for Disability, Housing and Community Services ACT, March 2009) 8. 
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long service leave is that state and territory long service leave laws not only provide for 
different amounts of leave and qualifying periods, but also a range of entitlements relating 
to termination of employment and other matters, such as the cashing out of leave.  
Tasmania has the longest qualifying period of 15 years,51 whereas the ACT has the 
shortest qualifying period of 7 years, pro-rata basis.52 As is shown from the comparison 
below, all other states and territories provide a long service leave qualifying period of 
10 years. Data obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (‘ABS’) relating to 
qualifying periods and accrual of long service leave is discussed in the next section of this 
paper. 
An accrual rate of 1.3 weeks per annum can be applied to employees in SA53 and NT54 
and mining employees in Tasmania.55 The other states and territories provide an accrual 
rate of 0.86667 weeks per annum. All employees in each of the states and territories are 
entitled to subsequent long service leave after the initial entitlement. All subsequent 
entitlements to long service leave have an accrual rate identical to that of the initial 
entitlement. Employees in SA56 and the ACT57 are entitled to subsequent long service 
leave on a yearly basis, whereas employees in Tasmania are entitled to subsequent long 
service leave on a 10 year interval.58 The other states and territories provide subsequent 
long service leave in 5 year intervals. 
All employees are also entitled to long service leave on a pro rata basis. All states and 
territories, except Victoria, have specified qualification criteria for pro rata entitlement to 
long service leave. Examples of qualification criteria for gaining the entitlement to pro rata 
long service leave are termination of employment for any reason other than serious 
misconduct; the death of the employee; or the termination of employment on account of 
illness, incapacity, domestic or other pressing necessity.59 In NSW60 and the ACT61 access 
to pro rata entitlement to long service leave is after five years of continuous service and the 
other states and territories provide pro rata access after seven years of continuous service.  
C. Data Relating to Employees with an Entitlement to Long Service Leave 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics publishes regular data relating to ‘Labour Mobility’62 
and ‘Forms of Employment’.63 The ABS reports that there were 11.4 million people 
working as at August 2012.64 ABS data based on ‘self report’ show 62 per cent of 
employees, excluding owner managers of incorporated enterprises, report an entitlement to 
long service leave. This data strengthens the argument for a national long service leave 
framework given there are so many Australian employees reporting an entitlement to long 
service leave.  
 ‘Length of Service’ data is provided in the most recent ABS ‘Labour Mobility’ 
survey.65 There were 2.9 million people who were working as at February 2012 that had 
been with their current employer for 10 years or more. This represents 27 per cent of men 
                                                                                                                                  
This report found that employers concerns about changes to long service leave entitlements occur in areas 
such as expense to employers and increased administrative burden. 
51  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (Tas) s 8(2)(a)(i).  
52  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (ACT) s 3. 
53  Long Service Leave Act 1987 (SA) s 5. 
54  Long Service Leave Act 1981 (NT) s 8. 
55  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (Tas) s 8A(2)(a)(i). 
56  Long Service Leave Act 1987 (SA) s 5. 
57  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (ACT) s 3. 
58  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (Tas) s 8(2)(a)(ii). 
59  Price, above n 6, 205. 
60  Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW), s 4 and Price, above n 6, 206. 
61  Long Service Leave Act 1976 (ACT), s 3. 
62  Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS Labour Mobility (Cat. No.6202) (August 2012). 
63  Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS Forms of Employment (Cat. No.6359.0) (November 2011). 
64  ABS, ABS Labour Mobility, above n 62. 
65  Ibid. 
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and 23 per cent of women who were working as at February 2012.66 The industry groups 
with the highest proportion of people who had been with their current employer for 10 
years or more were agriculture, forestry and fishing, 54 per cent; education and training, 35 
per cent; public administration and safety, 34 per cent; and manufacturing, 30 per cent.67  
These statistics show that 25 per cent of all employees, excluding owner managers of 
incorporated enterprises and owner managers and contributing family workers, have been 
with their current employer for 10 years or more. Ten years is the most common qualifying 
period for long service leave under state and territory legislation.   
D. Analysis of Instruments with Broad Application in the Jurisdictions 
As discussed earlier, employees may also have an entitlement to long service leave in a 
pre-modernised instrument such as pre-reform awards and agreements because a pre-
modernised instrument may contain more beneficial long service leave provisions than 
those contained in state legislation.68 This paper will analyse some key awards or 
agreements containing long service leave provisions that have broad application to a large 
number of employees within some of the jurisdictions. In formulating a national minimum 
long service leave standard, it is imperative that key awards and agreements are examined 
because of their broad application to employees across jurisdictions. The analysis below 
supports the argument that a national long service leave framework is needed for 
Australian employees. Long service leave entitlements in selected awards and agreements 
are discussed below to provide an overview of the common types of entitlements that are 
more beneficial to employees. 
1. New South Wales  
Long service leave applies to most NSW employees who are full-time, part-time or 
casual.69 
Five state awards applying in NSW that contain long service leave provisions have 
been analysed.70 They are the Aged Care General Services (State) Award, the Bread 
Industry (State) Award, the Broken Hill Commerce and Industry Agreement Consent 
Award, the Funeral Industries (State) Award and the Teachers (Independent Schools) 
(State) Award 2004. Some awards relied upon the Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW), 
but others contained more generous entitlements than contained in the state legislation. 
With respect to the initial entitlement to long service leave, the NSW state legislation 
provides for two months long service leave (0.8667 weeks per annum) after 10 years 
service.71 Two awards contained an entitlement to 13 weeks long service leave (1.3 weeks 
per annum) after 10 years. This was the highest accrual rate identified in NSW.  
2. Queensland 
Six state awards containing long service leave provisions in Queensland were examined.72 
Each of the awards relied upon the Queensland Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) for 
long service leave entitlement. Provisions in the legislation provide an initial entitlement to 
long service leave of two months long service leave (0.8667 weeks per annum) after 10 
years service. Subsequent entitlement to long service leave under the state legislation is 
                                                
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Forsyth et al, above n 11, 51. 
69  Price, above n 6, 206. 
70  The Awards analysed are: Aged Care General Services (State) Award, Bread Industry (State) Award, 
Broken Hill Commerce and Industry Agreement Consent Award, Funeral Industries (State) Award, 
Teachers (Independent Schools) (State) Award 2004.  
71  Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW) s 4. 
72  The awards analysed are: Building and Construction Industry Award – State 2003, Engineering Award – 
State 2002, Transport Distribution and Courier Industry Award – Southern Division 2003, Motor Vehicle 
Salespersons Award – State 2003, Anglican Community Services Commission Support Service and 
Personal Care Workers Certified Agreement – 2006, P&O Ports Limited Bulk Handling Agreement 2006. 
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four weeks after five years.73 In Queensland, pro rata accessibility is available to 
employees after seven years.74 Each of the awards analysed contained the provisions of the 
state legislation.  
3. Victoria 
Five state awards containing long service leave provisions were analysed from Victoria.75 
The majority of the awards relied upon the Victorian Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic) or 
provided similar entitlements. However, the two awards that related to nurses contained 
differing qualifying provisions (as explained below) than those contained in the state 
legislation. With respect to the initial entitlement to long service leave, the state legislation 
provides for 13 weeks long service leave (1.3 weeks per annum) after 10 years service. 
Subsequent entitlement to long service leave under the state legislation is 45 calendar days 
for each additional five years. Pro rata accessibility is available to employees after seven 
years. Employees subject to the Nurses (Victorian Health Services) Award 2000 and the 
Nurses (Private Pathology Victoria) Award 2004, hold an initial entitlement to long service 
leave of six months and three months respectively after 15 years service. Subsequent 
entitlement to long service leave for these employees’ is two months and one month 
respectively for each additional five years service. 
3. South Australia 
In South Australia, four state awards containing long service leave provisions were 
analysed for this thesis.76 Each of the awards relied upon the Long Service Leave Act 1987 
(SA). With respect to the initial entitlement to long service leave, the state legislation 
provides for 13 weeks long service leave (1.3 weeks per annum) after 10 years service. 
Subsequent entitlement to long service leave under the state legislation is 1.3 weeks for 
each year of service. Pro rata accessibility is available to employees after seven years. 
D. Australian Portable Long Service Leave Schemes 
Another form of long service leave operating in Australia is referred to as a portable 
scheme. Portable long service leave allows an employee to accumulate their long service 
leave whilst working for different employers within an industry sector, and also across 
jurisdictions. 77The accumulation of leave is therefore not limited to a single employer.78 
There are a number of industries in Australia that have developed portable long service 
leave schemes because it strengthens the capacity and sustainability of the sector. 79 This is 
particularly the case for the building and construction industry and all states and territories 
have schemes operating in this industry.80 The ACT and Queensland have also extended 
portability of long service leave entitlements to the contract cleaning industry and the ACT 
                                                
73  Price, above n 6, 206. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Nurses (Victorian Health Services) Award 2000, Victorian Independent Schools - Teachers - Award 1998, 
Nurses (Private Pathology Victoria) Award 2004, Food, Beverages and Tobacco Industry - Retail Dairies - 
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76  Coopers Brewery Limited Enterprise Agreement 2009, Utilities Management Pty Ltd Workplace 
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77  Long Service Leave (Portable Schemes) Act 2009 (ACT). Pursuant to the Act, the ‘Building and 
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79  ACT Chief Minister Katy Gallagher, ‘New scheme to strengthen community sector workforce’ (Media 
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has a scheme for employees in the Community Services industry. The ACT government is 
the first Australian jurisdiction to implement a portable long service leave scheme to assist 
child care and community sector organisations.81  
The ACT passed the legislation for a portable long service leave scheme in November 
2009. The ACT Government noted that the scheme ‘…will strengthen the capacity and 
sustainability of the sector, and will also assist in developing more career options for 
community sector workers by facilitating movement between organisations and providing 
more variety in work with greater prospects for promotion’.82 Further benefits of the 
scheme were identified as workforce retention and the protection of the basic entitlement 
of each worker to take long service leave.83 The ACT government also found through their 
consultation process that there was strong support from unions and employees for the 
scheme.84 The scheme was seen by these groups as an appropriate strengthening of 
employees' entitlements, supported by small to medium employers.85  
The Australian Services Union argues that ‘the advantage of a portable long service 
leave scheme is that where a worker decides to change jobs they might choose to stay 
within the sector rather than leaving for better wages and conditions in the public or private 
sector’.86 High staff turnover rates and low unemployment rates raises concerns about 
retaining employees and portable long service leave provisions encourage employees to 
stay in a particular sector.87 
It is uncertain how a national uniform long service leave provision might interact with 
portable long service leave schemes in each state or territory as there are many tensions 
associated with portability.88 However, given the strength of the schemes currently in 
place, there is a strong argument to allow these schemes to continue to operate in the event 
that a national long service leave minimum standard was introduced. These schemes 
would, of course, need to ensure that the applicable legislation met the minimum national 
standard.  
E. The Commonwealth Long Service Leave Framework 
The Commonwealth public sector industry is a good example of how a well established 
long service leave scheme operates. The federal and state public sector industries have 
worked together as a whole over many years to establish employee benefits such as a 
portable long service leave scheme to create comprehensive long service leave entitlements 
that apply across the board to all public sector employees. For that reason, it makes a good 
model for a future national long service leave scheme as it makes the public sector 
industries competitive and gives them an advantage in the labour market.89  
The Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 (Cth) provides an 
entitlement to long service leave for Australian public service employees.90 The basic 
qualification for long service leave is that the employee has been continuously employed in 
qualifying service91 for a period of service of at least 10 years.92 An employee accrues 
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86  Australian Government, Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research 
report, January 2010) 268. 
87  Ibid. 
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the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 (Cth). 
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three months long service leave after 10 years service and nine calendar days each year 
thereafter.93 The continuity of service provisions under the Act allow for absences, or 
breaks in Commonwealth employment, for up to 12 months.94 The Commonwealth’s long 
service leave scheme is a portable scheme. It allows an employee to transfer from one 
Commonwealth agency to another without losing any entitlement to long service leave 
because the scheme recognises the Australian government as the employer, rather than an 
individual federal agency.95 The legislation further accepts prior service from a range of 
other government authorities and non-Australian public service agencies, such as the 
public service of a territory, any service of a state, and members of the defence force.96 The 
legislation also provides that Commonwealth agencies may recognise prior service with 
other bodies such as non-Australian public service authorities or state government 
agencies, other than for long service leave purposes consistent with the Long Service Leave 
(Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 (Cth).97  
Essentially, the Commonwealth’s long service leave framework is a generous and 
flexible scheme as it allows for portability of entitlements among individual agencies. A 
scheme such as this provides employees with stability and greater benefits in the 
workplace. The Commonwealth public service is a strong employer and is able to attract 
employees due to the employment benefits, terms and conditions it offers.98  
III WHY A NATIONAL LONG SERVICE LEAVE MINIMUM STANDARD IS 
NEEDED  
A nationally consistent long service leave minimum standard is a desirable outcome in 
Australia as it will ensure that all employees are rewarded for long term service with an 
employer and will provide employees with a paid break from work. Growth in non-
standard forms of employment, such as casual, contract and other types of unstable 
employment is becoming the norm in Australia and is exceeding standard full-time 
employment.99 While the casualisation of labour is an important issue in this discussion on 
long service leave, it is not intended to examine this feature in detail as it would greatly 
add to the length of this paper. However, it is an issue that warrants further examination.   
The greatest growth has been in casual jobs, which are defined as working by the hour or 
day and not attracting paid leave benefits.100 The Australian Council of Trade Unions has 
found that approximately 40 per cent of the Australian workforce is employed in non-
standard types of employment, which is the second highest rate of insecure workers of all 
OECD countries.101 
The data supports the fact that employees are demanding flexible working 
arrangements from their employer in order to better balance their work and personal life.102 
Long service leave entitlements help employees to create a better work and life balance by 
rewarding employees with a break from work after long term service.103 An entitlement to 
long service leave provides employers with the security of long term employees because 
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employees are more likely to commit longer term.104 An example of the benefit of long 
service leave to employees is for construction workers as they need a physical rest from 
their work and long service leave allows them to take a break.105 Unions ACT argue that 
employers that offer long service leave entitlements to their employees are competitive in 
the labour market.106 These factors strongly support the need for a national long service 
leave entitlement, which applies to employees in non-standard types of employment. Based 
on this evidence, it is argued that, without a national long service leave framework, there 
will be continued growth in non-standard employment types as employees are forced to 
work outside of industries with flexible work practices. 
Flexible options for long service leave, including portable long service leave schemes, 
have been considered by Burgess et al,107 who argue that a re-examination of long service 
leave is warranted in Australia. The need for more flexible options in long service leave is 
due to the growth in non-standard employment types.108 It is argued that portable long 
service leave schemes operate well in industries where mobility within an industry is 
frequent, such as the construction and mining industries.109 Burgess et al argue that long 
service leave entitlements need to be protected and that employers should encourage 
respite from work that is linked with other family friendly working arrangements.110  
Casual employees are entitled to long service leave in most state and territory 
legislation. However, it should be noted that, in order for casuals to hold an entitlement to 
long service leave, certain conditions must be met, depending on the terms of the relevant 
legislation. Generally, casual employees are entitled to long service leave if they have 
completed the required years of ‘continuous employment’, for example 10 years service. 
Continuous employment means that the employee must have worked regularly for more 
than a certain number of hours, usually 32 hours, in each consecutive period of four weeks. 
A continuous period of service generally ends if the employment is broken by more than 
three months. However, the Fair Work Act does not mention casual or non-standard 
employment types when dealing with long service leave.111 
The next part of the paper outlines the challenges associated with developing a national 
minimum long service leave standard; however, options for such a development are 
explored later in this paper. 
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPING A NATIONAL LONG SERVICE 
LEAVE STANDARD  
This part of the paper will examine the challenges facing the developing of a national long 
service leave standard and will argue that a nationally consistent long service leave 
minimum standard is a suitable outcome in Australia.  
A. Determining the Long Service Leave National Standard 
States and territories have different legislative long service leave provisions which can be 
exceeded in awards and agreements. Providing a uniform national standard for long service 
leave provides a number of challenges as any standardisation may result in an 
improvement in long service leave conditions for some employees but not for others, 
depending on the jurisdiction. For example, applying the lowest qualifying period and the 
highest accrual rate across-the-board would mean an increase in the long service leave 
entitlement for employees in the other jurisdictions, whereas employees in jurisdictions 
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that already have the lowest qualifying period and the highest accrual rates would receive 
no additional benefit. This is an issue that poses a problem as it is unlikely that unions 
generally will want to see a reduction in long service leave entitlements and it is equally 
unlikely that employers will want to see an increase in long service leave entitlements due 
to the additional cost.112 These are issues that will need consideration in formulating a 
recommendation for this paper. 
Additionally, if such a model was adopted, there would be an increase in labour costs 
for employers in some jurisdictions. Conversely, adopting the more common provision in 
the other states and territories, ie three months after 10 years continuous service or 
equivalent, could mean a lowering of long service leave minimum entitlements for 
employees in some jurisdictions. The options for the development of a national long 
service leave framework are discussed in detail in Part VI. 
B. Relevant Fair Work Act 2009 Provisions 
The Fair Work Act prohibits a modern award from including terms dealing with long 
service leave because the current National Employment Standard provision preserves the 
effect of long service leave terms in pre-modernised awards from 1 January 2010. Section 
113 of the Fair Work Act provides that if there are applicable award derived long service 
leave terms in relation to an employee, the employee is entitled to long service leave in 
accordance with those terms.113  
To determine whether there are applicable award derived long service leave terms, it is 
necessary to consider the award that would have applied to the employee’s current 
employment if the employee had been in that employment immediately before 1 January 
2010.114 The Fair Work Act does not exclude state and territory laws that deal with long 
service leave, except in relation to employees who are entitled to long service leave under 
the Act. The Fair Work Act also states that state and territory laws that deal with long 
service leave prevail over an award or agreement.115  
C. Commonality of Long Service Leave Entitlements in Legislation between 
Jurisdictions 
Currently, the standard period of service to qualify for long service leave is 10 years. The 
standard term of the entitlement is 13 weeks.116 An analysis of the legislation applying in 
the state and territory legislation117 has shown some threads of commonality across 
jurisdictions in long service leave entitlements. Although there are variations in the amount 
of entitlement provided to employees, common themes in long service leave arrangements 
across jurisdictions exist in topic areas such as: 
 
• qualifying periods and access to pro-rata entitlement (for example, a 10 year 
qualifying period with a five year pro rata entitlement thereafter); 
• quantum of entitlement to long service leave (for example, three months leave); 
• pro-rata entitlement on termination; 
• entitlement for casuals, apprentices and trainees, if applicable; 
• what type of service counts for long service leave (for example, whether maternity 
leave counts as service for long service leave purposes); 
• treatment on transmission of business (for example, whether the new company 
accepts the previous entitlement); 
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• rate of payment during long service leave (for example, full pay at the employee’s 
current salary, or an average over the past 10 years); 
• method of payment during long service leave (for example, on a weekly basis or an 
upfront payment); 
• taking of long service leave in advance (for example, prior to the qualifying period 
of 10 years); 
• treatment of public holidays during periods of long service leave (for example, 
whether the public holiday is deducted from the long service leave balance); 
• undertaking employment during long service leave; and 
• record keeping and penalties. 
 
Building on these commonalities it would then be possible to add in the minimum or 
negotiated standards in areas such as qualifying periods, pro-rata entitlement and the 
amount of entitlement to leave. These common entitlements to long service leave could 
then be standardised across the various schemes and be narrowed to form the basis of a 
minimum national standard.  Table 1 outlines the areas of commonality across Australian 
jurisdictions with respect to long service leave. 
 
Table 1: Areas of commonality in state and territory legislation 
 
Long service leave entitlement Areas of commonality (state and territory legislation) 
Qualifying periods and pro-rata entitlement The qualifying periods of long service leave vary between 
jurisdictions. The range is between 7 years and 15 years. 
However, 5 states contain provisions for a 10 year 
qualifying period. The most common pro rata entitlement 
period is after 7 years. All jurisdictions have a 7 year pro 
rata entitlement except NSW and the ACT where employees 
are entitled to pro rata entitlement after 5 years. The pro rata 
entitlement periods range from 5 years to 7 years. 
Quantum of initial entitlement Quantum of entitlement varies greatly between jurisdictions, 
although the most common entitlement is 13 weeks after 10 
years. The minimum amount of initial entitlement is 6.07 
weeks and the maximum is 13 weeks.  
Quantum of subsequent entitlement Quantum of entitlement varies greatly between jurisdictions. 
The minimum amount of initial entitlement is 4 weeks after 
a further 5 years and the maximum is 8 weeks. 
Pro-rata entitlement on termination The most common clause relating to pro rata entitlement 
upon termination only applies if the employee dies or the 
employment is terminated due to illness or incapacity and 
does not generally include termination for serious 
misconduct. 
Entitlement for casuals, apprentices and 
trainees 
Casuals, apprentices and trainees are entitled to long service 
leave in all jurisdictions provided they meet the service 
requirements. 
What type of service counts for long service 
leave purposes 
Continuous service is generally accepted in all jurisdictions 
to be all periods of paid leave and some unpaid leave types. 
Most jurisdictions did not allow industrial disputes to count 
as service, other clauses varied. 
Treatment on transmission of business In all jurisdictions, transmission of business did not 
interrupt continuity of service. 
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Long service leave entitlement Areas of commonality (state and territory legislation) 
Capacity to contract out Some jurisdictions allowed for an employee to forgo their 
entitlement to long service leave if the agreement is in 
writing, and it usually would only occur at the termination 
of the employment relationship. 
Rate of payment during long service leave In general, employees are paid at their normal weekly rate 
of pay, excluding overtime and allowances. 
Method of payment during long service 
leave 
Many jurisdictions allowed for payment to be made to an 
employee in advance. Alternatively, the leave would be paid 
as though it was ordinary pay. 
Taking of long service leave in advance Some jurisdictions allowed an employee to take their long 
service leave before the entitlement crystallizes but, other 
jurisdictions were silent. 
Treatment of public holidays during periods 
of long service leave 
Most jurisdictions excluded public holidays during a period 
of long service leave. 
Undertaking employment during long 
service leave 
Not allowable in all jurisdictions. 
Records and penalties The most common period for keeping records was 7 years. 
The period varied between jurisdictions and ranges from 3 
years to 7 years. 
 
From this analysis it is clear that, although there is commonality of topic, however, the 
difference in treatment across jurisdictions requires the standardisation of entitlement to 
long service leave. This is evident from the simple topic of qualifying periods whereby the 
qualifying periods of long service leave varies between 7 years and 15 years between 
jurisdictions. To establish a standard qualifying period of 10 years for all employees would 
be beneficial because it would bring parity to Australian employee long service leave 
entitlements. The Commonwealth public sector industry is a good example of how a well 
established long service leave scheme operates. Because the federal and state public sector 
industries have worked together to establish employee benefits it gives them a competitive 
edge and places them in an advantageous position in the labour market because long 
service leave is an important employee entitlement.118   
V. LEGAL ISSUES IN DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STANDARD FOR LONG 
SERVICE LEAVE  
The introduction of a national long service leave system requires an analysis of state and 
territory laws as well as awards and agreements applying to employees in Australia. The 
following analysis raises issues surrounding constitutional law as well as industrial 
relations law in Australia.  
A. Referral of Workplace Relations Powers to the Commonwealth 
Section 51 (xxxvii) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 
provides that the Commonwealth parliament has the power to legislate on matters referred 
to it by the states. The Australian Constitution gave the states the primary responsibility for 
regulating industrial relations upon its enactment and also gave the federal parliament a 
limited law-making power in this area. This meant that the federal industrial relations 
system has operated concurrently with state systems.119   
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In 2009, all jurisdictions, except Western Australia, signed an agreement to refer their 
powers to the Commonwealth for the purpose of creating a national system. As discussed 
above, this paper will not examine the position of non-national employees, especially in 
Western Australia. To do so would have resulted in a very lengthy paper. The agreement 
referring the state and territory industrial relations powers is heavily detailed and currently 
excludes long service leave entitlements as this remains a matter for the states and 
territories.120 Depending upon the model selected to achieve uniformity on long service 
leave matters, the states and territories may need to refer their power to the Commonwealth 
to legislate on long service leave matters.  
B. The Potential Amendment of the Fair Work Act 2009 and State Long Service 
Leave Legislation 
In order for the government to meet its commitment to develop a uniform National 
Employment Standard for long service leave, the government will need to legislate to 
provide an ongoing long service leave entitlement for all national system employees. 121 A 
key issue is how a national long service leave standard will interact with existing state and 
territory laws about long service leave. As outlined earlier in this paper, most states and 
territories have specific legislation dealing with long service leave, with the exception of 
Queensland, which provides for long service leave in its industrial relations legislation.  
C. Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Options for Developing a Nationally 
Consistent Long Service Leave Framework in Australia 
Prior to making recommendations about a national long service leave standard, it is 
necessary to look at the constitutional issues, particularly under s 109, which states that 
‘when a law of a state is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall 
prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid’.122 A question 
to be considered is whether the states and territories could legislate aspects of long service 
leave not dealt with in a proposed new Commonwealth legislation.123 
Ultimately, s 109 of the Constitution has the effect that state laws that are directly 
inconsistent with the Fair Work Act are invalid.124 There is the potential for a state law 
concerning long service leave to be invalid for inconsistency with a long service leave 
National Employment Standard either on the basis that provisions of those laws are 
directly inconsistent, or because the National Employment Standard is intended to ‘cover 
the field’ in relation to long service leave.  
In order to avoid this, the Fair Work Act would need to expressly state whether it is 
intended to ‘cover the field’ for long service leave or whether state laws are intended to 
operate concurrently. Through correct drafting of a new long service leave National 
Employment Standard under the Act, the states and territories could legislate aspects of 
long service leave not dealt with in the Commonwealth legislation. This will require the 
Commonwealth to allow states and territories to continue to legislate on some aspects of 
long service leave and would mean that the Commonwealth does not ‘cover the field’. In 
Victoria v Commonwealth, Dixon J explained that: 
… if it appears from the terms, the nature or the subject matter of a Federal enactment that 
it was intended as a complete statement of the law governing a particular matter or set of 
rights and duties, then for a State law to regulate or apply to the same matter or relation is 
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regarded as a detraction from the full operation of the Commonwealth law and so as 
inconsistent.125 
The benefit of the constitutional terms for the government is that if a national minimum 
long service leave standard is set by the Fair Work Act, any state or territory law that 
provides for different minimum employment entitlements from a Commonwealth law will 
be directly inconsistent with the Commonwealth law and invalid. If a Commonwealth 
law provides a legal right or entitlement, a state law that claims to take away or 
reduce the legal right or entitlement will be inconsistent with s 109 of the 
Constitution. In Victoria v Commonwealth, Dixon J said: 
When a State law, if valid, would alter, impair or detract from the operation of a law of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, then to that extent it is invalid.126 
This means that a Commonwealth law setting a minimum long service leave standard must 
ensure that employees under the national system are entitled to certain entitlements at a 
national level. Depending on the way in which the Commonwealth legislation is written, it 
would be possible for the Fair Work Act to set a minimum standard for long service leave 
and then allow the states and territories to provide entitlements over and above the 
minimum standard. This arrangement would be similar to the community service leave 
National Employment Standard, whereby the Act states that entitlements under state or 
territory laws are not intended to be excluded to the extent that those entitlements are more 
beneficial than the National Employment Standard.127  
VI  OPTIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL LONG SERVICE 
LEAVE STANDARD  
Five options are examined below with a recommendation on the preferred option discussed 
at Part VII of this paper.  
A. Option 1: Harmonisation of Long Service Leave Legislation 
A ‘harmonisation’ model would require the Commonwealth and the states and territories to 
come to an agreement in developing consistency in existing state and territory long service 
leave legislation.  
Such a model would be similar to the recent harmonisation of work health and safety 
laws. In this case, the Council of Australian Governments formally committed to the 
harmonisation of work health and safety laws by signing an Intergovernmental Agreement 
for Regulatory and Operational Reform in OHS (‘IGA’) on 3 July 2008.128 The IGA 
outlined the commitment of all states and territories and the Commonwealth to work 
together to develop and implement model work health and safety laws in Australia.129 The 
model OHS Act aims to lead to better safety protections for employees and greater 
certainty for employers.130 The Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (‘WRMC’) 
considered and responded to the recommendations of the National Review into model 
OHS Laws . The WRMC decided on the most favourable structure and content of a model 
OHS Act to be adopted by the Commonwealth, state and territory governments.131 All 
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states and territories have different occupational health and safety legislation but all states 
and territories have committed to implementing uniform health and safety standards across 
Australia if they have not already done so.132  
This model would require each state and territory to amend their current legislation to 
provide consistency across all components of long service leave, in each statute, across the 
jurisdictions.  
This option is ideal as it will create certainty for employers and employees on the 
minimum entitlement to long service leave. However, a disadvantage of this model is that 
any increase in a state or territory’s current arrangements in order to meet a national 
standard could be resisted from employers as this would be an added business cost.133 In 
addition, a key issue associated with harmonisation is the difficulty in getting the various 
governments at all levels across Australia to agree to an outcome concerning long service 
leave and then that same government actually implementing the legislation due to electoral 
cycle. 
B. Option 2: Legislate a Long Service Leave Standard that Overrides State and 
Territory Legislation on Specific Components of Long Service Leave for National 
System Employers and Employees 
A further option is for the Commonwealth to legislate a long service leave standard that 
overrides state and territory legislation on specific components of long service leave for 
national system employers and employees.134 The Commonwealth would legislate on 
specific aspects of long service leave based on the commonalities that can be identified 
across the relevant provisions of state and territory legislation. This would require the 
states and territories to repeal their provisions dealing with those aspects of long service 
leave that the Commonwealth would have legislated on, although state and territory 
legislation dealing with other aspects of long service leave could continue to operate. 135 
This option would require careful drafting by the Commonwealth to avoid any 
inconsistency, as this may affect which ‘components’ are dealt with federally. 
Additionally, the states and territories will need to make complementary amendments of 
their relevant legislation to ensure that the state legislation fits with a federal Act.136 
The benefit of this option is that it allows the current state and territory legislation to 
remain largely unchanged. However, this option would not achieve uniformity on all 
aspects of long service leave because the state and territory legislation would be 
prescriptive on many aspects of the entitlement. It could also be more difficult for 
employers and employees to understand because the obligations could come from both 
federal and state legislation and employers and industry groups are likely to be concerned 
about retaining elements of state-based long service leave regulation because of the 
complexity involved in deriving an employment entitlement from both federal and state 
legislation.137  
As discussed earlier in the paper, it is likely that employers will feel disadvantaged if 
the level of legislated long service leave National Employment Standard is more generous 
than that which currently applies in a particular state because this will be an added cost to 
them.138 A further difficulty with this option is that it would require legislative 
amendments at both the federal and state and territory levels, which means that the 
Commonwealth and state workplace relations referral legislation might also require 
amendment to ensure that long service leave is not an excluded subject matter. 139 The NES 
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would only stipulate a minimum standard. Industry sectors or employers have the option of 
providing more than the minimum standard. However, the aim of this option was to ensure 
that a minimum standard was introduced. Other states may want to exceed the minimum 
standard in order to attract employees or keep existing entitlements.  
C. Option 3: Legislate a Minimum Long Service Leave Entitlement at the Federal 
Level and Allow States and Territories to Legislate More Generous Entitlements 
This option would create a National Employment Standard for the very basic aspects of 
long service leave based on the least generous entitlements currently operating across the 
various jurisdictions. state and territory legislation could then supplement the long service 
leave standard by providing more generous entitlements.  This option would operate 
similarly to the approach in the Fair Work Act in relation to the National Employment 
Standard that considers the entitlement to community service leave. The community 
service leave standard provisions contain a clause that explicitly states that state and 
territory laws are not excluded.140  Again, the drafting of the Commonwealth legislation 
would need to be carefully undertaken to avoid inconsistency issues.    
The benefit of this option is that the standard can be set at the lowest level currently 
applying in state and territory legislation and the states and territories will be able to 
maintain their current entitlements at a higher level. There is unlikely to be any resistance 
from employers as employees will not be disadvantaged. This option meets the 
government’s policy that commits to developing a long service leave standard as it will 
provide a minimum standard. The disadvantage of this option is that it is not a true 
harmonisation of long service leave entitlements for national system employers and 
employees as only a basic safety net would be set, with an increased safety net applying on 
a state by state basis, which causes employees to continue to have differing entitlements 
depending on geographical location across Australia. 
In order to implement this option, legislative amendments at both the federal and state 
and territory levels will be required. While states and territories would be able to continue 
legislating at or above any standard set in the long service leave National Employment 
Standard, amendments would still be required to ensure the state and territory legislation 
interacts appropriately with the Fair Work Act.141 The Commonwealth and state workplace 
relations referral legislation would also require amendment to ensure that long service 
leave is not an excluded subject matter. 142 
D. Option 4: Commonwealth to Exclusively Cover Long Service Leave through the 
National Employment Standard, with Appropriate Grandfathering or Transitional 
Arrangements for Employees in State and Territory Jurisdictions with Pre-existing 
Entitlements 
This option would involve the Commonwealth enacting a long service leave National 
Employment Standard that entirely covers the field of long service leave. This option 
would require comprehensive grandfathering or transitional arrangements for employees 
who are entitled to long service leave under state and territory legislation or pre-existing 
industrial instruments.143 A grandfathering clause, over a period of time, would allow 
employers and employees time to adjust to the changes in long service leave entitlement. 
An employee’s entitlements to long service leave would be subject to the terms of the 
transitional provisions contained in the Fair Work Act, which may provide a transitional 
period to align all long service leave entitlements or grant grandfathering status to 
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employees whose long service leave entitlements are derived from state and territory 
legislation or an applicable instrument. Transitional provisions could continue to apply 
until the employee’s existing employment ends or the employee becomes covered by a 
different instrument. The benefit of this option is that it is the most comprehensive solution 
as it allows a more prescriptive long service leave standard to be created. It is in line with 
the intent of a true national system as it would provide a single minimum long service 
leave standard for employers and employees. This would remove the complexity in 
determining where the employee entitlements and obligations were derived following a 
transitional period or upon the exhaustion of the grandfathering provisions. 
The disadvantage of this option is that grandfathering provisions and transitional 
periods are highly technical and it may be difficult for employers and employees to 
understand and implement. The complexity may arise due to the wide range of pre-existing 
long service leave entitlements and it will impose increased costs on employers over time. 
This would require very carefully drafted legislative provisions including a transitional 
Act. It would be complex and difficult for employers to administer in practice. While this 
would appear to be more of an administrative action or procedure, it is contended that it 
does provide an option. 
E. Option 5: Develop a Long Service Leave Insurance Scheme 
A further option for implementing a national long service leave scheme is to develop a 
mandatory insurance scheme, similar to the National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(‘NDIS’). The NDIS provides insurance cover for all Australians in the event of significant 
disability. The Productivity Commission made a recommendation that the funding of the 
scheme should be a core function of government, similar to Medicare.144 
Under this option, both the Commonwealth and the states and territories could come to 
an agreement about a national mandatory insurance scheme for long service leave 
entitlements. In order for this to occur, a set of standards would need to be developed by a 
committee comprising Commonwealth and state and territory government representatives, 
as well as employee and employer representatives. The standards would require wide 
consultation nationally to ensure the outcomes for employees are consistent with a set of 
agreed principles and objectives of Commonwealth and state and territory legislation. 
Given the consultation and agreement required, it would be impossible to reach an absolute 
conclusion as to the result. However, it is contended that it is still a viable option, albeit 
one that may be very difficult to achieve in practice. 
While the NDIS is not yet complete, similar considerations could be made for the 
development of a long service leave insurance scheme. It is envisaged that the scheme 
would operate to the effect that all affected and concerned employers were mandated to 
make a certain contribution for each of their employees towards an eventual long service 
leave entitlement. The contribution would be made to the Commonwealth, who would 
oversee the scheme, and who would make the employee payments at the time their 
entitlement crystallised. This option would require the Commonwealth to legislate a 
minimum national long service leave entitlement and would operate in conjunction with 
the other options examined in this paper.  
The disadvantage of this option is that it is likely that employers will be concerned 
about the possible added cost to them, although the Commonwealth will be able to 
consider possible funding options and it is arguable that a centralised scheme would reduce 
the long term costs to employers.145 The advantage of this option is that long service leave 
would effectively become a ‘portable’ entitlement that employees can transfer to other 
employers and industries where there is not a break in service. This is advantageous to 
employers as it gives them an advantage in the labour market and increases competition in 
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the current economic climate.146 While this option may appear to be simplistic, the 
government processes and consultation and the writing of new legislation would be quite 
involved, complex and time consuming. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the five options can be summarised as follows. The first option is to 
harmonise long service leave legislation across jurisdictions, providing consistency across 
all components of long service leave including a common standard that is contained in 
each statute across the jurisdictions. This option is strong because a national minimum 
standard for long service leave can be set in the Fair Work Act and it would create 
certainty for employers and employees on the minimum entitlement to long service leave. 
The disadvantage to this model is that some employers may need to increase the existing 
minimum entitlement, but this is of course advantageous to employees. While this option is 
appealing, it is noted that a key issue associated with harmonisation is the difficulty in 
getting the various governments to agree to an outcome and then that same governments 
actually implementing the legislation due to electoral cycle. 
The second and third options involve the Commonwealth parliament changing the Fair 
Work Act to legislate a national minimum standard that the states and territories could 
either completely supplement or supplement only some components. These options are 
seemingly simple; however, the disadvantages are that uniformity would not be achieved 
on all aspects of long service leave; it could be more difficult for employers and employees 
to understand; and the Commonwealth and state workplace relations referral legislation 
would also require amendment to ensure that long service leave is not an excluded subject 
matter, which is a complex process. 
The fourth option involves the Commonwealth enacting a long service leave National 
Employment Standard that entirely covers the field of long service leave with 
comprehensive grandfathering or transitional arrangements. While this is a comprehensive 
solution that achieves uniformity on long service leave, grandfathering provisions are 
highly technical and would be difficult for employers and employees to understand and 
implement.  
The fifth option is to develop a mandatory insurance scheme, whereby a scheme would 
operate to the effect that all employers were mandated to make a certain contribution for 
each of their employees towards an eventual long service leave entitlement. The 
contribution would be made to the Commonwealth, who would oversee the scheme, and 
who would make the employee payments at the time their entitlement crystallised. This 
option is advantageous to employers as it gives them an advantage in the labour market 
and increases competition. 
In weighing up the advantages, the disadvantages and the need for a national minimum 
long service leave standard, the most preferable option is the option of a harmonisation 
model. Given the success of the recent harmonisation of work health and safety laws, the 
potential issue of the difficulty in getting the various governments at all levels across 
Australia to agree to an outcome concerning long service leave and then that same 
governments actually implementing the legislation due to electoral cycle, is significant. 
This model would be developed through agreement of the Commonwealth and the 
states and territories. The representatives of the jurisdictions would need to build on the 
commonalities discussed in option 2 to create a national minimum standard for long 
service leave. For example, at the highest level, the most common entitlement is a 
qualifying period of 10 years, with 8.667 weeks entitlement and a further 4 ⅓ weeks after 
another 5 years service. For those employees in states and territories where an entitlement 
is higher, such as a qualifying period of 10 years with 13 weeks entitlement, the statutory 
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basis for the entitlement may continue as it will be over and above the national minimum 
standard.   
The harmonised model would work to the exact method used in the OHS 
harmonisation, whereby the Council of Australia Governments would formally commit to 
the harmonisation of long service leave laws by signing an Intergovernmental Agreement 
for Regulatory and Operational Reform in long service leave, containing the commitment 
of all states and territories and the Commonwealth to work together to develop and 
implement model long service leave laws in Australia. The effect of a ‘harmonisation’ 
model would be that a national minimum standard for long service leave will exist in state 
and territory statutes, creating certainty for employers and employees. However, all of the 
options examined above must be balanced with a strong consideration of the practical 
issues involved.  
In conclusion, a nationally consistent long service leave minimum standard would be a 
significant outcome in Australia as it will ensure that all employees are rewarded for long 
term service with an employer and will provide employees with a paid break from work 
while maintaining job tenure. Long service leave entitlements help employees to create a 
better work and life balance by rewarding employees with a break from work after long 
term service.  
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GLOBAL LAW FIRMS AS PROFESSIONAL GATEKEEPERS IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
STABILITY  
MAGDALENE D’SILVA∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews and critically analyses inter-disciplinary academic literature on global 
law firm governance and anti-money laundering regulation. The hypothesis which emerges 
from this review is that global law firms are professional gatekeepers in both corporate 
governance and financial system stability. These dual functions may in turn expose global 
law firms to a higher risk of financial crime due to their multi-jurisdictional one firm 
structure and seamless service offerings. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dominance of U.S. and U.K. … firms and the rise of the global firm … signal a new 
era where Anglo-American transnational lawyering is central to the global economy.1 
This paper critically analyses the impact of globalisation on the legal profession in the 
context of the global law firm service phenomenon by exploring the way in which global 
law firms fulfil gatekeeper roles in national and global financial systems through unwitting 
exposure to cross-border financial crime risks. These risks include for example: bribery, 
corruption and money-laundering. The analysis involves a review of current literature by 
some of the leading scholars in the areas of legal profession regulation, legal ethics, lawyer 
professional responsibility and law firm governance. The review and critical analysis 
attempts to establish potential research questions and to provide brief preliminary 
theoretical answers to those questions to create a foundation for future empirical research 
and debate by other academics, practising lawyers, legal profession organisations and 
commercial law firms in Australia and internationally. Leading scholars include Christine 
Parker,2 Joan Loughrey3 and John Flood,4 each of whom have adroitly illuminated the 
existence of a regulatory and ethical tension between the various professional 
responsibility duties owed by the individual Anglo-American common law lawyer to their 
client, and the duties they in turn owe to their employer firm which can contrast with the 
over-riding professional responsibility duties they simultaneously owe as officers of the 
courts in the jurisdictions where they are admitted and permitted to practice law. These 
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tensions are juxtaposed against the backdrop of national and potential international cross-
border regulation of law firms as organisations that employ individual lawyers to provide 
professional legal services to clients. The regulatory tensions between the individual 
lawyer’s over-riding duty to the court, to clients and then to themselves, contrasts with the 
responsibility of the law firm as a whole in which the individual lawyer is placed. This 
tension is receiving well deserved increased attention from legal scholars.5 However the 
literature also shows that the globalisation process allows law firms to operate both across 
and within other jurisdictions and their legal systems (whether common or civil law), 
which contain different laws, customs and legal traditions. As far as corporate governance 
and financial crime risk are concerned, this paper theorises that global law firms which are 
the subject of one form of legal services regulation in their home jurisdiction, may be 
inevitably exposed to a greater risk of regulatory breaches by virtue of offering seamless 
services in cross-border corporate and financial deals and transactions in other jurisdictions 
that take a different approach to legal services regulation. For example the regulation of 
lawyers and legal services within and across Australia, the United States and the United 
Kingdom is different. Global law firms operating in all of these jurisdictions must grapple 
with the regulatory differences. The question that arises from this is whether global law 
firms play a role in corporate governance and financial system stability at the global level 
and if so, what role? 
Global governance and regulatory issues for the world’s legal professions are directly 
connected to the economic uncertainty which continues to flow from the peak of the 2008 
global credit financial crisis. This uncertainty persists despite various sovereign debt re-
financing and fiscal stimulus measures (such as ‘quantitative easing’ in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom and more recently the numerous debt-restructurings for 
European Union nations such as Greece). Recent academic research shows that a 
widespread national culture of the financial crime of tax evasion was and continues to be a 
significant contributing factor to the financial problems afflicting Greece.6  However such 
a link may yet be drawn noting that organisations such as the G207 and International 
Monetary Fund8 have endorsed what is now (as of 16 February 2012) referred to as the 
revised Financial Action Task Force (FATF) International Standards on Combating 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (‘AML’). These 
endorsements might support an argument that a long-term international regulatory solution 
to global economic uncertainty and financial system instability needs to address financial 
crime risk in global transactions and money flows.9 
 A. Key Terms 
For the purposes of this paper some key terms and concepts need clarification. The term 
‘lawyer’ has different meanings in different jurisdictions, noting for example that in the 
United States lawyers are technically referred to as ‘attorneys’ whilst in the United 
Kingdom the traditional divide between ‘barrister’ and ‘solicitor’ remains, this tradition 
having been inherited by former colonial common law jurisdictions such as Australia. In 
this paper references to lawyer are thus broadly intended to encompass any registered legal 
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practitioner who holds a current practicing certificate regardless of their national 
jurisdiction. 
The term financial crime is variously used and understood in different contexts, 
depending on the criminal law of the national jurisdiction in which an activity is statutorily 
deemed to be unlawful.  Defining the scope of what constitutes financial crime is necessary 
because this materially affects the level of financial crime risk to which legal services may 
be exposed. The global context of this discussion would require a deeper exploration of the 
legal and other meanings of financial crime in a broader sense. For present purposes, the 
author adopts the classification of financial crime espoused by the International Monetary 
Fund:  ‘any non-violent crime resulting in financial loss.’10 This definition is useful 
because it enables the inclusion of various unlawful activities such as tax evasion and 
financial fraud which may arguably fall within the remit of what actually constitutes money 
laundering; a phenomenon that encompasses not only the traditional transactional layering 
and thereby concealment of illicit monetary proceeds, but potentially the concealment of 
any unlawfully obtained or detained property (such as tax evasion, restructuring a 
company’s operations to avoid responsibilities to creditors, or the purchase and sale of real 
estate).11 
Having preferred a wider remit with respect to what constitutes financial crime (of 
which money laundering is a key example), the research question that emerged from a 
critical analysis of the literature is whether and if so how, law firm legal services, 
particularly those provided on global transactions in property and finance matters, are 
exposed to the risk of unwitting involvement in non-violent unlawful criminal activity that 
causes financial loss to a third party.  The motive for law firm globalisation has been said 
to be driven by client demands for firms to have a presence abroad.12 However some 
commentary points to the possibility that a more likely agenda is that law firms themselves 
are chasing global money flows.13 Evidence to support this premise is however somewhat 
anecdotal and not concrete. Media reports in Australia for example have suggested that the 
strategy of some global law firms is to service foreign and local finance investment deals.14 
Comments on some large international law firm websites might reflect an intention to 
ostensibly strive to operate as one-firm15 and provide global clients with a seamless 
service.16  Putting aside for the moment questions about the authenticity of the ‘one-firm 
seamless service’17 (and by what criteria any law firm can claim the ‘global moniker’18) 
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the research hypothesis theorises that by establishing multi-jurisdictional offices to provide 
confidential legal services protected by legal professional privilege across national borders 
in foreign jurisdictions, this results in some lawyers within the same firm being exempt 
from direct AML regulation (such as in Australia). If the hypothesis is correct the result 
may be that global law firms which strive to provide seamless cross-border services but are 
not seamlessly regulated may be unwittingly exposed to a higher risk of cross-border 
financial crime. This risk arises because financial crime uses these legal protections, 
services and privileges to conceal its existence and commission.  
This paper therefore pre-supposes a global law firm to be any commercial law firm with 
offices outside its home jurisdiction that seeks to provide a seamless cross-border one-firm 
legal service to corporate clients. The nature, operation and model of a global law firm are 
also factors deserving of further critical analysis. They can directly influence a firm’s level 
of risk exposure to financial crime as well as to AML regulatory risk, depending upon 
whether the firm’s structure is for example, the traditional limited liability partnership 
(LLP) model or the newer alternative business structure (‘ABS’). The reason why a global 
law firm’s operational structure is relevant is that the structure itself may affect the flow of 
information between lawyers and partners across the firm given the doctrine of imputed 
knowledge in the traditional law firm partnership model with regard to confidential client 
information.19 This may in turn affect the AML regulatory culpability of the firm’s head 
office in its home jurisdiction by virtue of the actual knowledge or suspicion of money 
laundering held by the firm’s partners in an overseas office where AML regulation does 
not apply to lawyers, depending on whether that knowledge or suspicion is in fact 
transmitted to the firm’s head office partners. In other words: Is the knowledge or 
suspicion formed by the partners and lawyers in a firm’s overseas office, where lawyers 
are exempt from AML regulation, more likely to be transmitted to the managing partners 
of the firm’s home jurisdiction office (such as in the United Kingdom) where AML 
regulation does apply to lawyers? 
These preliminary research questions may also be relevant to other legal profession 
regulatory issues such as whether promoting compatible regulation of Anglo-American 
legal services20 to facilitate legal services as a trade export21 should adopt a global 
approach to all other aspects of legal profession regulation. Two aspects of the lawyer-
client relationship which are relevant for AML purposes are client confidentiality and legal 
professional privilege.22 This is important because legal professional privilege is defined 
and applied differently across various common law and civil law legal justice systems,23 
and has been relied upon by legal professions around the world to mount strong resistance 
to the imposition of AML regulation for lawyers.24 A consistent approach to AML 
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regulation may perhaps help to prevent global financial crime risks posed to the lawyer-
client relationship.  
Presently, legal professional regulation reform in countries such as Australia is focused 
on nationalisation which has amongst others, the aim of increasing gross domestic product 
for the purpose of national economic growth.25 However the benefit of a consistent 
international approach to AML regulation for lawyers is that it may in turn support the 
economic imperatives for nationalisation by enhancing the reputation of a particular 
nation’s profession.26  
B. Research Premise 
The paper’s proposed research hypothesis is to link the professional gatekeeper function of 
lawyers in corporate governance27 and financial system stability28  by considering the 
special role played by global law firms in preventing cross-border financial crime under 
AML. The suggested basis for making this link is the fact that the wider aims of corporate 
governance and AML are arguably the same; that is to strengthen corporate and financial 
system legitimacy and stability.29 The rest of the paper attempts to explain the link by 
considering the financial crime risks posed to the lawyer-client relationship in the context 
of global legal services. 
II. LAWYERS AS PROFESSIONAL GATEKEEPERS IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY 
Although there is no accepted universal meaning of the terms corporate governance and 
financial system stability the paper will broadly refer to corporate governance as the way 
in which a corporation’s decisions, behaviour and power are influenced, regulated and 
made accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders.30 The term financial system 
stability may be concurrently regarded as the process by which ‘financial intermediaries, 
financial markets and market infrastructure, facilitate the smooth flow of funds between 
savers and investors’31 to maintain soundness, confidence, legitimacy and integrity of the 
national and international (global) financial system.32 
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A. The Professional Gatekeeper in Corporate Governance: The Reputational 
Intermediary 
The concept of the professional gatekeeper in corporate governance has been variously 
defined. As Loughrey33 notes these definitions refer to private parties who can disrupt 
misconduct by not co-operating with wrongdoers or, sell products and services to clients 
which are needed to enter a particular market or engage in certain activity. A commonly 
cited definition of the corporate governance professional gatekeeper is John Coffee’s 
agency concept of the reputational intermediary, which is: 
 [A]n agent who acts as a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of 
the ‘signal’ sent by the corporate issuer. The reputational intermediary does so by lending 
or ‘pledging’ its reputational capital to the corporation, thus enabling investors or the 
market to rely on the corporation’s own disclosures or assurances where they otherwise 
might not. The gatekeeper has such reputational capital because it is a repeat player who 
has served many clients over many years.34  
Coffee’s reputational intermediary definition of a professional gatekeeper is preferred in 
this paper because it is directly linked to the way corporate and financial markets operate 
in the global financial system.35  Furthermore, the idea that internal and external lawyers 
are professional gatekeepers to corporate governance36 rose to prominence in the wake of 
the financial frauds and collapses of major corporate entities such as Enron when 
‘questions were raised about the lawyers for the banks who blessed a series of transactions 
which Enron designated as trading activity but which were … disguised loans to Enron’.37  
The economic fall-out from these corporate scandals led to significant law reform 
around the world that directly affected lawyers and legal services.  In the United States 
(‘US’) reforms were implemented under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200238 (‘Sarbanes-
Oxley’) which amongst other aims, recognises the corporate governance gatekeeper role of 
US securities lawyers as manifested in the ‘noisy withdrawal/up-the-ladder’39 reporting 
rule enacted by the US Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’). Under this rule lawyers 
must: 
[R]eport evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or 
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the 
chief executive officer of the company.40 
Where the in-house legal counsel or chief executive officer of a corporate client fails to 
adequately respond, the lawyer must then: 
 [R]eport the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to 
another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed 
directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.41 
These reforms arguably manifest state recognition of the role played by corporate lawyers 
in corporate governance and financial system stability because they directly regulate the 
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services and duties owed by the lawyers in the corporate/commercial lawyer-client 
relationship. Questions have been raised as to whether there should be similar regulation of 
the professional gatekeeper role played by Australian lawyers noting corporate scandals 
involving prominent Australian law firms.42 Although Australian corporate lawyer 
behaviour is already regulated to some extent under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)43 
there is no mandatory requirement for lawyers in Australia to externally report their 
suspicions or knowledge of regulatory breaches by clients or third parties. Perhaps the 
regulation of lawyers in Australia as professional gatekeepers first requires unification of 
the divergent perceptions of the lawyer’s role in the common law adversarial system. 
These perceptions range from the zealous client advocate who is independent of the state, 
to the responsible officer with over-riding duties to the court.44 As earlier stated these 
divergent perspectives apply to the role and conduct of the individual lawyer as well as the 
law firm as a whole.45 However it is the latter with which this paper’s analysis is 
concerned. 
B. The Professional Gatekeeper in the Financial System: The Financial 
Intermediary 
Whilst the professional gatekeeper in corporate governance focuses on the end result of the 
service provided by a lawyer to their client, the international regulatory landscape defines 
the professional gatekeeper in the financial system by focusing on the actual service itself. 
In other words, whilst the corporate governance professional gatekeeper is regarded as a 
non-participating reputational intermediary, the financial system notion of professional 
gatekeeper is regarded as an actively participating financial intermediary.  The idea that 
professionals such as lawyers should be regulated as actively participating financial 
intermediaries, first emerged in 1999 when the leaders of the Group of Eight Nations 
(‘G8’) issued the Moscow Communiqué a decade after the formation of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) by the Group of Seven (‘G7’) leaders. The FATF is a mandated 
inter-governmental anti-money laundering policy body consisting of 34 member states 
(including Australia) which released 40 ‘recommendations’ from 1990 to 2003 with the 
aim of fostering internationally agreed policies and standards to combat money laundering. 
An additional nine recommendations were also released following the 11 September 2001 
World Trade Centre attacks in New York, to combat terrorist financing (known as the 
‘FATF 40+9 Recommendations’).  The Moscow Communiqué recognised the role of 
financial intermediaries in money laundering schemes and said that the Group of Eight 
Nations (‘G8’) would consider requiring and enhancing suspicious transaction reporting by 
‘gatekeepers’ (such as lawyers) to the financial system.46 
The following two sections of this paper present the preliminary argument that both 
professional gatekeeper roles are concurrently fulfilled by global law firms. 
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III. FINANCIAL CRIME AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY 
A. The Gatekeeper Initiative: The 40+9 Financial Action Task Force Anti-Money 
Laundering Recommendations 
It is helpful to briefly explore the financial crime setting and its relevance to financial 
system stability. FATF released a consultation paper in 2002 known as the Gatekeeper 
Initiative47 which proposed a new AML regulatory framework that would apply to the non-
financial services professions such as lawyers. The academic literature refers to this 
framework as a typology of financial crime regulation and regulatory risk for legal 
services. The rationale for the FATF Gatekeeper Initiative was that money laundering, 
being regarded as a ‘process of obscuring the illegal origins of money derived from 
crime’,48 relies on professionals such as lawyers ‘who assist with transactions involving 
the movement of money in domestic and international financial systems’.49 Money 
laundering is therefore a secondary financial crime the aim of which is to conceal the 
proceeds gained from the commission of a predicate offence50 and therefore often follows 
the financial crimes of bribery, corruption, tax evasion and fraud.51 The impact of 
globalisation on money laundering is such that it now occurs ‘on a mass scale because the 
financial system can move money rapidly through bank accounts in several countries in a 
short period’.52 
The reason why financial crimes such as money laundering threaten financial system 
stability is that trust is considered to be a significant linchpin for the effective operation of 
the financial market economy as it depends on high levels of professional, legal and ethical 
standards of behaviour by market participants.53 The financial markets are nevertheless 
suspected to be an area in which products such as hedge funds and derivatives are used to 
commit the financial crimes of tax evasion and money laundering.54 As a report by the 
International Monetary Fund explains: 
A reputation for integrity … is one of the most valued assets by investors, financial 
institutions and jurisdictions. Various forms of financial system abuse may compromise 
financial institutions’ and jurisdictions’ reputation, undermine investors’ trust in them, and 
therefore weaken the financial system.55 
The FATF recommendations to combat money laundering risks were not treaty based so as 
to avoid imposing elaborate prescriptive regulatory procedures, in recognition that nations 
have their own diverse legal and financial systems.56  Instead, the FATF recommendations 
set minimum standards by which each nation can implement its own domestic regulation 
of those professional services (including banks, accountants and lawyers) that are 
unwittingly exposed to the risk of facilitating money laundering. The two main aims of the 
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recommendations are to prohibit and detect financial crime. The first aim is to be achieved 
through mandatory client and beneficial ownership identification and verification of the 
source of a transaction’s funds. Detection is then achieved through mandatory external 
reporting of suspicious transactions and activity by clients and related third-parties.57  
B. Australia 
Not all FATF member states have fully implemented its recommendations. For example 
Australia’s Federal Government enacted the first tranche of the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (Tranche 1) for institutions such as 
banks, which provide ‘designated financial services.’58  Legal services provided by 
lawyers (such as receiving and transferring client funds through a firm’s trust account) that 
would be otherwise caught under Tranche 1 as ‘designated financial services’, are 
specifically exempt unless the service is given in direct competition with licensed financial 
services providers.59  
The second tranche of Australia’s AML legislation (which is current in the form of 
draft amendments to Tranche 1 to extend the legislation’s application to professional 
groups  including lawyers), has not yet been enacted by Australia’s federal parliament, 
although it was originally intended to apply to professionals such as lawyers. Although 
Tranche 1 does not affect the law of legal professional privilege (‘LPP’),60 legal profession 
bodies raised concerns about the impact of Tranche 1 on LPP and client confidentiality in 
Australia, particularly regarding the imposition of a mandatory obligation on lawyers to 
make suspicious matter reports about their clients to an external body.61 However, a 
question still persists over whether lawyers still have other obligations to externally report 
knowledge or suspicion of criminal offences (including fraud and money laundering) under 
Australian criminal law.62 Otherwise, lawyers in Australia are not required to actively 
monitor clients or client matters from which suspicions or knowledge of money laundering 
activity could be acquired and international scholars have consequently observed that 
Tranche 2 of Australia’s AML regime ‘has not been adopted.’63  Nevertheless, signals 
from an Australian corporate regulator are that it will scrutinise lawyers acting in corporate 
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transactions in direct recognition of their gatekeeper role in the Australian financial 
system.64 
Interestingly, the FATF conducts periodic mutual evaluations of participating nations to 
highlight those jurisdictions which have not fully implemented the recommendations, 
arguably because if one country is weak ‘dirty money from around the globe is drawn to 
that jurisdiction’65 and ‘[n]ot compelled to report, lawyers become the obvious channel for 
money laundering.’66 A universal regulatory framework may thus be needed to monitor 
international/cross-border capital movements67 which may in turn capture global legal 
services. 
C. The Global Law Firm Link between the Corporate Governance and Financial 
System Professional Gatekeeper Roles of Lawyers 
This section considers the global law firm agenda for establishing a ubiquitous presence in 
cross-border transactions and whether this renders them as professional gatekeepers by 
being a reputational and financial intermediary. The theory proposed is that global law 
firms manifest a direct link between functions of the corporate governance gatekeeper and 
the financial system gatekeeper. This arises from a combined assessment of the findings of 
other academics which arguably points to the same functions played by commercial 
corporate lawyers and global law firms as reputational (corporate governance) and 
financial (financial system stability) intermediaries. It is contended that both functions 
involve seeking to ‘create value’ for clients through transactional legal skills68 that requires 
careful document creation and implementation by which a law firm effectively sells its 
intellectual capital.69 That law firm then publicly attaches its global brand reputation to 
‘sanctify the relationships that global actors form when they engage in business.’70 This 
dual gatekeeper role invites a critical analysis of the ‘threats to economic stability that are 
being generated by the globalisation of financial markets, and how lawyers are implicated 
in maintaining stability and yet paradoxically destabilising it’.71 
III. GLOBAL LAW FIRM EXPOSURE TO FINANCIAL CRIME RISK 
Having established a framework in which to argue for the professional gatekeeper role of 
global law firms as both reputational and financial intermediaries, further empirical 
research might be conducted to explore the routes by which global law firms may be 
exposed to the high risk of financial crime. As earlier stated, although a definitive link is 
yet to be drawn between financial crime and financial system stability, there is scope to 
argue that the link exists. Presuming for the present that the link exists then the exposure of 
global law firms to financial crime risk affects their ability to fulfil their financial 
intermediary gatekeeper function. The following sections therefore consider these risks by 
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way of a brief analysis of three areas of cross-border multi-national commercial legal 
services predominantly provided by global law firms. 
A. Transactional Legal Services and Financial Crime Risk 
It is important to clarify that the paper does not address law firms advising corporate 
clients on the legal but not financial aspects of an investment transaction or contract, where 
there is no issue of financial crime. In these cases the transaction’s financial risk does not 
pass to the lawyer and their firm because it arguably does and should remain with the 
client. What this section highlights is the nature of the relationship between global law 
firms and their financial institution clients and how the relationship’s purpose may expose 
the firm to a higher level of financial crime risk thereby impacting on its gatekeeper role in 
financial system stability. This entails briefly returning to the historical rise of the global 
law firm alongside the expansion of corporate and financial services clients such as 
investment banks. This expansion caused certain financial markets and therefore certain 
major international (now ‘global’) law firms to be predominantly based in the world’s two 
leading financial centres of New York and London, which are both now said to ‘matter 
more than others’.72  
Cross-border legal practice grew in direct response to that expansion and purportedly in 
response to the global business demands of clients in London and New York which 
resulted in an observation by leading scholars that US and UK law firms are leading the 
law firm race for global expansion.73  
The driving force behind the globalization of legal markets … has been the shift in the 
large transactions market (i.e., M&A, Capital Markets, complex Financing and Projects). 
The cross-border nature of these transactions, the concentration of these within the 
multinational group of companies and the growing dominance of UK and US law in these 
transactions has led to the need for an international capability if a firm is to be a serious 
competitor in this part of the market.74 
This globalisation agenda provokes the question of what it is that global law firms actually 
do which makes them special to the world’s leading financial centres? Some academic 
commentators have described the large international law firms and their lawyers as 
creating value75 by helping clients structure large transnational/cross-border transactions in 
this way: 
[A]s stabilisers in transnational business transactions replacing the function of national 
regulation in simpler, domestic transactions. These transnational transactions are puzzles 
for the lawyers to solve, using pieces of national law in their solution. The art of creativity, 
according to Flood and Sosa, comes in the way that lawyers combine bits of different 
national law with their prior experience in similar transactions to produce credible 
structures.76 
The notion that a lawyer’s role is to ‘create value’ has perhaps become trite77 and may 
deserve further in-depth analysis itself. If we presently accept that a hall mark of modern 
legal professionalism is indeed to create value for clients then the role of the global law 
firm lawyer as a professional gatekeeper in financial system stability arises in cross-border 
transactions because the lawyer and law firm’s function is to manage uncertainty by 
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legitimising financial deals.78 The hypothesis that global law firms are professional 
gatekeepers in financial system stability is crystallised by returning to the idea that a stable 
financial system relies upon trust. The global law firm thus acts as a trust stabiliser in the 
financial system by fulfilling its corporate governance professional gatekeeper reputational 
intermediary function. As Flood has said: 
But it is not just the brand; it is also the collective spirit of the law firm … that enables it to 
confirm that transactions will be accepted as real, true, and valuable by the commercial 
community at large … large law firm lawyers are endowed with priestly attributes, that by 
conferring their imprimatur on the transaction, the profane becomes sacred and believers 
have faith.79 
This power to influence market risk perception perhaps puts global law firms in an 
advantageous position because ‘only in the global, single firm form can the type of 
transnational lawyering … occur, and it is, therefore, this model that has become most 
prominent’.80 Further research might be needed to review the financial crime risks posed to 
front-end transactional legal services which might unwittingly occur through the legal 
advice itself. This is arguably because: 
The modern commercial lawyer is as much a manager as an adviser. At all events, he is a 
frequent participant in commercial conduct…It is no longer true … that the commercial 
lawyer … is simply a professional who gives advice but is not concerned with whether the 
client’s objective is achieved so far as it possibly can…Businessman want lawyers who are 
“business-minded”, capable of “getting the job done” or “pushing the deal ahead”…The 
promotional material in the glossy brochures of the major law firms accepts the need for 
the commercial lawyer to have business skills.81 
The global law firm commercial lawyer may therefore be exposed to financial crime risk 
due to the participating financial intermediary role he plays through planning and 
implementing commercial transactions which might ‘expose him to charges of conspiracy 
with the client or its executives.’82 Even where legal advice and services are legitimately 
given in the absence of any obligation on a lawyer to conduct AML client due diligence or 
suspicious transaction monitoring and external reporting, the question is whether and to 
what degree their legal services are exposed to the risk of being unwittingly used to 
facilitate organised financial crime.83  One example is mortgage fraud where a lawyer’s 
participation as a reputational intermediary can assist the commission of fraudulent 
transactions by ‘adding credibility’.84  
The point is that if a global law firm is exposed to financial crime risk, whether the risk 
is actual or regulatory, the firm’s reputation is sullied. This would adversely affect the 
firm’s ability to function as a reputational intermediary in corporate governance, and 
reduce its actual effectiveness as financial intermediary gatekeeper in the financial system.  
Ultimately, further and future research of these issues would in turn require consideration 
of the rule of law and the duty upon lawyers to uphold the rule of law. 
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B. Contentious Legal Services: International Arbitration and Mediation 
Corruption is the most pressing problem in international trade and commerce. It is 
pervasive, insidious and endemic in large areas of the world, particularly in what we term 
the ‘emerging markets’.85 
The same theory arguably applies to contentious legal services provided by global law 
firms. Although litigation through a nation’s public court system is what used to first come 
to mind when colloquial references are made to ‘back-end legal services’ the contentious 
global legal services that may be exposed to a higher risk of financial crime involve the 
private and confidential alternative dispute resolution methods of international 
(commercial) arbitration and mediation. 
Mediation (by and large) is a fully consensual dispute resolution process in which the 
parties are encouraged to mutually resolve their dispute by an independent non-judicial 
person.86 International commercial arbitration on the other hand is a dispute resolution 
method (that is not considered to be an alternative to litigation)87 by which the parties 
formally agree in advance (or on an ad-hoc basis) for an independent non-judicial person 
to arbitrate a dispute and make a binding enforceable decision. Theoretically, the 
international arbitration process gives the contracting parties access to cross-border justice 
through what some now refer to as the  new lex mercatoria88 as well as by giving 
commercial parties the liberty to select the arbitrator and arbitral seat.89 However, unlike 
litigation proceedings, which are largely conducted through a nation’s public court system, 
international arbitration has the commercial advantages of being supposedly more 
expedient and less costly, with perhaps its most attractive feature being its private and 
confidential non-public nature: 
People engaged in commerce choose arbitration in order to be outside the procedures of 
any national court. They frequently prefer the privacy, informality and absence of any 
prolongation of the dispute by appeal which arbitration offers.90 
As shall be considered further below, the features of international commercial arbitration 
that increase its attractiveness over litigation may also make it irresistibly attractive for use 
and abuse by financial crime perpetrators. This premise requires empirical testing, but 
theoretically accepting it for the present, the increasing popularity of international 
commercial arbitration in jurisdictions that exempt lawyers from AML regulation may 
pose a risk for financial system stability. It is interesting to note for example that at the 
peak of the global credit/financial crisis, arbitration case filings increased at some of the 
world’s leading arbitration centres. There was reportedly a 26.5 per cent increase at the 
London Court of International Arbitration and a 48 per cent increase at the German 
Institution of Arbitration.91 The sentiment of those who practice in this area is thus 
buoyant:  
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88  Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 747; Abul FM Maniruzzaman, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and International 
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?’ (1999) 14 (3) American University 
International Law Review 657. 
89  See generally, Nigel Blackaby et al, Hunter and Redfern on International Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) ch 1. 
90  This quote is taken from the case of West Tankers v RAS Runione Adriatica di Scurta SpA [2007] UKHL 4 
per Lord Hoffman at 17, as cited by Rashda Rana and Michelle Sanson, International Commercial 
Arbitration (Thomson Reuters, 2011) 10. 
91  Stephan Wilske, ‘The Impact of the Financial Crisis on International Arbitration’ (February2010) 65(1) 
International Dispute Resolution Journal 82, 84-5. 
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An outgrowth of a global economy is competition for international arbitration business. 
International arbitral institutions, including those that are in the arm of the state, are 
attempting to attract parties to file cases with them. This competition should heat up as a 
result of the boost in demand for time and cost-efficient arbitration services.92 
These figures do not correlate with nor support a presumption that an increase in 
international commercial arbitration automatically signals an increase in financial crime 
risk. What these figures do suggest is that a further review of international commercial 
arbitration services may be warranted in those jurisdictions such as Australia, where 
lawyers are exempt from direct AML regulation.  
Australia has implemented law reform to enhance its attractiveness as an international 
arbitral seat. In 2010 the Australian Federal Parliament passed a range of amendments to 
the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). The object of this legislation is to foster trade 
and commerce in Australia by encouraging commercial parties to: enter arbitration 
agreements, use arbitration as a dispute resolution method for commercial disputes and 
enable the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards regarding trade and commerce 
matters in Australian courts.93  
The main focus of the amendments … is to both increase the attractiveness of international 
arbitration generally as a dispute resolution method … and to encourage such parties to 
choose Australia as the venue for their arbitrations.94 
This recent push for more international arbitration to occur in Australia does not seem 
consistent with the disdain that has been previously expressed in other jurisdictions about 
the increasing juridification of commercial disputes through arbitration, such as in the area 
of construction, where lawyers are perceived to have ‘hijacked arbitration’95 and made 
arbitration ‘a more expensive process than straightforward litigation.’96 Added to this are 
anecdotal reports by international lawyers themselves, of incidents of corruption and 
money laundering through both mediation and international arbitration.97 As de Lotbiniére 
McDougall98 has explained, organised criminal organisations can use international 
arbitration to launder illicit money by simulating a commercial dispute between related 
corporate entities that prima facie appear to be unrelated. A false claim for damages based 
on forged evidence can result in an arbitral damages award that once enforced and paid 
through the courts, allows the transfer of illicit money without detection because ‘[u]nlike 
judicial proceedings, international arbitration offers … a degree of confidentiality, the 
freedom to organize the proceedings, and the ability to appoint accomplices as 
arbitrators’.99  
Other international arbitration financial crime risk scenarios include: the use of 
legitimate contracts to perpetrate money laundering schemes in ordinary transactions 
through the import and export of commodities in a foreign country using dirty money, 
which allows the money launderer to make illicit proceeds appear legitimate.100 
                                                
92  Ibid 86. 
93  International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 2D. 
94  Richard Garnett and Luke Nottage, ‘The 2010 Amendments to the International Arbitration Act: A New 
Dawn For Australia?’(2011) 7(1) Asian International Arbitration Journal 29, 31. 
95  John Flood and Andrew Caiger, ‘Lawyers and Arbitration: The Juridification of Construction Disputes’ 
(1993) 56 Modern Law Review 412, 432. 
96  Ibid. The average length of international arbitrations has been reported to be apparently between 17 to 20 
months. Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, CIArb Costs of International Arbitration Survey 2011 
<http://www.ciarb.org/conferences/costs/2011/09/28/CIArb costs of International Arbitration Survey 
2011.pdf>. 
97  Marriot, above n 85, 231; Tatiana Minaeva, ‘The Place of Arbitrators in Combating Money Laundering’ 
(2006) Stockholm International Arbitration Review 33. 
98  Andrew de Lotbiniére McDougall, ‘International Arbitration and Money Laundering’ (2005) 20(5) 
American University International Law Review 1021. 
99  Ibid 1023. 
100  Ibid 1024. 
 
 GLOBAL LAW FIRMS AS PROFESSIONAL GATEKEEPERS 
                                                                        53 
International arbitration is also said to be exposed to the financial crime risks of bribery, 
corruption and fraud.101 These risks are also present in mediation which being a more 
informal process not bound by the rules of evidence, arguably affords mediators more 
opportunity to detect criminal activity in the mediation process and therefore form an 
actual strong suspicion.102 Although senior opinion is that when confronted with 
corruption a mediator should immediately halt the mediation process, the question 
remaining is whether such mediator also has a duty to externally report their suspicion or 
knowledge and if so, to whom?103 
Similar issues have arisen in the context of litigation noting the English decision of 
Bowman v Fels104 which effectively confirmed that client legal professional privilege and 
the ordinary conduct of litigation by legal professionals are not caught by the offences 
under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002(UK)105 (‘POCA’). That provision 
effectively prohibits any involvement in arrangements that facilitate or are suspected of 
facilitating the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property. The effect of 
Bowman v Fels has been interpreted as exempting lawyers in the UK from a duty to report 
knowledge or suspicion of money laundering where it is acquired or has arisen in the 
course of litigation. However questions still remain over the legal, ethical and public policy 
position of lawyers acting in arbitrations or as arbitrators106 who become aware that a 
contract which is the subject of an international arbitration involves bribery, money-
laundering or corruption .107 Even where allegations of such crimes are dismissed by an 
arbitral tribunal, questions may persist over the enforceability of the tribunal’s award by 
the courts.108  
It is exactly this type of problem that is more pressing than ever in light of sustained 
international action against bribery and money laundering in recent years. These activities 
can no longer be discretely overlooked by multinational corporations or arbitral tribunals 
as an inevitable by-product of doing business in less-developed regions of the world.109 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to canvass these issues to the level they deserve, 
their existence is another area that may benefit from further empirical investigation of the 
potential financial crime risks that increased international arbitration activity may attract to 
legal services provided in jurisdictions where lawyers remain exempt from a regulatory 
obligation to conduct AML client due diligence and suspicious matter monitoring. 
                                                
101  Antonio Crivellaro, ‘Arbitration case law on bribery’ in Kristene Karsten and Andrew Berkeley (eds), 
Arbitration, Corruption, Money Laundering and Fraud (International Chamber of Commerce, 2003) 109; 
Alan Philip, ‘Arbitration – money laundering, corruption and fraud’ in Karsten and Berkeley, ibid 147. 
102  Marriot, above n 85, 235. 
103  Ibid. 
104  Jennifer Mary Bowman v William John Fels [2005] EWCA Civ 226 (8 March 2005, [42] (Lord Justice 
Brooke). 
105  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (UK) c 29, Part 7, s 328. 
106  Anonymous author, ‘Confidentiality and the Duty of Disclosure Sub-group 4: Impact of the initiatives on 
other areas of the law’(2003) 6(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 248, 250. 
107  Bernardo M Cremades and David J A Cairns, ‘Corruption, International Public Policy and the Duty of 
Arbitrators’ in the American Arbitration Association’s, Chapter 4 in the Handbook on International 
Arbitration and ADR (American Arbitration Association, 2nd ed, October 2010); Marriot, above n 85, 
233. 
108  Cremades and Cairns, above n 107, 37. de Lotbiniere McDougall, above n 98, and others have 
commented, an arbitral award that is found to be tainted by evidence of illegality (such as money 
laundering), might not be enforced under Article 36 of the United Nationals Commission on International 
Trade Law, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, on the grounds of it being contrary to 
national public policy. This is reflected in Australian legislation. See the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 
(NSW) s 36(1)(b)(ii); International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 8(7)(b). 
109  Cremades and Cairns, above n 107, 37. 
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C. Multi-jurisdictional Office AML Regulatory Risk 
A law firm partnership structure that genuinely operates as one-firm with multi-
jurisdictional offices around the world, may be inherently exposed to the financial crime 
regulatory risks presented by disparate national laws in an environment where ‘money 
launderers are known to use lawyers’ accounts to conceal funds’.110 The regulatory 
inconsistencies faced by the multi-jurisdictional lawyer acting for clients across different 
borders are a quandary.111  When we extend this quandary from the individual lawyer to 
the global law firm, further empirical analysis is needed to assess whether and if so how 
the law firm as a whole may be exposed to criminal liability for AML offences under 
applicable legislation. This question arises due to the idea that global law firms are 
‘seamless service’ structures. The supposedly seamless nature of global law firms may 
arguably increase the likelihood that information and knowledge of unlawful activity, as 
held by the partners of a firm’s overseas office, is physically passed to the managing or 
other partners of the head office in the home jurisdiction where AML regulation does 
apply to lawyers. The seamless nature of global law firms may be such that this 
information is in fact transmitted to the files, record retention management systems and 
email in-boxes in the head office where those lawyers and partners have direct access. 
Although AML regulation such as the UK’s POCA, does not apply to lawyers acting 
outside its jurisdiction, questions have been raised by legal profession organisations about 
the potential extraterritorial applicability of POCA, not only to individual lawyers but also 
limited liability partnerships (‘LLPs’).112 This arises because pt 7 of POCA creates 
offences for a failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering by ‘persons’ 
in the UK, whether they be individual natural persons (including foreign lawyers who 
conduct fly-in fly-out legal services) or corporate legal entities. In this regard guidance 
might be obtained from the evolution of criminal law in jurisdictions such as the UK and 
Australia which has attempted to trace corporate criminal culpability back to the persons 
within a company who are ‘directing its mind and will’ (such as the Chief Executive 
Officer and/or board of directors).113 Can the same criminal culpability for AML 
regulatory offences be applied to the global law firm structure that seamlessly operates in 
foreign jurisdictions where AML laws do not apply to lawyers? Can the knowledge or 
suspicion of money laundering activity by partners in an overseas law firm office (recalling 
this includes knowledge of financial or property proceeds derived from another predicate 
offence) be factually traced back to the directing mind and will of the firm’s partners in the 
home office? This question and others have been presciently raised by legal profession 
bodies (such as the Law Society of England and Wales)114 and the following diagram 
attempts to more clearly illustrate the quandary. 
  
                                                
110  John W Brooks and Roberta Vassallo, ‘Attorney Cathy’s Quandary, Or, Can The Gatekeeper Initiative Be 
Reconciled with the Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law?’ (2007) 41 The International Lawyer 59, 64. 
111  Ibid 61-2. 
112  Consider the response of The Law Society to the SRA Consultation on the Regulation of International 
Practice Law Society of England and Wales (February 2012) which states at 2-4, that the SRA has the 
power to regulate both firms and individuals under the Legal Services Act 2007 (UK)  c 19, see pt 3, ss 
13(2), 15, 18.  
113  This principle, as first enunciated in the English case of Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, 
has been previously criticised as failing to enable criminal culpability to be found against corporations 
where the alleged conduct can only be attributed to middle and lower management: see Brent Fisse, ‘The 
Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model’ (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 277, 
278. 
114  Consider, the United Kingdom’s Law Society’s Anti-Money Laundering Practice Note (October 2012) 
<http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/aml/ >. 
 
 GLOBAL LAW FIRMS AS PROFESSIONAL GATEKEEPERS 
                                                                        55 
Figure 1 – Global Law Firm Acts on a Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 1 above, a global law firm acts on a cross-border transaction in its London and 
Sydney offices. The client is a Chinese investor who gives instructions to the firm’s 
partners in the Sydney office to issue a take-over bid for an Australian company. Some 
aspects of the matter require legal advice from the London partners due to the fact funds 
for the bid are to be raised on the European capital markets. The Sydney partners suspect 
that the client has paid bribes to Australian officials to approve aspects of the bid and they 
know that the third party Australian company (which is being represented by another 
global law firm and is the subject of the client’s take-over bid) has breached Australian 
environmental protection laws. 
D. Questions 
Question that arise include: what and whether any client due diligence identification or 
mandatory reporting is made by the partners in the London or Sydney office regarding the 
knowledge and suspicions held by the Sydney partners.  
Where knowledge is factually and automatically conveyed from the Sydney office to 
the London office under a one-firm seamless structure, does a duty then fall upon the 
firm’s London partners to externally report this transmitted knowledge of the transaction’s 
third party’s breach of Australian environmental laws, to the relevant UK authority? 
Presuming that the nature of the work carried out by the partners of both offices falls 
within the definition of ‘regulated work’ under the UK’s POCA, do the Sydney partners 
rely on the London partners to comply with client due diligence requirements under UK 
law? Or, on the other hand, if most of the legal work and therefore monitoring of the client 
and the transaction itself can realistically only be conducted by the Sydney office partners 
within Australia, how much if any suspicious activity monitoring and reporting would 
occur when lawyers in Australia are prima facie exempt from such obligations under 
Tranche 1 of Australia’s AML regulatory regime?  
London Office 
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Finally, what is the entire firm’s criminal liability risk for committing failure to disclose 
knowledge and suspicion offences under POCA back in the UK, where under a seamless 
service structure, suspicions or actual knowledge by the partners in the Sydney office can 
be traced back to the directing mind and will of the partners in London?  
The answers to these questions will depend upon further quantitative and qualitative 
research of the structural operation of global commercial law firms, alongside analysis of 
legal profession regulation in those jurisdictions where global law firms are predominantly 
based. Global commercial law firms appear to fulfil a distinct and vital role in both 
corporate governance and financial system stability and further research may help to 
bolster and protect the broader functions that they serve. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers are likely to become more attractive to money launderers if they remain the only 
profession which can avoid disclosing suspicion to the authorities by taking advantage of 
the LPP exception.115 
Further critical investigation of global law firm exposure to cross-border financial crime 
risk is important at a time of ongoing international financial system instability and 
disparate AML laws across different jurisdictions.  Although empirical research is also 
required to obtain adequate evidence by which to test the veracity of the actual financial 
crime risks posed to global law firm services, present studies and academic literature 
indicate a need for more critical analysis of the role played by these firms in the national 
and global financial system. By linking the dual roles of professional gatekeepers in both 
corporate governance and the financial system with regard to AML as a potential prototype 
for financial crime regulation generally, the research questions outlined in this paper are 
designed to prompt a broader search for a long-term solution to the financial crime risks 
posed to the global lawyer-client relationship. 
Further research would also depend on the collaborative co-operation between 
academics and global law firms. In the meantime, as more global law firms arrive in 
Australia their potential unwitting risk of exposure to cross-border financial crime risk 
deserves more attention before the enactment of Tranche 2 of Australia’s AML regime. 
                                                
115  Middleton and Levi, above 83, 137. 
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THE FINANCIAL ADVISER AS FIDUCIARY 
A BRAVE NEW WORLD? 
KRISTY RICHARDSON AND JENNY BUTLER* 
ABSTRACT 
The November 2009 Report delivered by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services examined the role of financial advisers in the 
Australian context. The Parliamentary Committee questioned whether the apparent tension 
between client-focussed financial advice and product-focussed financial advice would be 
remedied by parliament imposing a statutory fiduciary duty of care upon financial advisers. 
The Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011(Cth) and the 
Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011(Cth) 
have now been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate. This paper suggests 
that the imposition of a statute based duty should not represent entry into a brave new 
world but is a reflection of the role that financial advisers play in contemporary society. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, Professor Malcolm Cope observed that, ‘[t]he courts have declined to adopt any 
comprehensive definition of who is a fiduciary and have left open the possibility that such 
a relationship might arise in an infinite variety of circumstances.’1 He noted however, that 
the courts have extended the duty of care into the area of financial services where there is, 
due to the nature of the specific relationship on the facts, ‘a reasonable expectation on the 
part of one party, to the relationship that the other will act in the interests of that party and 
not in the interests of himself or herself or the interests of some third party’.2 This means 
that a fiduciary relationship is not presumed to apply in every financial adviser/client 
relationship. For such a relationship to exist, the specific facts and circumstances of each 
case will need to be considered. Professor Cope’s statements were made before scandals 
such as the Opes Prime and Storm Financial collapses in 2008.3 Undoubtedly these 
scandals had an adverse effect on the public’s perception of financial advisers as the 
failures called into question the role, function and standard of financial advisers. These 
                                                
*  Associate Professor Kristy Richardson, Central Queensland University, Business Research Group, School 
of Commerce and Law; Mrs Jenny Butler, Central Queensland University, Business Research Group, 
School of Commerce and Law. A version of this paper was presented at the 1st Annual Financial Planning 
Research Symposium, Brisbane, 15 and 16 November 2011. It has been updated to reflect the changes 
which have occurred after the date of the Symposium. 
1  Malcolm Cope, ‘A Comparative Evaluation of Developments in Equitable Relief For Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty and Breach of Trust’ (2006) 6(1) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 
118, 121. 
2  Ibid. Professor Cope goes on to note that, ‘[a]side from lawyers and their clients, the other professional 
relationship in which breach of fiduciary duty claims are being raised, is in the context of the relationship 
of a financial adviser and client. All of the usual fiduciary duties may be brought into play, although as yet 
the body of case law is sparse, but is steadily increasing as a result of the growth of financial advisory 
work undertaken by banks, financial institutions, firms of accountants and others operating as independent 
financial advisers. There have been instances of successful claims based on conflict of duty and interest 
established against financial advisers, and of additional obligations having to be discharged because of the 
advisory role undertaken which will result in the court examining the quality of the advice and the fairness 
of the transaction. There have also been instances in which the courts have intervened where there has 
been a conflict of duty and duty on the part of the manager (citations omitted): at 127.  
3  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has dedicated websites for information relating to 
the collapses. See Overview of ASIC’s Storm Website <https://storm.asic.gov.au/storm/storm.nsf> and 
Opes Prime <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Opes+Prime?openDocument>. 
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calls were not only made in the public arena4 but resonated into the political domain 
ultimately resulting in the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services (‘the Parliamentary Committee’) being convened to ‘inquire into and report … on 
issues associated with recent financial product and services provider collapses’.5 The 
absence of financial advisers falling into an established category of fiduciary relationship 
was highlighted in the Report delivered by the Parliamentary Committee. This absence 
provided the impetus to the Parliamentary Committee to support, ‘the proposal for the 
introduction of an explicit legislative fiduciary duty on financial advisers requiring them to 
place the clients’ interests ahead of their own.’6 The Parliamentary Committee suggested 
that an explicit recognition of a fiduciary duty being owed to clients by financial advisers 
would assist in resolving any conflicts of interest issues that seem inherent in the role of 
the financial adviser. The federal government responded by proposing that a ‘best interests 
obligation’ be incorporated into the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).7 The best interests 
obligation is accepted as not being akin to establishing a fiduciary relationship as between 
financial adviser and client but something lesser.8 Whilst the statutory best interests 
obligation may be regarded as something lesser it is suggested, notwithstanding, that the 
relationship between financial adviser and client is such that the fiduciary duty ought to 
apply to financial advisers. It should apply not only based upon the professional 
relationship that financial advisers have with respect to their clients but society’s 
expectations of the role financial advisers now fulfil.  
The paper is organised by initially examining the notion of the fiduciary relationship. 
This is followed by an examination of the duty imposed upon fiduciaries. This includes 
reference to the historical conception of the role of the financial adviser and seeks to 
                                                
4  See for example, Michael West, ‘Storm Turns into Typhoon’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 12 
December 2008 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/storm-turns-into-typhoon-20081212-6x2y.html>; 
Michael West, ‘No Shelter from Storm’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 December 2008 
<http://www.smh.com.au/business/no-shelter-from-storm-20081211-6wgr.html>; Richard Webb, 
‘Countdown to the big clean-up’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 2 May 2010 
<http://www.smh.com.au/business/countdown-to-the-big-cleanup-20100501-u09g.html>; Alan Kohler, 
‘Opes Prime Collapse: Billion Dollar Bust’, The Business Spectator, 29 March 2008 
<http://www.thebusinesspectator.com.au> at 26 October 2010. 
5  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Commonwealth Parliament, 
Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia (November 2009) 1 (‘2009 Inquiry’). The 
Committee’s Terms of Reference required the Committee to pay particular reference to: 
1. The role of financial advisers; 
2. The general regulatory environment for these products and services; 
3. The role played by commission arrangements relating to product sales and advice, including the 
potential for conflicts of interest, the need for appropriate disclosure, and remuneration models for 
financial advisers 
4. The role played by marking and advertising campaigns; 
5. The adequacy of licensing arrangements for those who sold the products and services; 
6. The appropriateness of information and advice provided to consumers considering investing in those 
products and services, and how the interests of consumers can best be served; 
7. Consumer education and understanding of these financial products and services; 
8. The adequacy of professional indemnity insurance arrangements for those who sold the products and 
services, and the impact on consumers; and 
9. The need for any legislative or regulatory change.  
Added later was the requirement that: 
The committee will investigate the involvement of the banking and finance industry in providing finance for 
investors in and through Storm Financial, Opes Prime and other similar businesses, and the practices of banks 
and other financial institutions in relation to margin lending associated with those businesses. 
6  Ibid 110. 
7  See Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011 (Cth) s 961C(1); and Corporations 
Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth) s 961B. 
8  See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Commonwealth Parliament, 
Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011 and Corporations Amendment (Further 
Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 (29 February 2012) (‘2012 Inquiry’) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=corporations_ctte/f
uture_fin_advice/report/index.htm>. 
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reconcile that with the fiduciary principle. This is followed by a comment upon the 
potential impacts of the imposition of a statutory duty of care. 
II. THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
Professor PD Finn has noted that the, ‘fiduciary law’s concern is to impose standards of 
acceptable conduct on one party to a relationship for the benefit of the other where the one 
has a responsibility for the preservation of the other’s interests.’9 Professor Finn suggests 
then that ‘[t]he “fiduciary” standard for its part enjoins one party to act in the interests of 
the other – to act selflessly and with undivided loyalty.’10 Because of the fiduciary 
standard Perkins and Monahan suggest that:  
The standard of care prescribed for fiduciary duties is higher than the normal contractual or 
tortious duties of care and include a rebuttable presumption that the adviser has an undue 
influence over the client. It is the adviser therefore who bears the onus of proof that the 
terms of their engagement and remuneration do not conflict with the fiduciary duty to his 
or her client.11 
Whilst this statement of the duty is clear there is no comprehensive definition of who is a 
fiduciary or a codification of the relationships that are regarded as fiduciary.12 Rather the 
court will consider the nature of each relationship deciding whether a fiduciary relationship 
exists. If the relationship falls outside the accepted categories of fiduciary relationships the 
existence or not of a fiduciary relationship will occur on an ad hoc13 basis and depend 
upon an application of the principles underlying the process of identification. As Professor 
Cope identifies: 
Key factors singled out in the leading Australian High Court authorities have been a 
position of disadvantage or vulnerability on the part of one of the parties, which causes 
him or her to place reliance on the other, and in undertaking to act for or on behalf of, or in 
the interests of the another in the exercise of a power that will affect the interests of that 
other in a legal and practical sense.14 
One of the leading High Court authorities referred to by Professor Cope is Hospital 
Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation.15 The comments of Mason J are oft 
quoted as indicating the justification for a fiduciary relationship to exist. As Mason J noted 
in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation: 
The accepted fiduciary relationships are sometimes referred to as relationships of trust and 
confidence or confidential relations … viz, trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, 
solicitor and client, employee and employer, director and company, and partners. … The 
relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special 
opportunity to exercise the power of discretion to the detriment of that other person who is 
accordingly vulnerable to abuse for the fiduciary of his position. The expressions ‘for’, ‘on 
behalf of’ and ‘in the interests of’ signify that the fiduciary acts in a ‘representative’ 
character in the exercise of his responsibility …16 
Given that the categories of fiduciary are not closed the test becomes one of looking to the 
nature of the relationship as between the parties. As Professor Finn suggests: 
                                                
9  PD Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in TG Yourdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 1989) 
2. 
10  Ibid 4. 
11  Michael Perkins and Robert Monahan, Estate Planning (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2008) 364. 
12  Cope, above n 1,120. 
13  Professor Finn has noted that, ‘[t]hey can arise ad hoc because in the actual circumstances of a relationship 
the requisite ascendancy or trust has in fact been obtained, or given, or confidential information has in fact 
been acquired.’: Finn, above n 9, 43. 
14  Cope, above n 1, 121. 
15  (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
16  Ibid 96-7. 
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The initial difficulty is with the term ‘adviser’ itself. When used simply to designate a 
person who provides or is expected to provide information, opinion, or prediction to 
another either entirely voluntary or after solicitation so as to possibly inform that other in 
making a decision, it covers such a diverse range of social and business possibilities as to 
be uninstructive as a term of legal import. It is therefore not surprising to find judicial 
observations to the effect that ‘the mere giving of advice does not convert a business 
relationship … into a fiduciary relationship’. It is likewise, not surprising to find the 
regular assertion that advisers, at least of particular types, are fiduciary.17 
There is therefore some difficulty with the terms ‘advice’, ‘information’ or ‘opinion’ being 
relied upon to determine whether or not what exists between financial adviser and client is 
a fiduciary relationship. A more precise test needs to be applied to determine whether the 
relationship between financial adviser and client is a fiduciary one. To that end, Professor 
Finn suggests that the following questions should be asked of any situation to determine 
the existence or not of a fiduciary relationship: 
 
1. What are the nature, purpose and progress of the actual relationship between the 
parties particularly as manifest in their dealings inter se 
2. What, given the circumstances of the relationship, is the one party entitled to 
expect (generally or in particular circumstances) of the other in or in virtue of the 
relationship: that he will act on his own interests; that he will have regard to the 
former’s interests; or that he will act in the former’s interests? 
3. Are there any independent reasons in public policy which, of themselves, call for 
the regulation of the conduct of one party, or which would justify according a 
significant primacy to the expectation of the other?18 
 
Relevantly Professor Finn suggests with respect to these questions that: 
The one matter that warrants present emphasis is that reasonable expectations – an 
amalgam of actual expectations and judicial prescription – are a potential factor in the 
identification of the standard appropriate to a given situation.19  
Arguably, it is this notion of ‘reasonable expectations’ that is a more precise determinative 
factor as it does not rely on the need to determine whether what was being provided by the 
adviser was ‘mere advice’, ‘information’ or ‘opinion’. As Professor Cope identifies the 
reasonable expectation approach is one: 
… which requires the establishment of a reasonable expectation on the part of one party, to 
the relationship that the other will act in the interests of that party and not in the interests of 
himself or herself or in the interests of some third party. The expectation must be such that 
the fiduciary must act not merely having regard to the other party’s interests, but must act 
solely and selflessly in the interests of the beneficiary.20  
Arguably where there is a ‘reasonable expectation’ on the part of a client, the ability for the 
relationship of financial adviser and client to fall within the scope of a fiduciary 
relationship is far more evident. Indeed, given this adjustment in focus to determine 
whether a fiduciary relationship exists or not based upon the reasonable expectations 
approach, Vince Battaglia suggests that, ‘it would seem that the financial services industry 
provides many circumstances where there is a potential for a fiduciary relationship to 
arise.’21 On that point, Professor Finn explains: 
                                                
17  Finn, above n 9, 49. 
18  Finn, above n 9, 7. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Cope, above n 1, 121. 
21  Vince Battaglia, ‘Dealing with conflicts: The equitable and statutory obligations of financial services 
licensees’ (2008) 26 Company and Securities Law Journal 483, 485. As Professor Cope noted, 
‘[p]otentially many kinds of financial service relationships are open in scrutiny, including banks when 
they come to occupy the position of an investment adviser. Under the approach based on the reasonable 
expectation of the client, such findings are open irrespective of the level of sophistication of the customer 
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… fiduciary responsibilities will be exacted where the function of the adviser represents 
himself as performing, and for which he is consulted, is that of counselling an advised 
party as to how his interests will or might best be served in a manner considered to be of 
importance to his personal or financial well-being, and in which the adviser would be 
expected both to be disinterested, save for his remuneration, and to be free of adverse 
responsibilities unless the contrary is disclosed at the outset.22 
In the context of the role and function of the financial adviser/client relationship the 
demarcation between the provision of advice and information is not an easy one to 
specifically pinpoint. It becomes more a matter of considering the relationship and 
reasonable expectations the party had given a particular relationship situation. Given this, 
Battaglia argues that: 
The best view is that a relationship in a financial services context is to be marked as 
fiduciary only after an examination of the facts. An examination of the facts requires an 
assessment, in particular, of whether the contract of engagement permits the pursuit of 
multiple interests, and it cannot be said a priori that all professional relationships, where a 
financial service is provided … are fiduciary in character.23 
Such an examination of the facts and circumstances is not required if the relationship is 
accepted as falling into one of the established fiduciary relationships. In other words, if 
financial advisers have a statutorily imposed duty of care, the examination of the clients’ 
‘reasonable expectations’ becomes irrelevant. The existence of a fiduciary relationship 
between financial adviser and client will no longer be found on an ad hoc basis but will 
exist as an established relationship. Where a fiduciary relationship does exist the 
requirement to then act in accordance with the fiduciary duty will have a dramatic effect 
upon the relationship as the duty must be seen to have been discharged for liability to be 
avoided. Given the nature of the fiduciary relationship, compliance with the duty becomes 
significant in the context of the financial adviser/client relationship.  
III. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL 
ADVISER/CLIENT 
It is accepted that the fundamental duties of a fiduciary are that a fiduciary must not place 
himself or herself in a situation where their interest will conflict with that of the client 
without the client’s express, informed consent. Also, a fiduciary must not make a profit out 
of the relationship without the client’s express and informed consent.24 As Professor Finn 
notes: 
Two themes, it may be noted, are embodied in this: the one concerns itself with misuse of 
the fiduciary position: the other with conflicts of duty and interest or conflicts of duty 
arising in or in virtue of that position.25  
Once the role of the financial adviser is examined in more detail, particularly as (explained 
below) the role of the financial adviser has emerged, there is an inherent conflict of interest 
in the relationship. In that respect in its report the Parliamentary Committee noted that: 
A significant conflict of interest for financial advisors occurs when they are remunerated 
by product manufacturers for a client acting on a recommendation to invest in their 
financial product.26 … These payments place financial advisers in the role of both broker 
and expert adviser, with the potentially competing objectives of maximising remuneration 
                                                                                                                                  
or the ability of the customer to accept or reject the advice. It does not require a total assumption of power 
by the adviser or total reliance of the client on the adviser.’: Cope, above n 1, 122-123. 
22  Finn, above n 9, 27. 
23  Battaglia, above n 21, 486 (emphasis in original). 
24  Perkins and Monahan, above n 11, 364. 
25  Finn, above n 9, 27. 
26  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ‘2009 Inquiry’, above n 5, 75. 
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via product sales and providing professional, strategic financial advice that serves clients’ 
interests.27 
These issues need to be considered in an historical context, particularly in the context of 
the emergence of financial advisers within the industry. As Perkins and Monahan note in 
their text: 
The policy direction of government is certainly to redefine the role of financial product 
advisers who are now being seen to be representatives of the interests of the financial 
product consumer, not primarily the financial product provider. This tension is not present 
in relation to other professions in servicing the financial services industry as those other 
professions have not had the experience of being developed first as a distribution channel 
for financial service products and only more recently as a recognised profession and source 
of client rather than product-focussed advice.28 
The Parliamentary Committee also referred to this historical legacy. The Parliamentary 
Committee described that legacy as being, ‘potentially inconsistent with contemporary 
expectations that financial advisers provide a professional service that meets their clients’ 
best interests’.29 Despite the apparent societal change in the expectation of the role and 
function of a financial adviser the Parliamentary Committee noted that: 
The most common method for providing financial advisory services in Australia is through 
one of the approximately 160 dealer groups currently operating in Australia. There are just 
over 18,000 financial advisers in Australia working for 749 advisory groups operating over 
8,000 practices. The largest 20 dealer groups hold approximately 50 per cent of the market 
share. Around 85 per cent of financial advisers are associated with a product manufacturer, 
either as financial advisers working within the group and using the dealer’s support 
services or as directly employed authorised representatives under that corporate entity’s 
AFSL (Australian Financial Services Licence).30 
This tension between the role and function of the financial adviser and the management of 
conflicts of interest was expressed by the Parliamentary Committee in the following way: 
The financial advice industry has significant structural tensions that are central to the 
debate about conflicts of interest and their effect on the advice consumers receive. On one 
hand, clients seek out financial advisers to obtain professional guidance on the investment 
decisions that will serve their interests, particularly with a view to maximising retirement 
income. On the other hand, financial advisers act as a critical distribution channel for 
financial product manufacturers, often through vertically integrated business models or the 
payment of commissions and other remuneration-based incentives.31 
When examining whether the financial adviser/client relationship is fiduciary in nature, the 
apparent shift in the reasonable expectation of clients flowing from the financial 
adviser/client relationship is difficult to reconcile with the structure of the industry and the 
contemporary role of a financial adviser. If a fiduciary duty exists the central issue will 
become one of how to manage the conflict of interest that inheres in the provision of 
financial advice. The resolution of any conflicts of interest becomes even more important 
if the fiduciary relationship falls within one of the established categories of relationship as 
there is no opportunity to argue that the relationship does not exist on the facts of a 
particular case. 
The report of the Parliamentary Committee canvassed how financial advisers might 
manage32 disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and commented that: 
                                                
27  Ibid 75-6. 
28  Perkins and Monahan, above n 11, 358. 
29  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ‘2009 Inquiry’, above n 5, 69 
30  Ibid 16. 
31  Ibid 69-70. 
32  As required by ss 947B and 947C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
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The Committee is of the opinion that disclosure documents are too long and confusing for 
conflicts of interest caused by commission-based remuneration and vertical ownership 
structures to be properly understood by consumers. There are also limits to the usefulness 
of disclosure, however clear and concise, in an environment where clients have already 
committed in their mind to their trusted adviser’s chosen strategy. Present conduct 
standards are useful in that they prohibit clearly inappropriate advice being given to 
consumers, but the threshold is low enough to allow advice that favours the adviser’s 
interests above those of the client. Therefore, consumers are not necessarily getting advice 
that is in their best interests but, because of the limitations of disclosure often do not 
realise this.33  
The Parliamentary Committee recommended then that the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) be 
amended so as to require advisers to disclose prominently in marketing material the 
restrictions on the advice they are able to provide consumers and any potential conflicts of 
interest.34 The Parliamentary Committee was of the view that, ‘[t]his is particularly 
important, where conflicts of interest attributable to the ownership structure, will exist 
even if commission payments to advisers are eliminated as a form of remuneration.35 
Whether a court will accept this as satisfying the fiduciary duty will remain to be seen. 
In addition to the above recommendation with respect to disclosure the Parliamentary 
Committee was of the opinion that: 
The regulatory framework has not compelled the industry to shift from acting as a 
distribution network to providing a professional unbiased service. Instead, the transition 
from product sales to professional advice seems to be occurring gradually as a 
consequence of some sections of the industry’s desire to improve consumer confidence in 
their services.36 
In an attempt to force this shift the Parliamentary Committee was of the opinion that, 
‘[t]hat the Corporations Act [needs to] be amended to explicitly include a fiduciary duty 
for financial advisers operating under an AFSL, requiring them to place their clients’ 
interests ahead of their own.’37 Whilst the Parliamentary Committee drew, ‘no conclusion 
about whether such a duty would automatically preclude the payment of commissions to 
financial advisers’ it made a recommendation that ‘the remuneration structures that are 
incompatible with a financial adviser’s proposed fiduciary duty be removed.38  
In terms of the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest the issue of remuneration and 
organisational structures will need to be considered and will become an even more 
pressing consideration if a fiduciary relationship is accepted to exist between the financial 
adviser and client.  
The best interests obligation as imposed by s 961B of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) 
requires that: 
 
1. The provider must act in the best interests of the client in relation to the advice.  
2. The provider satisfies the duty in subsection (1), if the provider proves that the 
provider has done each of the following:  
a. identified the objectives, financial situation and needs of the client that were 
disclosed to the provider by the client through instructions;  
b. identified:  
i. the subject matter of the advice that has been sought by the client 
(whether explicitly or implicitly); and  
                                                
33  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ‘2009 Inquiry’, above n 5, 87. 
34  Ibid 115. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid 70. 
37  Ibid 110. 
38  Ibid 127. 
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ii. the objectives, financial situation and needs of the client that would 
reasonably be considered as relevant to advice sought on that subject 
matter (the client's relevant circumstances);  
c. where it was reasonably apparent that information relating to the client's 
relevant circumstances was incomplete or inaccurate, made reasonable 
inquiries to obtain complete and accurate information; 
d. assessed whether the provider has the expertise required to provide the client 
advice on the subject matter sought and, if not, declined to provide the advice;  
e. if, in considering the subject matter of the advice sought, it would be 
reasonable to consider recommending a financial product:  
i. conducted a reasonable investigation into the financial products that might 
achieve those of the objectives and meet those of the needs of the client 
that would reasonably be considered as relevant to advice on that subject 
matter; and  
ii. assessed the information gathered in the investigation;  
f. based all judgements in advising the client on the client's relevant 
circumstances; 
g. taken any other step that, at the time the advice is provided, would reasonably 
be regarded as being in the best interests of the client, given the client's 
relevant circumstances.  
 
In terms of the requirement to manage conflicts of interest, s 961J of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) requires that: 
 
1. If the provider knows, or reasonably ought to know, that there is a conflict between 
the interests of the client and the interests of:  
a. the provider; or  
b. an associate of the provider; or  
c. a financial services licensee of whom the provider is a representative; or  
d. an associate of a financial services licensee of whom the provider is a 
representative; or  
e. an authorised representative who has authorised the provider, under subsection 
916B(3), to provide a specified financial service or financial services on behalf 
of a financial services licensee; or  
f. an associate of an authorised representative who has authorised the provider, 
under subsection 916B(3), to provide a specified financial service or financial 
services on behalf of a financial services licensee;  
g. the provider must give priority to the client's interests when giving the advice.  
 
Interestingly, notwithstanding that the best interests obligation is something lesser than the 
statutory fiduciary duty called for by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services the second referral of the Bills to the Committee did not result in 
any amendment to the sections.39 The question of whether the statutory best interests 
obligation displaces any obligation that the financial adviser may be found to have if they 
are found to be in a fiduciary relationship with the client will remain an issue to be decided 
by the court. In that respect there is no statutory provision which details how the statutory 
                                                
39  See Recommendations 4.66 and 467 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services Corporations, ‘2012 Inquiry’, above n 68 Recommendation 4.66: ‘The committee considers that 
the introduction of a statutory best interests duty for financial advisers to act in the best interests of their 
clients is a vital reform for the financial advice industry. This duty will help increase the professionalism 
of the industry and provide additional protection for consumers’. Recommendation 4.67: ‘The committee 
believes that the formulation of the best interests obligation in the Bill strikes an adequate balance between 
providing certainty for the industry while ensuring professional standards are raised’. 
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obligation interacts with other laws.40 So do these changes really mean a brave new world 
for financial advisers?  
IV. THE FINANCIAL ADVISER AS FIDUCIARY: A BRAVE NEW WORLD? 
Professor Finn has noted that the fiduciary principle: 
… has been used, and is demonstrably used, to maintain the integrity, credibility and utility 
of relationships perceived to be of importance in a society. And it is used to protect 
interests, both personal and economic, which a society is perceived to deem valuable. … as 
perceptions of social interests and values change so also can the ambience of the fiduciary 
principle itself.41 
He suggests then that: 
It originates, self-evidently, in public policy: in a view of desired social behaviour for the 
end this achieves. To maintain the integrity and utility of those relationships in which the 
(or a) role of one party is perceived to be the service of the interests of the other, it insists 
upon a fine loyalty in that service.42 
There is much that is positive to be drawn from such statements in the context recognising 
the worth of financial advisers in our contemporary society. The fall of such financial 
advisers as Storm Financial and Opes Prime has demonstrated that there is a social and 
economic need to maintain the integrity and utility of financial advisers and the advice that 
they can provide. Underlying this then is the perception that there is a ‘way’ that financial 
advisers should act and interact with society and clients and that ‘way’ needs to be 
reflected in the law as an expression of that public policy aim. As Professor Finn argued 
above, the finding that a fiduciary relationship exists is one way by which this perception 
and social expectation can be incorporated into the legal (common law or statutory) 
regulation of the relationship to facilitate a change in behaviour. Whilst this recognition of 
the financial adviser is positive, there are perils associated with being regarded as a 
fiduciary. In the end, the imposition of a statutory fiduciary duty upon financial advisors 
may not be the issue. Undoubtedly, there is already scope (legal43 and professional44) to 
accept that the financial adviser/client relationship is fiduciary in nature. So the imposition 
of the statutory duty should not be the starting point of the ‘brave new world’. What will 
be the brave new world is whether the industry has the capacity to both structurally and 
organisationally ensure that the demands of the fiduciary duty have been met.  
V CONCLUSION 
Following the financial adviser collapses of Storm Financial and Opes Prime the role and 
function of financial advisers was brought into the public and political domain for 
examination. Once in the political domain the impetus for change gained momentum and 
the report produced by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services recommended that a statutory fiduciary duty of care be confirmed as existing 
between financial adviser/client. Arguably this was a reflection of societal influences and 
the importance and worth of financial advisers to society. The law is a reflection of societal 
                                                
40  As for example, s 185 of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) does with respect to Director’s Duties. Section 
961M(8) of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) provides that the civil remedies available where there has 
been a breach ‘do not affect any liability that a person has under any other law’. 
41  Finn, above n 9, 26. 
42  Ibid 27. 
43  See for example, Mathas v Slater; Donnybrook Properties Pty Ltd v Simpson [2009] NSWSC 1397; Evans 
& Ors v Brannelly & Ors [2008] QDC 269. 
44  Battaglia, above n 21, 485. See also the rewritten/updated Code of Ethics and other professional practice 
standards of the Financial Planning Association of Australia; Financial Planning Association of Australia, 
The Pillars of Our Profession: Code of Professional Practise (July 2011) 
<http://www.fpa.asn.au/media/FPA/FPA Standards/CodeofPractice_July 2011.pdf>. 
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influences and expectations and has been willing, given certain circumstances, to accept 
already that there is capacity for the financial adviser/client relationship to be fiduciary in 
nature. The statutory amendment to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) should then not 
represent a brave new world but just a step in the direction of recognising societal 
expectations of the financial adviser. What will be a brave new world is how the industry, 
given its historical development, will restructure to demonstrate that the client’s interests 
have been put first and any conflicts of interest have been appropriately managed. 
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ADOPTION IN VANUATU 
SOFIA SHAH* 
Vanuatu is known for its pluralistic society where there are more than one form of law 
governing the land and people, statutes and customary law.1 This area of research is very 
extensive and as this is ongoing research I will narrow down this paper to focus on the 
statutory approach to inter-country adoption in Vanuatu and then discuss the customary 
approaches to adoption.  
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGARD TO ADOPTION 
Internationally there has been a lot of recognition given to the rights of the child regarding 
adoption. This is evident through the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (‘The Hague Convention I’),2 the United 
Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and 
Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally 
and Internationally3 (‘UN Declaration 1986’) and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child4 (‘CRC’).  
Most of the provisions from these international conventions, which are for the welfare 
and good of the children, have been suggested to the regional countries. The regional 
countries need to incorporate these laws into their domestic legislation, if they are 
signatories to the conventions.  
According to the Hague Convention I, the child who is to be adopted has to be less than 
18 years of age and unmarried. However, Hague Convention I can only be invoked if the 
state where the adoption is taking place is a signatory to this Convention.5  
Under Article 6 of the Hague Convention I, an adoption will be granted if it is deemed 
to be in the interest of the child. The court under this Convention has to make an inquiry in 
regard to the adopters, the child and his or her family. Whether adoption is an international 
or domestic matter, Article 21 of the CRC specifically states that states have an obligation 
to ensure the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration in matters of 
adoption. So in adoption cases, states need to comply with the law and proper procedures. 
According to Hague Convention I, the application for intercountry adoption should be 
made to the central authority in the state of their habitual residence which is then referred 
to the central authority of the child’s country. The receiving state then decides if the 
adopter is eligible or not for the adoption after the background check is finalised according 
to Article 17 whereby consent of the parents is an important aspect.6 Therefore, states must 
ensure that their domestic legislation protects the child, that proper procedures are in place, 
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1 David Weibrot, ‘Custom, Pluralism, and Realism in Vanuatu: Legal Development and the Role of 
Customary Law’ (1989) 13(1) Pacific Studies 65 
<https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/PacificStudies/article/viewFile/9578/9227>.  
2 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption, opened for 
signature 29 May 1993, 85 UNTS 89 (entered into force 1 May 1995) (‘The Hague Convention I’). 
3 United Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of 
Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, 
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that parents must give their consent, and that adoption procedures do not facilitate the sale 
of children. 
The CRC endorses intercountry adoption where a child cannot be placed in foster care 
or an adoptive family cannot be found in the child’s country of origin as per Article 21. 
Article 3 of the CRC is very explicit in that in regard to all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, administrative 
authorities, courts of law or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be the 
primary consideration.7 The Hague Convention I seeks to ensure that where intercountry 
adoption takes place it does so in the best interest of the child and that children are 
protected from abduction, sale or trafficking.  
Adoptive parents come from New Zealand and Australia in some circumstances. These 
countries are signatories to these conventions. However, the Pacific Island countries have 
limited international obligations in respect of intercountry adoption procedures as per 
Articles, 4, 14 and 22 and the role of central authorities and the regulation and control of 
agencies involved in the adoption process as per Articles 6 to 13.8 In Vanuatu the adoption 
provisions are found in the Adoption Act 1958 (UK). The Adoption Act 1958 (UK) is 
applicable in Vanuatu by virtue of Article 95 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Vanuatu.9 
Intercountry adoptions’ aim has been to assist childless couples and at the same time 
provide for the many orphans and children who need a home around the world.10 Usually 
when couples adopt a child they prefer that the child grows up to know them as being the 
child’s biological parents.11 Intercountry adoptions have been on the rise as shown by the 
following statistics. Australia reported a total of seven adopted children from Fiji and 
Tonga between 2001 and 200412 while New Zealand reported 557 children being adopted 
between 2001 and 2003 from six South Pacific countries namely Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.13 In 2011 the number of children being adopted has 
been 384 for Australia out of which 62 per cent were intercountry adoptions14 and 199 
children15 were adopted by families in New Zealand. The United States of America reports 
to have over 5 000 adoptions for 2011.16  
II. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
It is good to see that international efforts are being made to find homes for these homeless 
children but at the same time one has to bear in mind the growing number of offences 
                                                
7  CRC art 3 
8  UN Declaration 1986. 
9  Article 95 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu: Existing Law 
(1) Until otherwise provided by parliament, all joint regulations and subsidiary legislation made 
thereunder in force immediately before the Day of Independence shall continue in operation on and after 
that day as if they had been made in pursuance of the Constitution and shall be construed with such 
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10  Olowu, above n 5, 111 at [1]. 
11  bid 111 at [1]. 
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against children such as child trafficking, sexual abuse, adoptee’s loss of identity, denial of 
access to historical records, and violence against children.17 Also according to Troy, 
intercountry adoption has its advantages but also has its share of problems such as child 
trafficking.18 
According to academic Sue Farran, adoption of Pacific Island children by non-Pacific 
Islanders gives rise to a few issues.19 These children lose the connections with their 
language, culture and their Pacific identity. Loss of identity of a child has also been 
addressed by Article 8 CRC whereby the obligation is upon the state party to respect the 
right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family 
relations as recognised by the law without any unlawful interferences. In cases where the 
child is deprived of some or all elements of their identity, the state shall provide 
appropriate assistance and protection to re-establish the child’s identity.20 State parties 
need to take note of this and apply it in protecting the child from identity loss in adoption 
proceedings. There is also the danger that the increasing demand for infants available for 
adoption could lead to abuse of process. There have been outcries from time to time that 
the children are virtually been sold into the adoption market. Sometimes non-indigenous 
residents of Pacific Island states choose to adopt Pacific Island children while living in the 
Pacific region.21 The mother or both parents of the child may be known to the adoptive 
parents. While the adopted child will have the advantage of being brought up within his or 
her island country, some problems may be experienced as a result of being raised by 
parents of a different ethnic or racial group.22 It is also possible that ultimately these 
‘expatriate’ adoptive parents will return to their own country or move to other countries, 
taking the child with them and thereby severing links with the child’s country of origin.23  
In some cases it may be just a single parent who applies for adoption.24 Miller views 
single parent adoptions positively since they come with more flexibility.25 This theory has 
been supported by Strauss.26 This trend is also growing in the Pacific, where couples after 
divorce or while still single tend to adopt children and look after them.  
However, issues with the citizenship of child and adoptive parents can arise in some 
cases.  
In the case of In re Chelsea Lee,27 the adoptive parents were Australian. Although they 
had been residents of Vanuatu for some time, they appeared to have no intention of 
renouncing their Australian citizenship.28 Thus the statutory requirement for domicile 
according to the Section 1 of Adoption Act 1958 (UK) had not been satisfied. However, 
while citizenship was not a pre-requisite for granting the adoption order, there was a pre-
requisite for proof of continued domicile in Vanuatu.29 The court went on to satisfy itself 
that the adoption was in the best interest of the child.  
The court according to the law must always be concerned about the welfare of the child, 
particularly where the effect of an adoption order will see the child removed from her 
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country of origin, natural parents and wider natural family.30 In the case of The Child M 
Adoption case,31 Justice Spears has dealt with this issue in detail.  
III. CUSTOMARY ADOPTION IN THE COURTS 
Customary adoption is widespread in the region both historically and at present day. The 
customs vary and the extent of its recognition by statute also varies. One of the problems 
with customary adoption is not only that the customs that apply may vary within the 
jurisdiction,32 but also that often customary adoption takes place in different ways and it 
might be different from island to island like in Vanuatu.33 Therefore, there are no codified 
customary laws available to consider what the practice or procedure for a customary 
adoption should be. The proof of these customs is another challenge to prove if adoption 
was really made.  
The role of the near family in approving the adoption and accepting it becomes 
important especially when the adopted person claims rights to succession.34 The reason for 
seeking an annulment of the adoption will often be material, for example because issues of 
succession to property are raised or because the adopted child has become a burden. In 
Vanuatu in the case of M v P Re the Child G,35 the mother of the child claimed that she had 
given the child to a relative to care for only because she had ten other children to care for. 
She maintained some limited contact with the child through visits but made little material 
provision for him.36 The question arose whether the child had been adopted in custom. The 
petitioner’s claim was that ‘in Erakor custom if you give a name to a child then the child 
belongs to you’.37 She had kept some contact with the child usually by visiting the child 
but had not made much material provision for the child.38 The issue was whether the child 
had been adopted under customary laws. The petitioner maintained her claim that under 
custom if the child has been given a name by the biological parents then the child belongs 
to them. The permission of the chief might be sought and a feast may be given but this was 
not necessarily the case.39 The judge was persuaded that the child had been adopted in 
accordance with local custom despite the fact that the child was not a Ni-Vanuatu. The 
court noted that the arrangement of the mother to place the child with the adoptive family 
was more than a temporary arrangement.40  
However in custom there is no such restriction as in statutory law as to who may adopt 
the child. If procedures are followed in custom then anyone whether resident or foreigner 
may adopt a child and vice versa. Both these cases are from Vanuatu but the adoption 
procedures according to custom in both are different. Similarly, the child has no say in the 
custom proceedings as the legal proceedings. The child is never asked anything in relation 
to being given up for adoption. The decision of the elders and family members overrides 
the opinion of the child.41 
                                                
30  The Child M Adoption case [2011] VUSC 16, <http://www.paclii.org>. 
31  Ibid 3 at [14].  
32  M v P Re the Child G [1980-1984] Van LR 333, 4 at [4]. 
33  Tebahai v Habnai [1986] VUSC 9, 5 at [7]. Both these cases are from Vanuatu but the adoption 
procedures according to custom in both are different.  
34  [1986] VUSC 9, 2 at [1].  
35  [1988] VUSC 2, 2 at[2]. 
36  Ibid 2 at [4]. 
37  Ibid 4 at [3]. 
38  Ibid 2 at [5]. 
39  Ibid 3 at [4]. 
40  Ibid 2 at [5].  
41  Olowu, above n 5, 120 at [2]. 
 
 ADOPTION IN VANUATU 
                   71 
IV. STATUTORY ADOPTION IN VANUATU 
In Vanuatu according to the decision of Justice Spears, the judges can make an adoption 
order under the Act by exercising their discretion as per s 1 of the Adoption Act 1958 
(UK).42  
According to Justice Spears: 
The law and practice relating to intercountry adoption has undergone great change 
internationally in the recent years. In particular, the 1993 Hague Convention (Convention 
for the protection of Children and Cooperation in respect to Intercountry Adoptions) came 
about to meet a growing post-World war II demand for intercountry adoption. 
Furthermore, it was recognised that there was a corresponding need for clear guidelines to 
apply to intercountry adoptions particular to safeguard the child.43  
Vanuatu is not a signatory to the Hague Convention I. However, this Convention gives 
effect to article 21 of the CRC and Vanuatu is a signatory to CRC. 
The principles embedded in Article 21 of the CRC are those that deal with adoptions 
and intercountry adoptions. According to the judgement of Justice Spears, this requires 
paramount consideration to be given to the rights of the child in question. For this the court 
has outlined the needs to consider the following factors: 
 
a. first considering national solutions- that is, the placement for adoption in the 
country of origin; 
b. ensuring that the child is ‘adoptable’ 
c. Ensuring that the information about the child and his/her parents is preserved; 
d. Ensuring that the prospective adoptive parents are evaluated thoroughly by and 
independent, responsible and competent government agency in their country; 
e. Ensuring that the match of adoptive parents and child is suitable; 
f. Imposing additional safeguards where required; 
g. Ensuring that the placement in the foreign country will be monitored and generally 
supervised by a responsible and appropriate arm of that foreign country.44 
 
Therefore the developed international approach to intercountry adoptions requires that the 
two countries -that of the adoptive parents and the adoptee child- work together by sharing 
responsibilities so that the best interest of the child can be ensured.  
In this case there was no guarantee that any responsible and suitable government body 
would take up any responsibility to assess the prospective adoptive parents and further 
ongoing supervision and monitoring of the adoption. Therefore an invitation was extended 
to the Attorney General to intervene so that proper consideration could be given to the 
implications and international responsibilities arising out of the proposed adoption.45  
The government should confer with the relevant UN agencies, the civil society and 
experts in the field of child rights so that they can provide appropriate specialised and 
technical training for professionals such as judges, magistrates, state counsels, police 
officers, immigration officials, customs officials, social welfare workers and all other 
individuals and community, who are involved in the daily administration of child adoption 
laws or child adoption processes.46 The training should be across disciplines and the 
communities should be involved in creating such awareness about child adoption and child 
rights. The Vanuatu government has to come up with clear policies and guidelines which 
actually consider the ‘best interests of the child in relation to intercountry adoptions’. 
                                                
42  The Child M Adoption case [2011] VUSC 16 <http://www.paclii.org>. 
43  Ibid 3 at [8]. 
44  Ibid 7 at [14]. 
45  Ibid, 8 at [20]. 
46  Olowu, above n 5,144 at [4]. 
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A. Conflict of Laws 
Conflict of laws is often seen as a hindrance when determining which country’s laws 
should apply on deciding issues of child adoption. The American states have taken a step 
forward and adopted the Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the 
Adoption of Minors (1985). Article 4 clearly states: 
The law of the domicile of the adopter (or adoptee) shall govern: 
a) the capacity to be an adopter; 
b) the age and marital status requirement to be met by an adopter; 
c) the consent of an adopter’s spouse, if required, and  
d) the other requirements for being an adopter47 
It has to be noted that if the requirements of the law of the adopter (or adopters) are less 
strict than those of the law of the adoptee’s country, then the law of the adoptee’s country 
shall govern the adoption.48 This is a very interesting aspect as the adoptions in Vanuatu 
are governed by the laws of Vanuatu when in most of the cases the adopter or adopters are 
from another country. This is an indication to Vanuatu on the steps it can take to ensure 
that the adopter or adopters meet the requirements of adoption in their own country before 
adopting a child from Vanuatu. Of course, if Vanuatu’s laws regarding adoption are stricter 
than those of the law of the adopter’s country then they would apply. 
B. Requirements regarding Consent 
Another important factor is the consent of the biological parents to give the their child up 
for adoption. This is also provided for under sections 4, 5 and 6 of Adoption Act 1958 (UK) 
and given prominence in court. However, there is no provision that actually seeks the 
consent of the child who is brought up for adoption. In many cases it is an infant but in 
other cases where the child is old enough to reason there are no provisions to take the 
child’s views into consideration before making the court orders.49 There are no 
participatory rights of adoptee children in the adoption proceedings which need to be 
addressed by the countries involved. 
V. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO CUSTOMARY ADOPTION ON VANUATU 
Now we move on to consider the customary approaches regarding adoption in the islands 
of Vanuatu. Information on customary approaches to adoption in Vanuatu was gathered in 
an interview with Mr Stevie Namali, the National Customary Lands Officer of the 
Malvatumauri, National Council of Chiefs, Vanuatu.50  
In 1993 there was an attempt made by the Vanuatu National Council of Chiefs (VNCC) 
to codify customary laws of the country however, no reference was made to the adoption 
of children.51 The flexible, variable and adaptable nature of the customary laws also makes 
it difficult to integrate the doctrine of 'best interests of the child’ into the customary 
practices of child adoption.52 Also it becomes difficult to identify the rights of the adopted 
child in relation to inheritance, property and marriage due to the uncertainty and unwritten 
nature of customary laws.53 Moreover customary law does not cater for intercountry 
                                                
47  Article 4 of Inter –American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of Minors (1985) 
24(2) International Legal Materials 460. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Olowu, above n 5, 121 at [3]. 
50  Interview with Stevie Namali, National Customary Lands Officer of the Malvatumauri, National Council 
of Chiefs, Vanuatu (National Council of Chiefs Office, Port Vila, 10 May 2012). 
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52  Olowu, above n 5, 141 at [1]. 
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adoptions. According to the National Council of Chiefs, intercountry adoption is for the 
courts to deal with while domestic adoptions can take place under customary laws of the 
land.54  
A. Reasons for Customary Adoptions 
One of the reasons why customary adoption may be resorted to in families is where the 
couple has no sons. In this case the couple may adopt a son from the husband’s sister and 
the child would come and take over the rank of the adoptive father.55 Another reason is 
when there is a lot of tribal warfare and the tribe is nearly wiped out. In this case the 
village would adopt a son who could come and start breeding and put a stop to the fight.56 
In many cases two tribes may exchange a child to put a stop to the warfare and 
bloodshed.57 These children are regarded as replacement and both tribes would bring them 
up as their own child.58 This increases friendship and good-will amongst the tribes. These 
sacred adoption ceremonies are supervised by the chiefs and later on the chief and the 
family also supervise how the child is being kept and treated by the adopted parents.59 
However it is important to note that in all cases the parents need to give consent for the 
child to be adopted. According to Mr Stevie Namali, in situations where there is an 
unwanted pregnancy, the mother has no choice but to give up her baby for adoption. So 
family members who want a child would talk to her and under custom adopt the child as 
theirs. Once the child is adopted the biological parents have no right over the child. 
Similarly, where a couple has a lot of children it may become difficult for them to provide 
for all of them and may give up a child for adoption but this may be problematic in some 
cases as was in the case of M v P Re the child G.60 As considered by the Honorable Patrick 
E Mc Gann, some of the reasons why a child is given up for adoption are: parents who 
cannot afford another child giving them up for adoption, a woman in a relationship gets 
pregnant and her partner walks away gives the child up for adoption, or in some cases the 
victims of rape choose to give the child up for adoption.61 However, in all these cases the 
parent of the child gives their consent before the adoption process is finalised.62 
B. Different Customary Rules for Adoption in Vanuatu 
There are various islands in Vanuatu and they have different customary rules for the 
adoption of a child. I will briefly look at these different islands customary approaches to 
adoption. 
On Malekula or Malampa Island the prospective parents have to make payments in 
custom to the biological parents of the child and perform the customary ceremony.63 A 
child in Malekula can be adopted from the age of one month old till six months old.64 This 
adoption has to be registered with the Council of Chiefs as a form of record which will 
later become useful when sorting out succession rights of the adopted child. This 
customary process of adoption in Malekula is supervised by the chief.65 For the adoption to 
take place, both biological parents need to give their consent.66 Once the child has been 
                                                
54  Interview with Stevie Namali, above n 50. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ibid. 
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59  Ibid. 
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adopted, the biological parents do not have any further rights to that child under custom 
and vice versa, the adopted child has no rights to the biological parents neither in custom 
and nor in property.67 Also, once the child has been adopted, the biological parents cannot 
take their child back from the adoptive parents.68 
Even though the customary adoption is being practised and recognised, the adopted 
child has to be legally registered to get the legal recognition. This is to ensure the rights of 
the child are safeguarded and the chiefs are made aware of this process.69  
VI. ADVANTAGES OF CUSTOMARY ADOPTION 
The advantages of customary adoption are that it gives adoptive parents a child if they 
cannot bear children. It strengthens the links and relationships between the biological and 
adoptive families. There are fewer burdens on the biological parents if they have many 
children to care for. The advantage of this customary practice of adoption is that it is less 
expensive for the parties. It is done within the family tribe and everyone gets involved so 
they know who has been adopted by whom. Also, as it is performed in custom, there are 
not many documents or paperwork required and it can be done anytime, unlike in the 
courts where a date has to be given specifically.  
The advantages of customary adoption in Santo are that a lot of love is expressed in 
such arrangements and the children do not feel neglected. Also very little or no costs are 
involved. It decreases separation or divorce rates especially where couples have a role to 
provide care for the children. Also, on the other islands, due to custom there is a lot of 
respect amongst the families and they would not mistreat the child as everyone will see the 
adoptive parents as the natural parents.  
If in any case the child is mistreated there is a hefty fine imposed on the family by the 
chiefs. The adoptive parents may seek to reconcile by bringing mats, food, kava or even 
cash, however the child is never sent back to the adoptive parents who abused the child. 
Customary adoption maintains and builds the relationship amongst the people and 
decreases differences between families as all the children are taken care of in the same 
way. It is a symbol of a living covenant within families and villages.  
VII. DISADVANTAGES OF CUSTOMARY ADOPTION 
The disadvantages of the customary practice are that the child may still live too close to the 
biological parents. Also the adoption has to be registered at the court rather than the 
customary ceremony, so people have to travel all the way to have their customary adoption 
registered, which of course involves expenses for the families.  
The formal and legal adoption procedures to give it legal recognition involves costs and 
time and heartache for the people as they might feel that their well recognised customs 
need a further step under the legal system. It is interesting to note that the Constitution of 
Vanuatu recognises customs but yet there are these legal procedures and requirements to 
give them formal recognition.  
Another disadvantage is that custom is unwritten in many places and the procedures 
may vary. The younger generations do not know the customary practices, so teaching these 
practices to the children of today is very important for the people of Vanuatu. 
The customary way of adoption is a more peaceful, cost effective process which 
involves trust and harmony. The disadvantage is that there may be chances of the child 
being mistreated by the adoptive parents.  
Finally, if the adoptive parents have other children of their own it may cause ill feelings 
and hatred and jealousy amongst the children when they are fully grown up and may not be 
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equally treated. It may also create family conflicts, especially if both parents depend on the 
child when the child grows up.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it can be seen that both forms of adoption, statutory and customary, give 
some form of recognition to the rights and welfare of the child. They have, however, 
different ways to attain this. For foreign adoptive parents the child has to be adopted 
through the formal statutory procedures as biological parents may not be able to supervise 
how their child is being treated in another country. It is one area where the government 
needs to expand and invest resources especially during these times when child trade has 
become a money making business. Adoption under customary law seems a lot safer as the 
child stays and is cared for within the bigger family and within the jurisdiction which is 
witnessed by all. In intercountry adoption, on the other hand, the adoptive parents take the 
child away to another country. Supervision of the treatment and care given to the child is 
currently impossible as this requires both countries to work together under the UN 
Conventions to put supervisory structures in place and if a country is not a signatory then 
enforcement is useless.  
There is a need for Vanuatu to put in place effective legal and procedural frameworks 
regarding child adoption within the region. For Vanuatu to become compliant with all the 
requirements under the international conventions regarding intercountry child adoption, 
would demand a massive awareness program, legislation and policy reforms as well as 
technical assistance from the international community and involvement of the grass root 
people. It is imperative that courts inquire into matters of consent being obtained from 
biological parents as well as where appropriate to keep the child involved and properly 
represented at these adoption proceedings. It is essential for the Pacific Island nations to 
ratify the Hague Conventions I and II. However, if these countries do not have the means 
to put in place the necessary structures to make these operative, it would be of no use.  
In the meantime it would be helpful to protect the interests of the child and to comply 
with the UN conventions by requiring that the country of the adopter play a major role in 
monitoring that the child is given all its rights and the convention has been complied with. 
This would mean that the family courts, welfare agencies, and immigration authorities of 
the adopter’s country such as Australia, New Zealand or the United States, work very 
closely and comprehensively with the Pacific Island communities such as Vanuatu to 
ensure that the best interests of the child is adhered with in the adopter’s jurisdiction.70 
This would also enable the adopter’s jurisdiction to monitor the child’s welfare and report 
it to the relevant authorities in the adoptee child’s jurisdiction. Courts also have a duty to 
oversee that intercountry as well as customary adoption of children adhere to the best 
interest of the child and enforce it in Vanuatu. 
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